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Sustained Tension

What Future Awaits Pakistani-Afghan Relations?

27 مايو، 2024


The ruling Taliban in Afghanistan rejected, on May 12, 2024, a scheduled visit from a Pakistani military delegation to the Afghan city of Kandahar, the headquarters of Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada. The visit aimed to discuss border management and the Pakistani branch of the Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, TTP). The cancellation of the visit followed Islamabad's drone and missile attacks on Paktika province in southeastern Afghanistan.

Earlier, on March 18, 2024, Pakistani forces carried out airstrikes on the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktika in response to a deadly attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban's security forces in North Waziristan. This indicates the ongoing tension marring relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021.

Tense Relations

The cancellation of the Pakistani military delegation's visit to Afghanistan highlights the noticeable tension in the relations between the two countries, stemming from several reasons, the most prominent of which are:

1. Border dispute between the two countries:

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2400-kilometer border. The relations between the two countries have been strained for over seven decades due to the Durand Line Agreement signed in 1883. The agreement resulted in large parts of Afghan lands inhabited by the Pashtun ethnic group being annexed to British India, which exist currently within Pakistan. Afghanistan objected to the border arrangements stipulated by this agreement, with all Afghan governments, regardless of their political and ideological affiliations, refusing to recognize the Durand Line as an official international borderline with Pakistan. While the Taliban government denies the existence of an official border with Pakistan, the latter considers the border issue settled.

2. The Tehreek-e-Taliban  in Afghanistan:

Pakistan claims that fighters of the Tehreek-e-Taliban and its supporting groups seek refuge in Afghanistan. This claim is supported by UN intelligence assessments indicating not only the presence of the group in Afghanistan but also the recruitment of some members of the ruling Afghan Taliban in its ranks. Islamabad believes that there is a significant increase in cross-border terrorism and wants to convey a message to the ruling Taliban in Kabul to address this issue.

Estimates suggest that between five to six thousand Tehreek-e-Taliban fighters are in Afghanistan, having fled there to escape large-scale military operations conducted by Pakistani authorities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa about a decade ago to expel terrorists.

3. Pakistan's targeting of Afghan territory:

The Pakistani military occasionally launches military strikes on Afghan territory, particularly the border areas, targeting what Pakistan claims are Tehreek-e-Taliban hideouts. These attacks often result in civilian casualties, including women and children, provoking outraged reactions from the Afghans.

For instance, on March 18, 2024, Pakistan launched a series of airstrikes targeting the Tehreek-e-Taliban in the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktika in retaliation for a suicide attack inside Pakistan. This attack resulted in the death of several Pakistani military personnel.

In retaliation, Kabul targeted several Pakistani military sites along the border. In a statement condemning the Pakistani action, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid warned of "very severe consequences that could escalate beyond Pakistan's control" if Pakistan conducted more cross-border airstrikes.

4. Pakistan's decision to expel Afghan refugees:

In November 2023, Pakistan expedited the deportation of tens of thousands of undocumented Afghan migrants as part of a plan to deport more than one million out of the four million Afghans living in the country. The Pakistani government claimed that the migrants were involved in attacks and crimes by militant groups undermining Pakistan's security. This move strained relations further between Islamabad and Kabul, which accused Pakistan of forcibly deporting and mistreating refugees, contrary to international treaties.

Indicators of Disputes

Recently, several indicators have emerged reflecting the tensions and disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. These can be outlined as follows:

1. Accusing Kabul of destabilizing Pakistan:

Pakistani authorities have accused Afghanistan of being responsible for growing violence and a suicide attack in March 2024 that targeted Chinese engineers working on Chinese projects in Pakistan. These actions have destabilized Islamabad, particularly as Pakistan claims that "terrorists" from the Tehreek-e-Taliban use Afghan territory as a base for terrorist attacks targeting Pakistan, an accusation Kabul denies.

2. Closure of commercial border crossings:

Political and security tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, especially since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, have led Pakistani security authorities to repeatedly close the Torkham border crossing on the Afghan border in response to terrorist attacks targeting Pakistani military sites.

