The Washington Post reported on September 22 this year: "The speaker of the lower house, Vyacheslav Volodin, warned that strikes on Russia would lead to war with nuclear weapons and reminded the European Parliament that its headquarters in Strasbourg was only a three-minute flight for a Russian ICBM." Such statements represent Russia's latest nuclear threat, aimed at deterring the West from making decisions that would displease the Kremlin.[1] However, Western governments remained resolute in their stance. Hence, nuclear deterrence, both Russian and otherwise, is gradually losing its once near-absolute power.
From Globalization to Geopolitics
From the moment the Soviet Union built its first atomic bomb in 1949, some of the world's finest minds began developing theories of deterrence. Implementing effective deterrence proved far more challenging than anticipated, primarily because the deterring side could never be certain what truly deterred the adversary. The absence of a military attack raised questions: Was it evidence of successful deterrence, or did it simply indicate that the adversary never intended to attack in the first place?
Despite these uncertainties, Thomas Schelling and other leading deterrence thinkers established actionable theories. Most significantly, they developed the concept of MAD – Mutually Assured (nuclear) Destruction. Involving US and Soviet nuclear weapons, MAD became a powerful motivator for each side to merely deter the other, rather than use the weapons or even suggest their use.
Tension between Russia and Western countries has been escalating since at least 2012, when Vladimir Putin's re-election as President of Russia marked the end of the nation's period of meek collaboration with the West. The era of fruitful economic cooperation, exemplified by projects like the Nord Stream pipelines connecting Russia and Germany, has faded into memory. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 prompted Western governments to impose economic sanctions, a move made possible by Russia's post-Cold War transition to a market economy and its integration with other market economies. Consequently, Western powers could penalize Russia's illegal actions by prohibiting various financial interactions with Russian banks, institutions, non-bank businesses, and individuals. Additionally, Western governments implemented a ban on the export of military goods to Russia.[2] In the weeks preceding Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West imposed a range of new sanctions to deter the aggression. Despite these measures, Russia invaded anyway, prompting more sanctions. As the war has continued, a string of further punitive actions have been introduced.
Russia's response has gone beyond punishing Western companies; it has regularly invoked the nuclear spectre. When Ukraine's fate prompted Sweden and Finland to seriously consider NATO membership in 2022, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and former President, retorted that their joining would force Russia to strengthen its military presence in the Baltic Sea region. He added ominously, "There can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic - the balance must be restored."[3]
The following month, Medvedev revisited the prospect of Russian nuclear weapons in its Baltic exclave, Kaliningrad, should Sweden and Finland accede to NATO. In an interview with the newspaper Argumenty i Fakty, he elaborated: "We will have to strengthen these borders. The Baltic region's nonnuclear status will become a thing of the past, and the group of land and naval forces in the northern sector will be seriously increased. No one is happy with this, not the citizens of these two NATO candidate countries. It's not the best prospect for them to have our Iskanders, hypersonic missiles, warships with nuclear weapons on their doorstep."[4]
Despite Russia's attempts to frighten Sweden and Finland away from a decision that would displease the Kremlin by invoking the nuclear threat - a tactic that should be used extremely sparingly - both countries joined the military alliance anyway. Russia's nuclear gambit had failed.
The threat of nuclear violence should be used with extreme caution due to its serious, existential nature. Only when all other tools and threats have been exhausted should nuclear weapons be invoked, as effective deterrence requires the willingness to follow through on such threats. Russia's suggestion of using "warships with nuclear weapons" in response to Sweden and Finland joining NATO is highly improbable, given that NATO would retaliate with US nuclear weapons. Sweden and Finland correctly assessed Russia's nuclear rhetoric as not credible and proceeded with their plans.
