In February, the Pentagon spokesman reiterated the US stance against Ankara’s possession of the Russian S-400 missile system. On February 15, in his first communication with his Turkish counterpart, the US Secretary of State confirmed the need for Ankara to abandon the Russian S-400 missiles. Thus, new tensions are noticed in the US-Turkish relations, which had witnessed massive escalations during the term of former US President Trump.
The stance of the new US administration reflects the widening chasm between Ankara and Washington, which is not only about Turkey’s possession of the Russian S-400 system, but extends to other issues that US President Biden promised to raise upon taking office, such as Ankara's human rights and internal democracy files. Accordingly, these issues of disagreement will be a catalyst for escalating tensions between the two parties. However, areas of common interest between the two sides may contribute to reducing tension areas and accommodating them, particularly with issues of mutual interest. This also comes in light of their need for each other to enhance their regional presence within the new maps of influence currently being formed in the Middle East. Through its coarse involvement in regional conflicts, Ankara was able to impose itself on the equations of possible settlements, which may help Washington balance Russian and Iranian influences in vital areas of interest.
Thus, this analysis seeks to expound the implications of the new US administration rejecting Ankara's possession of the S-400 system, as well as exploring factors and motivations behind potential de-escalation and possible scenarios for the future relationship between the two sides.
Triggers for escalation and tensions
The course of Turkish-US interactions is under tension due to controversial issues that escalated during the period of former US President Trump, particularly Ankara's possession of the Russian S-400 system. This situation is likely to worsen under Biden's administration which expressed its adherence to the stance against Ankara’s possession of the S-400 air defense system. This was clearly reflected through the US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, renewing the Biden administration’s concern about the impact of the S-400 missile deal between Ankara and Moscow on the cohesion of the NATO allies.
Washington had imposed a set of sanctions on Ankara as a result of its purchase of the missile system last December. This included imposing sanctions on the Turkish Defense Industry Advisor and a number of its officials under the The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Washington also stopped training Turkish F-35 pilots, and prevented them from obtaining them and from participating in a NATO-supervised training program for manufacturing them. Furthermore, it prohibited the issuance of any arms export license to the Turkish government agency in charge of military procurement. On February 6, a spokesman for the US Department of Defense announced that the Biden administration is continuing its predecessor’s policy of excluding Turkey from the international F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, due to Turkey buying the S-400 air defense system from Russia, which comes in contravention of Turkey's obligations as an ally of Washington and the NATO.
The influence of this issue in the escalation of tensions between the two sides will be complemented by the influence of other issues, which can be summarized as follows:
1- The continuation of US sanctions: The US position reflects adherence to imposing sanctions as a mechanism to push Ankara to give up its S-400 system, and even exploring the intensification of these sanctions in the future in the event that Ankara adhered to its position. This was reflected in the statements of US officials during the last period, as Anthony Blinken mentioned last January that Washington would review if further sanctions are required on Ankara over its acquisition of a Russian air defense system. In his first contact with his Turkish counterpart on February 15, he stressed the need for Ankara to give up possession of the Russian system. This position will, in turn, contribute to the escalation of tensions between the two sides.
2- The Human rights situation: The new approach adopted by Biden's administration gives priority to the value perspective of freedom, democracy and human rights as the main pillars of the US foreign policy towards Turkey. Thus, in December 2019, Joe Biden, in his statements, attacked Ankara's human rights file, describing the Turkish president as a "tyrant", denouncing his policy towards the Kurds and calling for support for the opposition. This was also asserted in the interview of US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, with the spokesman for the Turkish presidency on February 3, as he affirmed the new administration's broad commitment to supporting democratic institutions and the rule of law. Through a statement last January, The US State Department also urged Ankara to respect basic freedoms and seek prompt and just solutions to the Kavala and Demirtaş cases, indicating that the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association are "essential to any healthy democracy". Therefore, this issue is one of the controversial points through which Washington will impose pressure on Ankara. However, the extent of its influence will be determined by the extent of agreement on other contentious files between the two sides.
