According to the popular African proverb, 'When the elephants fight, it is the grass underneath that gets trampled,' the biggest loser in any war between prominent actors who possess weapons are the people who are put in harm's way. This proverb applies perfectly to Sudan, as on April 15, 2023, the Sudanese crisis took a violent turn, with warring parties resorting to weapons to control the situation in the capital Khartoum, shattering hopes for democratic transition.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, and the Sudanese armed forces commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan engaged in fierce clashes in which many people were killed or injured. The violence erupted due to a dispute over the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese armed forces. The planned integration was part of a power-sharing agreement with civilian leaders who led protests against former long-serving President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in 2019. The power-sharing agreement was implemented for two years before both al-Burhan and Hemedti staged a military coup in October 2021.
What is concerning is that the current deadly clashes between military factions are spreading throughout the country, especially in North, West, and South Darfur, where the RSF maintains a strong presence. Amidst the escalating events, the commander of the Sudanese army announced the dissolution of the RSF militias, and both sides exchanged accusations through a fierce media war. However, it is evident that the Sudanese army has tightened its grip on strategic points in Khartoum, which hold significant symbolic and political importance.
This article attempts to delve deeper into the current situation in Sudan and explore the impact of the conflict between the RSF and the Sudanese armed forces on the country's political stability and security, as well as the expected regional and international ramifications, implications, and consequences.
Roots of the Conflict
The roots of the current conflict can be traced back to the significant role the Sudanese army has played in the country's political landscape since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came to power through a military coup and ruled the country with an iron fist for 30 years before he was overthrown in another coup in 2019. After al-Bashir's ousting, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for radical reforms to the security sector, but these efforts have resulted in covert and overt conflicts between factions within the military institution.
That is why one of the main reasons for the violent bouts of tension among the elements of this military component since the uprising is the civilian leaders' demand for control over the army and the envisaged plan for integrating the powerful RSF into the regular army. Civilians also demanded that military assets and profitable companies in agriculture, trade, and other industries be surrendered. These demands strike at the heart of the army's power and wealth, making it a fundamental source of conflict between the military, whether the army or the RSF, and civilian leaders.
Another point of contention is the pursuit of justice regarding allegations of war crimes committed by the army and its allies in the Darfur conflict since 2003. The International Criminal Court is seeking to prosecute the ousted President Omar al-Bashir and other Sudanese suspects. Efforts are also being made to achieve justice for the killing of pro-democracy protesters who fell on June 3, 2019, which involved military forces from the RSF. Activists and civil rights groups have expressed anger over the delay in conducting an official investigation. Additionally, factions from the Forces of Freedom and Change want justice for at least 125 people who were killed by security forces during peaceful protests since the coup staged by al-Burhan on October 25, 2021.
In any case, structural reforms to Sudan's security sector necessitate redrafting the legal framework to define the role of security forces and create a unified national army that communities and regions in Sudan can trust, especially in conflict-hit areas. Moreover, efforts must also be made to disentangle the military from the economy. The Sudanese armed forces and the RSF dominate almost all aspects of Sudan's politics, economy, and media. This will require careful planning, as military institutions protect this vast influence. This indicates why the conflict between Hemedti and al-Burhan revolves around safeguarding these privileges.
Hemedti's Alternatives
Several weeks ago, the disputes between Al-Burhan and Hemedti became public when the RSF in Khartoum and Hemedti visited other countries and received international envoys separately from al-Burhan. This highlights the intricate and complex political landscape in post-al-Bashir Sudan.
The Central Council of Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) considers Islamists as the biggest threat to the country's peaceful transitional process. This opinion is based on recent events as well as on the political and ideological divisions that have traditionally shaped Sudanese politics. This perception stems from recent events as well as the political and ideological divisions that have historically shaped Sudanese politics. Islamist groups have wielded considerable influence within the Sudanese armed forces, where the Islamist alliance and the army have ruled the country since the coup staged in 1989, long before the emergence of the RSF in 2013. The RSF's influence has since grown, and it has become a significant player in Sudanese politics.
Assessments from Western security and intelligence sources suggest that the RSF is a 100,000-strong force with military bases and deployments throughout the country, while the army is estimated to have around 124,000 personnel. Based on this analysis, the FFC has formed an unexpected and seemingly contradictory alliance with the Rapid Support Forces.
The FFC has formed a robust political alliance with the RSF, which is regarded as the arch-enemy of Islamists. The alliance was created by political brokers affiliated with marginalized factions of the FFC. These brokers prioritize their political interests and do not consider the political militia system's dominance to be a significant issue as long as it serves their own political interests.
During the failed transitional period, these brokers exchanged privileges and political favours with the RSF, strengthening their relationship. It is no secret that this close relationship has led to the framework political agreement reached on December 5, 2022.
It has become clear that the alliance between the FFC and the RSF is strong, demonstrated by Hemedti's unwavering support for the FCC's actions. This includes his endorsement of the Sudanese Bar Association's constitution draft before it was even reviewed, his repeated commitment to the framework agreement as the sole option for a political settlement, and even his public apology for his involvement in the coup staged by al-Burhan.
However, the logic followed by the FFC and the RSF to prevent the Islamists from re-assuming power is flawed.
First, following the al-Burhan/Hemedti coup, the Islamists had ample opportunity to regain control over the state institutions and financial centers they had dominated during their 30-year reign.
