Turkey might be smoothing things over with Syria. Lately, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, historically a strong opponent of the Syrian regime, has spoken of possible dialogue with Damascus. The change in sentiment towards Syria came soon after a Tehran summit held July 19 where Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Erdogan met.
Change in Turkey’s Position
For President Erdogan circumstances are shifting. Erdogan’s Turkey is not interested in seizing Syrian territory, recognising the emerging need to cooperate against rising terrorism threats against both countries. Echoing Putin, Erdogan has said Syria and Turkey needed to engage in unconditional dialogue to tackle rising terrorist activity at their borders.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu met with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, on August 11 and have spoken of the developing Syria-Turkey relations since the 2021 Non-Aligned summit in Belgrade. Heads of intelligence of both sides have meet multiple times in recent months to discuss “the possibility of working together against YPG, the terrorist organization PKK’s Syrian component, in the East of the Euphrates river,” a Turkish official has told media.
Russia is playing a role in rebuilding Syria-Turkey relations. Mekdad visited Moscow on August 23 where he met his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. The ministers did not comment on reports claiming Moscow might be planning an indirect meeting between presidents Erdogan and Bashar Al-Assad at the 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan, especially seeing Syria is keen to join the SCO. Yet Moscow, a key backer of the Syrian regime, has made strong efforts to bridge the relations between Ankara and Damascus, aiming to drive cooperation on common issues in northern Syria.
The Reasons for Change
Ankara is showing more leniency towards Damascus. Yet what is driving this change in Turkey’s foreign policy on Syria? Three key aspects may be influencing Turkey’s shift, outlined as follows:
1. Erdogan’s pragmatism:
The Turkish president has no qualms about making big and quick changes to his policy, and the recent mend in relations with Israel is a case in point, having switched from hard-line animosity to fully fledged relations. Thus, Turkey’s warming to Damascus would not come as much of a surprise as it repositions itself in the region.
2. Domestic pressure:
With Turkish presidential elections imminent, opposition parties are using the presence of more than 4 million Syrian refugee in Turkey to campaign against Erdogan, highlighting the link between his inadequate policies on Syria and the waves of refugees arriving in the country. To this effect Erdogan is trying to deal with opponents by working out an arrangement with the Syrian regime to send back the bulk of the refugees ahead of the 2023 elections.
3. Appeasing Russia:
Erdogan’s latest statements indicate is desire to align with Russia’s Putin. He’s trying to utilise the Russo-Ukrainian war to make political and economic gains. And while Putin might be willing to let Erdogan get what he wants, the latter would have to compromise on issues of reviving diplomatic relations with Syria, counterterrorism, and seizing Turkey’s military activity in northern Syria, which would put less pressure on Russia and allow it to relocate troops to Ukraine.
The Response
Turkey’s shift in its policy on Syria have been received with scepticism rather than welcome by regional and international actors. Most notably, the following actors have raised questions about Erdogan’s intentions:
1. Syrian opposition:
Turkey’s latest move to amend relations with Al-Assad’s regime has worried, in fact angered, the Syrian opposition. Former president of the Syrian National Council, George Sabra, for instance, called the Turkish foreign minister on August 22 to express the opposition’s deepest concerns over Ankara’s latest reconciliation move. In a Facebook post, Sabra wrote: “if Cavusoglu is concerned with reconciling with the Syrian regime, that is his business. As for the Syrians, they have a different cause for which they have paid and continue to pay the dearest price.”
Then, the questions for Syria’s opposition would be: will Ankara stop supporting the political change, the drafting of a new constitution, and the regime transition in Syria? Or is Ankara’s new stance mean the demise of the Geneva II Conference on Syria and the adoption of Russia’s approach?
2. Iran:
The Islamic Republic has sought to build a level of trust and reconciliation between Syria and Turkey for many months. It has done so through security and military cooperation, paving the way for gradual normalisation. Tehran aims to translate trust-building into political alignment between the two sides, perhaps reaching a resolution to Syria’s more than a decade-long civil war, a feat which Europe and the US have failed to achieve to date. For Iran, achieving this goal would protect its presence and interests in Syria.
Also, Iran and Turkey share a common animosity towards Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). While Turkey has clashed directly with the PKK on Turkish territory, two Iranian parties have bid allegiance to the PKK in their effort to overthrow the Iranian regime. Therefore, it is well in Iran’s interests to facilitate a reconciliation between Syria and Turkey.
Iran also has been strengthening its relations with Russia beyond the Syrian question, in areas of economic and diplomatic cooperation. Western sanctions on both countries have brought them closer and more aligned on threats facing the Syrian regime, both becoming invested in mending the relations between Ankara and Damascus.
3. The US:
Washington has opted not to make a comment on Turkey’s recent efforts to mend its relations with Syria. The US maintains a strong presence in Kurdish autonomous regions on the pretext of fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); and controls Syrian oil fields, which many experts have noted is in violation international law.
Washington also has rejected the prospect of Turkish-led military operation on Kurdish-controlled territories in Syria, though it hasn’t taken a position on past operations elsewhere in Syria. For these reasons Turkey may have sought to align with Russia, Syria, and Iran as Washington fails to acknowledge Ankara’s security interests in the region, pressuring the US on key bilateral issues.
Mutual Terms
Having carried out four military operations, Turkey had maintained a rigid strategy in northern Syria but with notable differences across three regions: Afrin, northern Aleppo, and Tell Abyad.
Turkish forces were successful in displacing the local Kurdish population in Afrin and replacing them with militants and moved Turkman refugees to camps along the northern border, which had an impact on the region’s demography. Moreover, a military conscription law has been enforced by Tukey, cementing Ankara’s rule over that region.
But in Tell Abyad and northern Aleppo, Turkey has been more accommodating of the local population, and have negotiated joint patrols with Russian and Syrian forces, though Ankara has accused them of not keeping up their part of the deal. The purpose of these patrols is to counter PKK-backed Syrian militias active in the region.
Turkish media reports recently unveiled that in high profile intelligence meetings held in Russia and Iran, Syrian and Turkish officials discussed in great detail Ankara’s demands for removal of PKK militias from its southern borders, its refusal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish region, and its request to Damascus to cease cooperation with Kurdistan Regional Government.
Damascus, on the other hand, has demanded that Ankara would cease its support of Tahrir al-Sham militia, which has full control over Edlib; that Ankara would remove Turkish-backed militias fighting the PKK from the northern territories; and to reopen the M4 motorway linking Aleppo, Latakia, and Damascus, where Turkish forces had been deployed heavily, blocking access to the vital highway.
Demands by both sides seem unrealistic at this stage. It is difficult to picture the Syrian regime agreeing to Turkey’s full control of the northern territories including Afrin and Aleppo. And despite Russia and Iran’s pressure, Damascus wouldn’t overlook the increased terrorist activity surrounding its borders. At the same time, Turkey wouldn’t agree to Syria’s demands listed above, especially the reopening of M4, not soon at least, nor pushing back Tahrir al-Sham by 20 km as had been agreed previously.
The complexity of relations in Syria among regional and international actors may well slow any efforts of normalisation between Turkey and Syria. Yet an official meeting between the two presidents might facilitate an understanding and bring stability, which would offer Erdogan the leverage he needs to face upcoming challenges at home, and in the region.
