The Sadrist Movement has recently increased its activities throughout Iraq, hinting at a possible return to the country's political landscape. This development follows the movement's vow to boycott the political process in July 2022.
Multiple Indicators
Several recent indicators point to the Sadrist Movement's re-engagement in Iraqi political life, including the following:
1. Changing the name of the Sadrist Movement:
In mid-April 2024, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the change of the Sadrist Movement's name to the "National Shi'ite Movement." The new name has been consistently used since then, including when signing documents. While the name change does not necessarily imply an explicit return to political life by al-Sadr, it carries primarily electoral connotations. Al-Sadr aims to target the "Shi'ite Coordination Framework in Iraq" to achieve two main objectives. On one hand, the Sadrist Movement seeks to present itself as an alternative political force to the Coordination Framework, breaking its monopoly on representing Shi'ite interests in Iraq. The movement aims to connect with new segments within the Shia community, particularly those who are not necessarily supporters of the Coordination Framework and can be described as the "silent majority."
On the other hand, the inclusion of the term "National" in the new name underscores the Sadrist Movement's openness to all political forces in Iraqi society, regardless of sectarian affiliation. This aligns with the movement's general call for forming a national government without regard to sectarian quotas. Al-Sadr has repeatedly expressed his desire to form a technocratic national government, especially after his movement's majority win in the 2021 elections.
The new name is likely to be used for mobilization and electoral campaigning purposes but not for actual participation in the elections. Article 5 of the Iraqi Party Law prohibits using sectarian names for political parties or movements.
2. Leadership changes:
In a signed document, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the removal of a prominent figure from the Sadrist Movement's leadership due to non-compliance with work ethics. This announcement can be understood within the broader context of the movement's preparation for the upcoming elections. Al-Sadr is seeking to reorganize the movement internally to prepare for the next elections. Al-Sadr has likely made a number of internal arrangements, such as dismissing or replacing prominent figures or changing their positions within the movement. This becomes increasingly important for al-Sadr, especially in light of the recurring divisions among members of the Sadrist Movement. These divisions have emerged particularly following al-Sadr's decision to withdraw from political life and the parliament. Al-Sadr fears the potential loss of the movement's influence and popular base, affecting its effectiveness as a united political and electoral bloc.
3. Al-Sadr's meeting with Al-Sistani:
In a significant move, Muqtada al-Sadr paid a visit to Iraq's top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, in March 2024. Al-Sistani has refrained from meeting Iraqi politicians for nearly a decade. While the nature of the meeting and the reasons behind al-Sadr's visit were not officially disclosed, it was widely interpreted as al-Sadr seeking the grand ayatollah's approval for his return to political life. This interpretation was further reinforced by subsequent meetings held by Sadrist Movement officials with civil society figures and parliamentarians, all centered on preparations for a political comeback.
Multiple Motives
The recent activities of the Sadrist Movement, indicating a potential return to Iraqi political life, are driven by a number of factors, the most important of which can be summarized as follows:
1. Exploiting differences:
Muqtada al-Sadr seeks to capitalize on the disagreements and tensions among some Coordination Framework forces to position himself as a "Shi'ite" and "national" alternative capable of leading the country in the next phase. The recent local elections in Iraq revealed the extent of the disagreements among members of the Coordination Framework. The framework forces were unable to agree on running in the elections on a single list, which led to them running individually. This resulted in losing important electoral districts such as Basra, Karbala, and Wasit. Al-Sadr believes that if these disagreements among the members of the Coordination Framework continue and worsen, his chances of winning a majority similar to the one he achieved in the 2021 elections will increase significantly. Al-Sadr's current efforts in the parliament to amend the electoral law may be a way to deepen the rift within the Coordination Framework. A number of Iraqi political forces, including members of the Coordination Framework in the Iraqi parliament, are seeking to amend the electoral law to include the adoption of multiple electoral districts or to maintain the single district system according to the "Sainte-Lagüe" system and to change the electoral divisor formula from 1.7 to 1.9.
The current push to amend the electoral law is considered problematic for the Coordination Framework and beneficial for the Sadrist Movement for several reasons. The law was already amended in 2023 to adopt the single-district system using the "Sainte-Lagüe" method, replacing the multiple-district system used in the 2021 elections. Amending the law again in such a short period would suggest that the law is being modified based on the partisan interests of the dominant forces in parliament (the Coordination Framework). This aligns with the Sadrist narrative that accuses the Coordination Framework forces of acting in their own personal interests.
Second, the multi-constituency system is beneficial for political currents with concentrated political weight within specific geographical areas. This reveals the differences within the coordination framework. The single-constituency system, which treats the entire governorate as a single electoral district, was previously favored by the forces of the coordination framework since the framework runs on a single list in each governorate. However, after internal disagreements, some political factions, including the State of Law Coalition headed by Nuri al-Maliki, believe that returning to the multi-constituency system is better. This is given the fragility of the framework alliance and the uncertainty surrounding the future of joint candidacy, especially in light of the framework's negative experience in the local elections.
