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Partial Agreement

Understanding why Washington accepted an informal agreement with Iran

23 يونيو، 2023


Officials from three unidentified countries, in statements to US newspaper "The Wall Street Journal" on June 14, 2023, said that the United States and Iran are quietly negotiating with the aim of reaching imminent agreements between them to mitigate the risks of Iran's nuclear program and release Americans prisoners, with the goal of reducing tensions and minimizing the risks of getting involved in military confrontation with Iran.

Terms of the Negotiations

Based on what has been published regarding the potential talks between the Iranian and American sides, several implications can be identified as follows:

1- Unofficial understandings:

Western and Israeli sources indicate that rounds of indirect talks between the US President Joe Biden's Senior Advisor for Middle East Affairs, Brett McGurk, and the Iranian Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, held in the Sultanate of Oman since May 2023, may lead to a limited, unwritten, and unofficial understanding. This is an attempt to avoid potential objections from the US Congress to any agreement reached by the Biden administration with Tehran, given the opposition of a large number Republican and Democratic lawmakers to signing an agreement with Iran, in addition to Iran's firm stance in the negotiations.

2- Implications of potential agreements:

Western reports indicate that the agreements between Washington and Tehran would require Iran to cease uranium enrichment beyond  60%, to expand its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), release American prisoners, urge its militias to halt attacks on US forces in Syria and Iraq, refrain from intercepting ships and vessels in the region's waters, as well as to end its support for Russia with weapons in its war against Ukraine.

In return, Washington would pledge to ease sanctions on Iran and refrain from seeking new punitive resolutions against Iran in the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, it promises to release frozen Iranian funds abroad, particularly in Iraq and South Korea. It appears that some terms of this agreement have already been implemented, as Iran announced on June 10, 2023, that Iraq released $3 billion of Iran's funds that were frozen due to US sanctions.

3- Oman confirms an understanding was reached:

On June 15, Omani Foreign Minister, Badr Al-Busaidi, confirmed that a  positive atmosphere prevails regarding the nuclear issue, as indirect talks were taking place between Iranians and Americans in Muscat. He indicated that the two sides are nearing the final touches on an agreement that would lead to the release of Americans detained in Tehran, pending some technical matters. He added that he believes the Iranian leadership is serious about reaching an agreement.

Multiple Implications

The resumption of indirect talks between Americans and Iranians, after a hiatus since September 2022, has several implications that can be highlighted as follows:

1- Positive signs from Iran:

It appears that Tehran is showing preparedness to reach a partial agreement with the United States regarding its nuclear program, although it  previously resisted such a move. Indicators of this include providing an explanation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the discovery of uranium traces at one of the three undisclosed sites. The explanation was deemed satisfactory by the international nuclear watchdog. Additionally, Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, expressed his approval of reaching an agreement with the West regarding Iran's nuclear program, while emphasizing that it should not harm the country's nuclear infrastructure. Furthermore, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi confirmed on June 17, 2023, that Iran does not seek to produce nuclear weapons because this contradicts the principles of the Islamic Republic and the recommendations of the supreme leader.

It is worth noting that achieving such an agreement would provide Iran with some economic benefits, particularly concerning the release of frozen Iranian funds. It would also imply an implicit acknowledgment of Iran's right to enrich uranium up to 60%.

2- US avoiding escalation:

It became evident that in dealing with Iran, the Biden administration has no options other than the diplomatic approach. This is evidenced by the Administration’s hesitant response to Iran's threats to navigation in the Arabian Gulf or even Tehran's attacks on US troops stationed in Syria.

Although US officials denied reports that reaching an agreement with Iran is imminent, as reiterated by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on June 16, 2023, their statements did not deny that there were ongoing talks with the Iranians. They did not even rule out the possibility of reaching an informal understanding that does not require Congressional approval.

The US took this position as a result of its inability to exert any serious pressure on Iran to compel it to return to the nuclear agreement, due to its engagement in the Ukrainian war. Additionally, Iran has imposed a new reality by increasing uranium enrichment levels, building new nuclear facilities, partially suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and demanding serious guarantees from Washington to prevent it from withdrawing from the nuclear deal again. This would require the approval of the nuclear agreement in the US Congress, a step former President Barack Obama was unable to accomplish, although his administration signed the nuclear agreement in 2015. Congress continues to oppose such an agreement to date. 

And as a result, it is in Washington's interest to freeze the current situation regarding Iran and reach agreements that serve certain American interests, such as stopping Iran’s attacks on US troops in Syria, as well as its support for Russia with suicide drones of the "Shahed" type.

3- The Israeli position remains ambiguous: 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on June 18, 2023, rejected any “mini-agreement” or understanding that may be reached between the United States and Iran regarding Iran's nuclear program. He emphasized that Israel is not bound by such a deal. Additionally, Israeli National Security Advisor, Tzachi Hanegbi, and Chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Yuli Edelstein, confirmed that a potential agreement between Washington and Tehran would not pose a significant threat to Israel, and that Israel can “live with it” as long as there is strict and genuine oversight of Iran's nuclear program.

Netanyahu's stance may indeed serve propaganda purposes, especially because his government is receiving a barrage of sharp criticism from the opposition in the Knesset, as he is making efforts to prevent the opposition from using this issue against him. This is supported by the fact that without US military support, Israel is still unable to carry out any attacks that would destroy Iran's nuclear program. In other words, without such support, Israeli threats lack credibility.

4- Gulf mediation underwary:

Iranian Foreign Minister, Hussein Amir Abdollahian, on June 20, 2023, began a Gulf tour during which he visited  Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait. The Iranian Foreign Ministry statement on his visit to Oman noted that Abdollahian carried an Iranian response to a message conveyed by Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said of Oman three weeks ago during his visit to Tehran.

In addition to that, Qatar and Muscat are possibly taking part in the process of repatriating a portion of Iran's frozen assets, as a result of any agreements that may be reached with the United States. This is further supported by the visit of the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Mohammad Reza Farzin, to Doha where he met with Qatari counterpart Bandar bin Mohammed Al Thani.

In retrospect, it can be said that proposing the option of a temporary or interim agreement with Iran in recent times has resulted from the accelerated pace of Iran's nuclear program and the United States’ inability to impose any serious threats against Iran that would compel it to de-escalate its nuclear activities. This is due to Washington's involvement in the Ukrainian war. Accordingly, any partial agreement, if reached, would serve the mutual interests of both parties. That is, it would ensure Iran's access to some of its frozen funds, while Washington would be able to mitigate Iran's regional risks and cast doubt on Russia's reliance on Iran if Tehran complies with Washington's demands to halt the supply of drones to Russia. However, on the other hand, such a partial agreement would make the prospects of reviving a comprehensive nuclear agreement unlikely in the foreseeable future.