3- Renewed disputes over the Kurdish file: The Kurdish file is one of the unresolved disagreements between Ankara and Washington, which had culminated during the Trump administration as a result of Washington's support for the Kurdish forces on the Turkish borders in Northeast Syria, considering them the local proxy through which the military presence of the Iranian militias would be balanced. In the first test indicating the stance of the new US administration on this issue, on February 14, the US State Department issued a statement questioning the killing of 13 Turks in Northern Iraq, which prompted Ankara to announce the responsibility of the PKK for the operation. Washington expressed that it awaits additional confirmation about the circumstances of their deaths, stressing that if reports of the death of Turkish civilians at the hands of the PKK are confirmed, then they condemn this action in the strongest possible terms.
This position escalated tensions between the two sides, as Ankara summoned the US ambassador to it, expressing dissatisfaction with the statement of the US State Department. Moreover, the Turkish President accused the US of supporting "terrorists", renewing the accumulated tensions between the two sides regarding this issue.
4- A continuing conflict between Ankara and NATO allies: There are further tensions in relations between Ankara and NATO members due to the intense competition over resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region, as well as the divergent interests over the crises of the Middle East, particularly Libya. Washington seeks to restore the strength of the NATO in addressing the Russian-Chinese influence. This will only happen through the settlement of internal differences among its members, which is hindered by the Turkish hostile moves in the Eastern Mediterranean pushing the Europeans members of the alliance to view Ankara's possession and testing of the Russian S-400 system as a sign of its attempts to impose pressure on them to take a neutral stance towards the Eastern Mediterranean conflict.
5- Enhancing the Turkish-Russian rapprochement: One of the areas of tension and disagreement between Ankara and Washington are the Turkish endeavors to create a conciliatory framework with Russia to expand its movement outside the closed circles imposed by its relationship with Washington and the NATO members. This rapprochement is in conflict with the US-NATO interests. This was also highlighted through the divergent perspectives on regional files such as the Syrian and Libyan crises, as well as the economic partnerships with Russia in the energy field, such as the TurkStream project to transport Russian gas to Turkey and Southeastern Europe via the Black Sea bypassing Ukraine. In 2019, Russia ranked first in supplying gas to Turkey, which would reduce the impact of Western sanctions on Russia, and enhance its financial resources in addition to a potential cooperation in the space field, which also raises tensions with Washington. Last but not least, military cooperation is enhanced as Ankara purchased the Russian S-400, which would reveal the secrets of Western armament systems to Moscow. This would enable Russia to compete with Washington in the global arms market, after it ranked second globally in arms exports, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute. Furthermore, its financial resources would be enhanced through that deal, which amounted to about $ 2.5 billion.
In general, Moscow views its cooperation with Ankara as significantly improving its ability to accomplish its policy goals in the Middle East. The current disputes between Ankara and Washington are an opportunity for Russia to deepen the increasing gap within the NATO, which reduces its effectiveness towards vital issues. For example, the disputes between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, resulted in a split among NATO members, which impeded the EU efforts to reach a consensus over unrelated issues such as Belarus.
Factors and triggers of appeasement
The new US administration may be shaping a new regional strategy, where the US explicit role in the Middle East is limited, while authorizing its regional partners to protect the common interests, as well as maintaining close relations with the medium-sized powers in the region, given the need to transfer resources to Asia to balance Chinese influence. Thus, Ankara is expected to play a key role in that strategy due to its geostrategic position, which has been enhanced over the past decade by virtue of its coarse involvement in conflict areas that are vital to Washington in order to balance the Russian-Iranian influence, and to possibly absorb the emerging tensions between the two sides regarding this issue. This comes with other triggers that can be summarized as follows:
1- Reducing US sanctions: Within Ankara's pressing economic conditions, which is impacted by US sanctions, the extent of Ankara's flexibility in aligning with US interests and its security considerations in terms of its acquisition of the Russian S-400 will be enhanced according to Washington's direction to reduce its sanctions in a manner that contributes to fostering the Turkish economic situation and to supporting the Turkish president, whose popularity has declined within the Justice and Development Party.