Russia's nuclear threats, however, have not been limited to these two countries. In fact, Russia has been intensifying its nuclear rhetoric in recent months and years. On February 24, 2022, the day Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin cautioned Western countries against interfering in Ukraine or attacking Russia, warning of immediate consequences "such as you have never seen in your entire history".[5] Three days later, Putin escalated the situation by raising Russia's nuclear forces to a heightened status of alert, claiming it was in response to economic sanctions and "aggressive statements" by the West.[6]
In September of the same year, Putin addressed the Russian people, stating, "We will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff".[7] Shortly after, the Russian President made a chilling reference to the United States' nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, suggesting that the US had "created a precedent".[8]
In May 2023, Putin announced Russia's plan to station nuclear weapons in Belarus, a move implemented the following month.[9] While Russia maintains the right to position nuclear weapons in willing host countries—a practice the United States has long employed in several NATO states—the decision clearly aimed to send a message to Western countries supporting Ukraine, as well as to Ukraine itself.
Mentioning the Unmentionable Weapons
Russia is not the first country to invoke the spectre of nuclear weapons outside their intended context. Originally designed for war between major peer adversaries and to deter significant military attacks, nuclear weapons have seen their perceived role expand. In 2018, the Royal United Service Institute's Modern Deterrence program, which focuses on deterrence of grayzone threats (that is, threats below the threshold of armed military violence), was established. When invited to a radio interview long-standing defence analyst Sir Lawrence Freedman remarked, "What do we need new forms of deterrence for? We've got nukes." However, we must remember that threatening a nuclear strike in response to, for example, a cyber-attack is not credible because NATO would never respond in such an exaggerated manner.
In a more significant case, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, US President George Bush sent Saddam Hussein a letter demanding Iraq's withdrawal. The letter, delivered to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz by US Secretary of State James Baker, warned, "The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort."[10] Upon reading the letter, Aziz refused to pass it on to Saddam. In an interview years later, he explained, "I told him, 'Look, Mr. Secretary, this is not the kind of correspondence between two heads of State. This is a letter of threat, and I cannot receive from you a letter of threat to my President.' So I returned it to him."[11]
To ensure Aziz understood the consequences of Iraq's non-compliance, Baker reiterated the letter's message. Aziz later recounted the exchange: "He said, 'Look Minister, if you don't implement fully the UN Resolutions, we will attack you. You know that we are a very powerful country, and we will bring you back to the pre-industrial age. Another leadership will decide the future of Iraq."[12]
Aziz's response was measured yet resolute: "Mr. Secretary, Iraq is a very ancient nation; we have lived for six thousand years. I have no doubts that you are a very powerful nation with a very strong military machine, and you'll inflict heavy losses on us. However, Iraq will survive, and this leadership will decide the future of Iraq."
Although Bush's letter did not explicitly mention nuclear weapons, its threat of overwhelming force against Iraq was unambiguous. Nevertheless, the Iraqi leadership remained undeterred, demonstrating that even threats of massive destruction often fail to convince the opposing side to change course.
Since the Cold War's end, China has ascended to major-power status. Western governments initially welcomed this rise, which was primarily economic. However, particularly in the last decade, Beijing has dramatically expanded its armed forces, now boasting the world's largest navy. Additionally, China possesses an estimated 500 nuclear warheads and is rapidly growing its nuclear arsenal.[13] Projections indicate the Chinese arsenal may comprise some 1,500 warheads by 2035.[14]
The development of China's military capabilities, coupled with the strengthening ties between China, Russia, and North Korea amidst intensifying standoffs with the West, has prompted President Joe Biden to amend US nuclear strategy. The revised strategy now includes the prospect of a nuclear confrontation with all three countries.[15]Mirroring Putin's tactics, Chinese leaders could potentially begin invoking the prospect of a nuclear attack on Taiwan periodically.
Nuclear weapons, though, stand apart from all other armaments. Their unique nature makes discussions about them perilous outside the context of major conflicts or deterrence against invasion by significant military powers. Mentioning nuclear retaliation carries the risk of misunderstandings and accidental use. Particularly concerning are smaller nuclear weapons, which Putin feels comfortable referencing due to their relatively lesser destructive capacity compared to larger variants.
