The regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is, theoretically, different from almost all the world’s political regimes recognized in available literature, in that it gives the republic’s Supreme Leader, or the vali-ye faqih (the Guardian Jurist), an extremely unique position found nowhere else in the world’s political regimes. However, this does not negate the fact that it holds several similarities to other political regimes, due to their pursuance of realism in the use of authority and mechanisms that set the course for their foreign policy.
Qatar is the closest model similar to the Iranian regime. What stands out here is that this similarity was evident even through accusations made by regional and international powers against these two states. That is because both states seek to use the same mechanisms to achieve their goals such as supporting terrorism, interference in the internal affairs of other states in the region, as well as undermining stability in the Middle East.
Based on that, it is, perhaps, possible to explain some aspects of Iranian support for Qatar’s stance in the current escalating crisis with the anti-terrorism quartet countries. Iran believes that it is coming under similar pressure as Qatar, especially because the same existing concerns with regards to Iran appear to be what have caused the current crisis with Qatar.
Key similarities between Qatar and Iran can be explained as follows:
1- Dual Authority: Several views indicate that the polities of both Qatari and Iranian politics are similar in terms of dual authority. That is, both Qatar’s former emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, now known as the “Father-Emir”, and Iran’s Supreme Leader play similar roles controlling most authorities to run their states and determine the course of their foreign policies. His son, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani plays a role that is more like that of Iranian president, who has limited jurisdiction revolving around the execution and implementation of public policies set by the country’s top leader, who has the final word over the decision-making process.
Hence, the decision-making process in Doha is under the complete control of what can be called the “Velayat of the Emir” (guardianship of the Father-Emir), a term coined after Iran’s Velayat e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which constitutes the backbone of the Iranian regime.
Among the most significant impacts of the “guardianship of the Father-Emir” is that it restricts the power of the young emir, who competes with a team of the officials who previously worked with his father. The same holds for the Iranian regime, where the president of the republic is not the only figure who has executive powers. Rather these powers are shared between the president and a team of officials, such as the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, who report directly to the supreme leader.
2- Crisis-hit Regional Milieu: The foreign policies pursued by both Qatar and Iran in the past decades have produced ongoing crises with their neighbours. In particular, both states continuously sought to interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbouring states through establishing ties with local groups, thus impacting their security and stability.
These attempts created regional pressure that pushed the two states to seek rapprochement promoting their political and economic cooperation and maintaining strong relations, at various levels, with other regional states, such as Iraq and Turkey.
3- Alliance with Protagonists: Both Tehran and Doha adopt dual foreign policies to deal with foreign developments. This is evident at two levels. Firstly, they “speak more than one language” with foreign parties, as part of what can called a division of roles, through which the two states seek to expand their freedom of movement and manoeuvres in the foreign stage.
Secondly, the two states open communication channels with protagonists and rivals to support their own efforts to bolster their regional presence. What stands out in this context over the past years is that while Iran was keen to export an anti-US ideologically-inspired rhetoric, it conducted secret negotiations with the US that culminated in the July 2015 nuclear deal. Moreover, in the early days of the revolution in the 1980s, Iran adopted the same policy and attempted to reach understandings with Washington over more than one issue. Furthermore, Iran spared no effort to establish strong relations with Turkey, despite their apparent disagreement over the developments of the conflict in Syria.
For its part, Qatar sought to promote its relations with Israel in 1996, as well as with the US, while at the same time it maintained strong relations with Tehran, the Iranian-allied Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria. This allowed Qatar, for instance, to take part in efforts made to reach a settlement to the Lebanese crisis through the Doha Agreement, concluded among rival Lebanese factions on May 21 2008.
Moreover, Qatar attempted to pursue the same policy to deal with other regional crises, including the conflict between the now-ousted Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the Houthi group in 2008, and the crisis between the regime of Sudanese president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, and the Darfuri rebel Justice and Equality Movement
Justice and Equality Movement in 2009.
4- Supporting Terrorism: The two states’ relations with terrorist organizations appear to be the product of their dual policies. That is, while Tehran and Doha are keen on promoting their claims of participating in the war on terrorism, their establishment of relations understandings with terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and ISIS in particular, cannot be negated.
Through such efforts, the two states seek to achieve two goals. The first goal, which the two states have achieved, is to avoid being hit by terrorist attacks by these organizations. No terror attacks have hit any of the two states, with the exception of June 7, 2017 attack that hit the heart of the Iranian capital- for which ISIS claimed responsibility. This claim did not hold the Iranian opposition from questioning the regime’s narrative, and even insisting that the attack was perpetrated by the regime’s establishments.
The second goal is a bid to strengthen their influence in some regional states, and in war-torn states in particular. Obviously, enhanced relations enabled both states to reach deals to swap prisoners and bodies in Syria. What is known as the "Four Towns Agreement”, reached between warring parties in April 2017 in Syria, was sponsored by both states. The deal was concluded thanks to Iran’s influence on the Assad regime and allied Shiite militias, and Hezbollah in particular, and Qatar’s influence on involved terrorist organizations such as the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which includes the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), formerly known as al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of al-Qaida in Syria.
It is worth noting that the deal was cross-border, where it also led to the release of Qatari citizens who were kidnapped in Iraq. Iran’s intervention and influence on Iraqi militias and forces made it possible to settle the issue.
5- Providing Shelter for Islamist Forces: Both Qatar and Iran were keen on establishing strong ties with political Islamist groups in some regional states to use them as leverage against these states, amid escalating disagreement over how to deal with regional issues. Soon after popular protests broke out in some Arab countries in early 2011, both Qatar and Iran rushed to capitalize some groups’ success to reach power to further bolster their own influence in the involved states.
Iran called the protests a prelude for an Islamic renaissance and was quick to emphasize that these developments will contribute towards strengthening its role and efforts to establish and lead an “Islamic Middle East”. Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, explained this approach on April 5, 2013, when the Muslim Brotherhood reached power in Egypt, saying that the Brotherhood is closer to Tehran than any other Islamic group, and is also the closest Islamic movement in terms of religious ideology.
Qatar pursued the same approach setting up strong ties with the Brotherhood in states where it reached power, and backed the group in Syria against the Assad regime. After the June 30 revolution broke out in Egypt, Qatar hosted a large number of terrorist leaders belonging to the group.
Moreover, ties with the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas, also stand out as a common denominator between Doha and Tehran, which sought to exploit the movement to strengthen their role in the developments of the Palestinian cause. However, this role has imposed several negative consequences on the cause, which the two states used as political and propagandist leverage to conceal their real political agendas and regional calculations.
Overall, these similar policies of both states reveal that the “Velayat of the Emir” has become the most important key to understand the mystery of the Qatari-Iranian strong relations. It is what shaped the alliance between the state of the supreme leader in Tehran and the state of the two Hamads (the Father-Emir Sheikh Hamad, and Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani) in Doha.