2- Reducing tensions between Ankara and NATO members: Ankara has expressed willingness to establish a truce with Greece and Cyprus, as it stopped exploration activities within the disputed areas with Cyprus. Furthermore, on January 25, Ankara began talks with Greece and held the eighth technical meeting, to establish a “deconflicting mechanism” to avoid skirmishes in the East Mediterranean region. This comes as part of the endeavors of the confidence-building meetings that the two sides started at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
These steps would aggravate tensions between Ankara and the NATO members, which will positively impact the de-escalating endeavors between Washington and Ankara and its attempts to clear their disputed issues.
3- Neutralizing the Turkish-Russian rapprochement: The Turkish-Russian rapprochement remains to be one of the contentious issues between Washington and Ankara as well as the NATO allies, given the loopholes that this rapprochement poses in the cohesion of the NATO. This is what Moscow aims for through its cooperation with Ankara in order to regain control within and outside its vital areas, after many years of confinement.
This will push Ankara to take steps to ensure the neutralization of this rapprochement regarding the interests of the US and the NATO members, on top of which comes the S-400 settlement. Ankara will have to consider the red lines imposed by Washington, such as the deployment and installation of Russian systems in preparation for their operation. Ankara may resort to the Greek model in handling this issue, as Greece postponed its operation of the S-400 system and stored it in a military warehouse in Crete to appease the NATO. Ankara may also resort to breaching the system's "end-user document" by selling it to a third party or leaking its secrets to NATO allies, in exchange for alleviating pressures on it and providing a military alternative for that system, namely the Patriot system that Ankara sought to obtain.
Ankara will also be required to revisit its economic partnerships with Moscow (particularly the Russian gas transport projects), which may be a long-term goal given the need to provide alternatives for the economic returns that Ankara receives as a result of these partnerships. This may be no difficult task for Ankara, as it seeks to break its reliance on Russian gas and achieve energy independence.
Possible scenarios
Based on the previous variables, the future course of the relationship between Washington and Ankara will be governed by a number of possible scenarios that can be summarized as follows:
1- A partial settlement of disputes: Within the framework of mutual interest between the two sides, it will be more beneficial for both parties to cooperate than to dispute to secure their interests based on a more pragmatic approach. This requires more readiness to set priorities, work on settlements calmly, and make early deliberations to prevent disputes, and to prevent disputes from turning into an existential threat to the relationship. This scenario will depend on the experience of President Joe Biden, as a previous member of the US Senate and a former Vice President.
This is a more likely scenario based on some indicators which confirm the keenness of both sides to lift tensions and resume cooperation. This was highlighted by the US administration’s retreat from the statements issued by the US State Department commenting on the killing of 13 Turks in Northern Iraq, which was condemned by Ankara. Later, US Secretary of State called his Turkish counterpart on February 15, to express his condolences for the killing of the Turkish hostages in Northern Iraq, stressing that the PKK bears responsibility of this terrorist act.
It also reflects the Turkish keenness to relay positive messages regarding contentious issues, clearly reflected in its resumption of talks with Greece last January, and holding some technical meetings between the two parties to establish mechanisms to avoid the occurrence of skirmishes in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2- The continuation and escalation of tensions: In the absence of alternatives and the decline of the gains that Ankara can get from enhancing its relations with the strategic West (the US and the NATO countries) at the expense of its Eurasian relations with Russia, China and Iran, the tension between the two sides is likely to escalate, especially over vital issues such as the Kurds files, and Washington's support for those elements in the areas adjacent to Turkish borders with Northern Syria. This comes in addition to the economic aid and investments that may improve Turkey's economic situation, which was the target of its partnerships with Russia, China and Iran.
This scenario is reinforced by the heightened tension that arose as a result of the US State Department’s statement about the killing of Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq, which Ankara saw as a support for the terrorist PKK.
This scenario may be more likely based on the new US administration’s direction to raise the issues of human rights and Turkish democracy, which will raise tensions, albeit with a lesser impact than other contentious files.
3- Maintaining the status quo of lukewarm relationship: Both parties may tend to maintain the status quo in terms of controlling escalations threatening their relationship and the common frameworks that unite them. The chances of the fulfilment of this scenario are contingent on both sides failing to reach a consensus regarding the controversial issues, thus stalling current negotiations.