Nuclear weapons' primary purpose lies not in their use but in their ability to instill fear in adversaries. They are meant to exist unseen and unmentioned, especially as punishment for actions falling short of major warfare. Invoking them in inappropriate contexts diminishes their value in proper scenarios. The more frequently they are referenced inappropriately, the more their effectiveness wanes in legitimate situations.
The erosion of nuclear deterrence resulting from Russia's increasing nuclear rhetoric should concern countries far beyond Ukraine, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states. As one of the world's five official nuclear-weapons states and indeed the largest, Russia's regular threats of nuclear weapon use outside the context of a world war may prompt unofficial nuclear weapons states to adopt similar tactics against their adversaries.
Currently, the nuclear-weapons club includes four unofficial members (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) alongside the five official ones (Russia, the United States, Britain, France, and China). Additional countries, most notably Iran, are striving to develop nuclear capabilities.[16] Even South Korea's newly appointed defence minister, Kim Yong-Hyun, has previously entertained the idea of his country acquiring nuclear capability.[17]
During the Cold War, the tense standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact made both sides acutely aware of the consequences of even a single nuclear warhead being fired. Leaders adopted a disciplined approach to nuclear weapons, rarely mentioning their use outside appropriate contexts and actively negotiating weapons reduction. However, that discipline has faded in recent times, and unofficial nuclear-weapons states may never have felt bound by it.
The current reality risks creating a situation where the world still possesses a nuclear arsenal capable of annihilating the planet several times over, yet the threat of using such weapons has become so commonplace that it is no longer taken seriously. For every country, this prospect is extremely dangerous. Thus, all nations should weigh in on any country engaging in loose nuclear talk, delivering a clear message: such rhetoric will not be tolerated.
[1] Catherine Belton and Robyn Dixon, “With nuclear option unlikely, Putin struggles to defend his red lines,” Washington Post, September 22, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/22/putin-russia-red-lines-nuclear-threat-retaliation/
[2] EU Updates Sanctions Against Russia and Crimea, Baker & McKenzie, January 2015, https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2015/01/eu-updates-sanctions-against-russia-and-crimea/files/read-publication/fileattachment/al_germany_sanctionsrussiacrimea_jan15.pdf
[3] Guy Faulconbridge, Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO,
Reuters, April 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-baltic-nuclear-deployment-if-nato-admits-sweden-finland-2022-04-14/
[4] Ann M. Simmons, “Russia to Bolster Border With Nuclear Weapons, Missiles if Sweden, Finland Join NATO,” Wall Street Journal,June 28, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-to-bolster-border-with-nuclear-weapons-missiles-if-sweden-finland-join-nato-11656417583
[5] “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, February 24, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843
[6] “Putin orders "special service regime" in Russia’s deterrence force,” TASS, February 27, 2022, https://tass.com/defense/1412575
[7] “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, September 21, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390
[8] “Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people's republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia,” President of Russia, September 30, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465
[9] “Russia to deploy its tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus at request of Minsk, says Putin,” TASS, March 26, 2024, https://tass.com/russia/1594483;
[10] Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 178-79, https://wwnorton.com/college/polisci/lenses/protect/bush_letter.htm
[11] PBS, Oral History, Tariq Aziz, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html
[12] PBS, Oral History, Tariq Aziz, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html
[13] “Role of nuclear weapons grows as geopolitical relations deteriorate—new SIPRI Yearbook out now,” SIPRI, press release, June 17, 2024, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/role-nuclear-weapons-grows-geopolitical-relations-deteriorate-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now
[14] “China expanding nuclear arsenal much faster than predicted, US report says,” Guardian, October 20, 2023,
[15] Ibid.
[16] Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, Arms Control Association, July 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance
[17] William Gallo and Lee Juhyun, “Under Yoon, calls for South Korean nukes 'normalized',” Voice of America, September 9, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/under-yoon-calls-for-south-korean-nukes-normalized/7777068.html