Second, relying on the alliance with the RSF to confront the Islamists proved to be futile over the past period. This is because the December revolution dismantled the Islamist regime, which has compelled conservative right-wing groups to adopt a provisional democratic transitional path led by civilian figures, albeit temporarily. Thus, any endeavors to reverse the progress made so far should not be tolerated.
The Sudanese state apparatus and political system, which were constructed on ideological principles during al-Bashir's dictatorship, have been corrupted and require comprehensive, principled, and fundamental reforms.
Using the state's administrative power or the military apparatus to resolve political disagreements is improbable to lead to the necessary reforms for long-term civilian and democratic rule. This is apparent from the recent experience of the so-called Dismantling Committee when the judicial system quickly overturned its accomplishments after the coup.
In summary, relying on Hemedti to fight the remnants of defeated Islamists is a strategic mistake made at the expense of Sudan's future stability. Instead, Hemedti worked tirelessly before and after the Framework Agreement to strengthen his political, economic, regional, and diplomatic power, including intervention in Chad, Niger, Mali, and the Central African Republic, as well as his public and secret military and trade relations with the Russian security firm Wagner Group. Attempts to stir up conflict between the coup partners to bolster the democratic camp have proved to be an ineffective tactic that cannot yield meaningful outcomes. Such an approach will only further consolidate power in the hands of one individual in Sudan.
Regional and International Repercussions
Sudan is in a turbulent region bordered by the Red Sea, the Sahel region, and the Horn of Africa. Given its strategic location and abundant agricultural resources, the country is an appealing prospect for regional and global powers, which further complicates the chances of a successful transition.
A state of chaos, political unrest, and violent conflicts has affected many of Sudan's neighbors, including Ethiopia, Chad, and South Sudan. It is a known fact that Sudan's relationship with Ethiopia has particularly become tense due to the conflict over the border area of Al-Fashaga and the conflict in the Tigray region, which has displaced tens of thousands of people to seek refuge in Sudan, in addition to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
In addition, Egypt, which has historical ties with Sudan and a close relationship with its military, has taken a neutral and balanced stance to safeguard its national security interests. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two influential players, play a critical role in Sudan's political transition process. The two nations, along with the United States and Britain, comprise the "International Quartet" that facilitated political mediation in Sudan in partnership with the United Nations and the African Union. Western powers have also expressed concerns about the potential establishment of a Russian military base on the Red Sea, an option that Sudanese military leaders have said they are open to.
The ongoing confrontation in Sudan is not expected to affect the agreement between Moscow and Khartoum to establish a logistics center for the Russian navy in Sudan. Moscow's interest in the base is due to its strategic location, which provides access to its areas of influence in the non-coastal Central African Republic and the coastal and desert region where Russian mining companies operate. Plans for the Russian base were developed in 2019 but were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the capabilities were already prepared, and the official opening was about to be announced when the pandemic hit the world. Despite the military coup led by General Hemedti, the project is unlikely to be halted as the conflicting factions in Sudan do not hold an anti-Russian stance. While the fate of the base will be known during the Second Summit Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg from July 26 to 29, these regional and international interests should be taken into account when assessing the consequences of the current developments in Sudan.
Scenarios and Consequences
Although the Sudanese army has announced that it has captured a majority of the RSF's military bases, including a strategic one in the Karari area, it is clear that they are engaged in an asymmetrical war with the paramilitary RSF militias. In such engagements, there are no clear frontlines, as fighters blend in with civilian populations or use unconventional battlefields, such as cyber warfare or urban street warfare. These types of conflicts are extremely complex and difficult to resolve, as conventional military strategies are no longer effective in defeating the weaker party. If members of the Sudanese army currently operating within the Rapid Support Forces decide to return to their previous military positions, it could lead to another stage of the conflict, where there is no clear winner or loser. This could hinder progress toward civilian rule and make the conflict even more challenging to resolve.
Sudan's current situation could potentially add to the burden already placed on the region, where governments are collapsing, and multiple political and military actors exist within a single state. An alternative scenario could involve the army further tightening its grip on the capital and expelling the RSF. This action would create another opportunity for international and regional efforts to fully implement the Framework Agreement, which includes reforming the security sector and integrating the RSF into the army.
A third scenario represents the brink of the abyss, where the situation in Libya could be replicated in Sudan, resulting in the practical division of the country. This possibility highlights the issue and implications of non-state military entities coexisting alongside the national army.
In conclusion, it is evident that military intervention or a zero-sum game is not a viable option in a country already suffering from structural problems and conflicts in peripheral areas such as Darfur and the East. Such options would result in the Sudanese people being the biggest losers. Therefore, the warring parties may be urged to engage in dialogue to resolve the conflict. In fact, Volker Perthes, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, has called for an immediate cessation of fighting to ensure the safety of the Sudanese people and prevent violence from spiraling out of control.
Moreover, international and regional stakeholders have communicated with the conflicting parties and appealed to them to engage in constructive dialogue to resolve their disputes. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have called for self-restraint and advocated for a political solution to the conflict. These efforts demonstrate the readiness of all parties involved to resolve the crisis in Sudan and restore stability to the country. It is, therefore, imperative for all parties to engage in constructive dialogue to find a lasting solution to the crisis and guarantee the security and stability of the Sudanese people.