Pakistan's obstruction of Afghanistan's import and export operations through the Karachi port has prompted Afghanistan to seek an alternative route through the Iranian port of Chabahar. This move by Pakistan has also led the Afghan Taliban to call on Islamabad to separate trade relations from political and security issues, especially since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, making it entirely dependent on Pakistani seaports for its foreign trade.

3. Escalation of terrorist attacks against Pakistan:

Since the Taliban reassumed power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan has witnessed a rise in terrorist attacks. Despite the Afghan Taliban mediating talks between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban, the latter unilaterally ended the ceasefire in November 2022. Since then, Pakistan has witnessed a significant increase in attacks against military and security personnel in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, adjacent to Afghanistan.

Future Scenarios

Amid the complex state of recent Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, several potential scenarios can be envisaged, the most notable being:

1. De-escalation: 

This scenario suggests that both countries might move towards containing tensions and resolving disputes. Their recent agreement to continue working together to enhance bilateral relations supports this prospect. Pakistan wishes to expand cooperation with the Taliban government in areas such as communication, trade, security, counterterrorism, and people-to-people relations, seeing these as top priorities for Islamabad. Meanwhile, Afghanistan seeks to play a constructive role in Pakistan amidst growing positive interactions in the region and the launch of major regional infrastructure projects. Furthermore, Afghanistan's acting Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, expressed his country's desire to build strong relations with Pakistan's new government led by Shehbaz Sharif.

2. Continued tensions:

This scenario assumes ongoing tensions, with Pakistan continuing to pressure the Taliban government, which in turn might support groups opposing Pakistan, notably the Tehreek-e-Taliban. This scenario is further supported by Kabul's persistent refusal to accept the Durand Line as the official line of demarcation, indicating that the unresolved border dispute will remain a major source of tension. Additionally, the management of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations lies with the Pakistani military, which suggests that no significant change is expected, maintaining tensions as a dominant feature of their relations.

3. Escalation:

This scenario anticipates a significant increase in tension, potentially leading Pakistan to consider toppling the Afghan Taliban government. Supporting this scenario is Pakistan's potential use of various tools against the Afghan Taliban, including economic pressure by closing trade crossings, supporting the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) as a primary adversary to the Taliban government, and backing political opposition to the Taliban. Conversely, the Taliban government could escalate by fully supporting Tehreek-e-Taliban, seeking alternative trade routes to bypass Pakistani crossings, and forming an inclusive government with various Afghan factions. Additionally, Afghanistan might obstruct key regional projects, such as the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), which aims to supply electricity from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban could also hinder Pakistan's overland trade routes with Central Asia.

4. Military Standoff 

This scenario considers the possibility of war between the two countries if the Afghan Taliban persists in providing sanctuary to Tehreek-e-Taliban members on Afghan soil and fails to prevent them from launching attacks inside Pakistan. Pakistan's military might retaliate against what it perceives as a national security threat to Islamabad if Afghanistan does not meet its sole demand of curbing the Tehreek-e-Taliban, thereby avoiding future military strikes, as stated by Pakistan's defense minister. However, this scenario seems unlikely given Pakistan's reluctance for armed conflict with Afghanistan, as expressed by Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, and the Afghan Taliban's lack of the military capacity to attack Pakistan, though they could resort to unconventional means like actively supporting anti-Pakistan militants in response to increasing Pakistani pressure.

Chinese Mediation 

China has significant interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly in their economies. Prolonged tensions and disputes between the two countries could negatively impact China's interests. This might prompt Beijing to intervene and mediate to prevent further deterioration of relations between Islamabad and Kabul, a situation China wishes to avoid.

In conclusion, canceling the scheduled visit by a Pakistani military delegation to Afghanistan marks the latest indicator of tensions that could escalate into a broader political crisis, given both countries' failure to reach a compromise on key issues straining their relations. These issues include the unresolved international border and the presence of Tehreek-e-Taliban in Afghanistan, potentially leading to more strained and volatile relations, possibly even military confrontation, though this remains a less likely option in the short term. Accordingly, sustained tension is likely to dominate their bilateral relationship, conflicting with the interests of major Asian powers, particularly China, which might be prompted to intervene to mediate between its neighbors.