Therefore, alliances like the State of Law Coalition and the Hikma Movement headed by Ammar al-Hakim - for example - may find it beneficial to run individually in multiple constituencies in areas where they have political clout. This will ensure their representation. However, some of the less popular and geographically less represented forces of the Coordination Framework do not favor this approach and seek to run jointly. This is because running on a single list with the other forces of the Coordination Framework will guarantee them representation in parliament, which may not be achieved under the multi-constituency system.
In this context, some estimates suggest that al-Maliki communicated with al-Sadr (through intermediaries) in March 2024 to convince him to return to political life. He also presented proposals for amendments to the election law to al-Sadr, which are largely in line with the latter's aspirations. Some sources also indicate that al-Maliki intends to reach an understanding with al-Sadr on the upcoming elections that may include some form of political cooperation between the two currents. In this context, al-Sadr may take advantage of al-Maliki's initiative to push his vision for amendments to the election law, which could deepen the rift within the Coordination Framework.
2. Exploiting the rift between al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework:
Since the formation of Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani's government in Iraq in October 2022, there have been signs of a crisis between him and the Coordination Framework forces, especially on government positions. This became more apparent in the case of the appointment of the head of the National Intelligence Service, which the factions wanted to control, but al-Sudani decided to retain the presidency of the service for himself. The differences between al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework forces continued, and perhaps the most important of these is the difference in vision between the two sides regarding relations with the United States, specifically the American military presence in Iraq.
However, the current rift between al-Sudani and some of the Coordination Framework forces is primarily of an electoral nature. Some of the Coordination Framework leaders, headed by Nuri al-Maliki, fear the growing popularity of the current Prime Minister. Estimates indicate that al-Sudani could win around 60 seats based on his numbers in the local elections. This is supported by a poll conducted by Gallup, which indicated that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani received a strong approval rating of 69% among Iraqis in 2023, the highest percentage recorded by Gallup for any Iraqi leader since it began measuring the Iraqi Opinion Index towards political leadership in 2012. The poll indicated that Iraqis under the age of 30 - who were the driving force behind the mass protests that began in 2019 - have a remarkable approval rating of al-Sudani at 68%. The majority of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan (55%) also approve of al-Sudani's performance (compared to 71% in the rest of Iraq).
Al-Sudani's high level of popular support, his independent streak from the Coordination Framework's general line, his efforts to establish himself as a "statesman," and his good relations with regional countries make him a strong candidate in any upcoming elections. Therefore, the leaders of the Coordination Framework, headed by al-Maliki, may seek to neutralize al-Sudani in the coming period by adding an article to the election law prohibiting the Prime Minister or ministers from running in the elections.
This greatly serves the interests of the Sadrist movement. On the one hand, the rift between al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework reinforces the political fluidity witnessed in the Iraqi political arena by dismantling the old and cohesive alliances that have been in place since 2021. Therefore, the Sadrist movement will try to present itself as a solid, cohesive, and competitive movement, unlike the other political forces. On the other hand, al-Sudani's distancing from the Coordination Framework provides a greater opportunity for the Sadrist movement to maneuver. Al-Sadr may seek to get closer to al-Sudani and try to reach an understanding that could lead to the formation of a parliamentary alliance after the elections, as al-Sudani shares with al-Sadr a number of general political principles. These include the importance of state neutrality and placing the national interest of the state above all other considerations.
3. Exploiting Iran's internal preoccupation:
In general, Iran has acted as a regulator for armed factions and their political extensions in Iraq, often intervening to draw the broad outlines for Shi'ite political forces in elections and the subsequent alliance formation phase. For example, in 2018, after sharp disagreements between Shi'ite forces over the nomination of a prime minister, former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani intervened to end the rift between the Shi'ite forces and map out a future course of action. In this context, al-Sadr is seeking to exploit Iran's current preoccupation following the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a plane crash while returning from a summit with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the inauguration of a dam in a border area between the two countries, on May 19, 2024, and Iran's preparations for presidential elections. This is in order to arrange his alliances in the coming period without Iranian interference in the Iraqi political scene.
All indications suggest that the Sadrist movement will soon return to the Iraqi political scene in the wake of the 2025 parliamentary elections. However, the Sadrist movement's chances of winning the parliamentary elections in Iraq are essentially linked to its ability to form strong alliances with various Iraqi political forces and present a real and effective alternative to the State Administration Alliance. This includes the Coordination Framework forces, the two main Kurdish parties, the Azm Coalition, and the Sovereignty Alliance, among others. The Sadrist movement's chances are also linked to its ability to attract the youth segment of Iraqi society, not only in the Shi'ite sect but also young people from different sects and ethnicities. This can be achieved through reaching an understanding with the Iraqi Prime Minister, civil currents and forces, and independent candidates in parliament.
