Libya has recently witnessed a dynamic shift in momentum, accompanied by a range of diverse reactions. This development can be attributed to the dedicated efforts of the Special Representative and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Abdoulaye Bathily. His primary goal has been to persuade the key stakeholders in the Libyan crisis to explore viable solutions and bring the prolonged transitional period to a decisive conclusion. The persistent challenges stem from ongoing disputes that consistently clash with the conflicting interests of all parties involved.
In November of last year, Bathily encouraged the engagement of Libya's five major parties in meaningful political dialogues. This initiative marked a fresh attempt to expedite the completion of the transitional phase. The parties include Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives; Mohamed Takala, the President of Libya's High Council of State; Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, the Prime Minister of the Libyan Government of National Unity; Commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar, a prominent military commander; and Mohamed al-Menfi, the Head of the Libya Presidential Council.
During his last briefing to the UN Security Council on December 18, 2023, Bathily stated that the five selected parties "are either capable of reaching consensus and making progress in the political process or prolonging the impasse and preventing Libya from holding peaceful elections." He added: "Competition among them and lack of trust is the basis of this protracted crisis."
Within this framework, an analysis of the UN envoy's initiative in Libya becomes crucial to discern whether it will lead to shifts in the positions of the Libyan parties or if it will inaugurate a heightened complexity in the issue.
A Revisited Proposal
There is no apparent indication that Libya is currently facing a new proposal, particularly based on the preliminary features of the initiative upon which Bathily is relying. However, the successful realization of this initiative may hinge on the initial procedural step that the UN envoy aims to accomplish. This step involves convening a preparatory meeting for representatives of the five parties or their delegates to outline plans for the subsequent phase. Bathily confirmed this during his recent briefing to the Security Council, stating, "As a preliminary step towards convening a meeting of the five main parties, I have requested the nomination of three representatives from each of them to partake in a preparatory session. The objective is to agree on the criteria for the main leaders' meeting, including the date, venue, and agenda."
This initial step introduces uncertainties regarding the likelihood of success, suggesting that overcoming the challenges of translating this idea into a concrete and viable proposition may prove to be a formidable task.
Bathily's current endeavors seem to echo his previous announcements, notably from his briefing to the Security Council in February, where he reiterated the necessity of forming a high-level committee. This committee would bring together the various Libyan parties involved in the crisis to collaboratively devise a legal framework and timetable for conducting elections and concluding the transitional phase. Despite these earlier efforts, Bathily faced challenges in completing this mission, encountering significant resistance to the initiative's proposal. Additionally, issues concerning the UN mission's authority and the boundaries of its intervention in shaping Libya's transitional process further complicated the situation.
Given Bathily's prior statement and the preliminary aspects of the new endeavor, it appears that there is no fundamental shift in the existing circumstances or interactions that could result in a significant change in the transitional phase. The only notable change is the extension of the UN mission's mandate by a Security Council decision in October. Although extension is common in such cases, the introduction of the initiative indicates Bathily's efforts to add new momentum in conjunction with the extension of his term. The previous period demonstrated his tendency to move stagnant waters or, at the very least, attempt to break the stalemate that governs political interactions in Libya.
The introduction of the proposal in the second term of the current UN envoy could be associated with the concept of gradualism or incremental progress. In his initial term, Bathily concentrated on extricating Libya from the grip of "militarization" and worked towards preserving the rules of military engagement through ongoing coordination with the Military Committee (5+5). This approach resulted in a reduction in conflicts among various military factions or, at the very least, contributed to their containment. Apart from the clashes in Tripoli last August between the "444 Brigade" and the "Special Deterrence Forces," Libya experienced a notable decrease in significant escalations among diverse military groups.
Following this strategic vision, the initiative could represent the second phase of Bathily's mission. The initial focus was on stabilizing the military landscape, preventing further escalation, and fostering a conducive environment for progress. The current step involves transitioning to the political arena and advancing the road map towards completion. However, this perspective raises concerns about the potential resurgence of conflict if the road map runs counter to the interests of local actors.
A Hard Access
The success or failure of any political reform in Libya hinges on several crucial factors. Firstly, the nature of pre-existing political interactions plays a pivotal role in shaping the potential for political transformation. Additionally, the qualities of the leaders involved in the process and their commitment to navigating the complexities of the transition are essential considerations. The involvement and limitations of non-governmental actors also significantly impact the success or failure of the transition process. Furthermore, the stance of international actors and the degree to which they support or embrace the political transition process is a crucial aspect. In this regard, the following significant trends can be identified:
1. Role dilemma and initiative architecture:
Despite high expectations from observers of the Libyan crisis for Bathily to be the first African envoy undertaking the responsibilities of the UN mission in the country, the mission's performance during the initial year of his term exhibited instability. Notably, Bathily altered his positions on the transitional process multiple times, initially stating that he would not advocate for a new government, deeming it a futile endeavor. However, in recent months, he shifted his stance, advocating for the establishment of a unified government to oversee the transition process.
Regrettably, the UN team faced challenges in exerting pressure on parties opposing the road map. In the recent period, Bathily aimed to communicate his observations without formulating comprehensive measures to break the political deadlock and alleviate the blockade constraining Libyan interactions. The call for a five-party meeting is deemed incomplete due to the absence of a defined timeframe or a detailed vision. Although Bathily mentioned deferring this matter to preparatory meetings before the Security Council, the architecture of the initiative necessitated more preparation before its public announcement. This precaution would help avoid devolving into a mere dialogue forum between Libyan parties with no tangible results on the ground.
2. Continued division and lack of consensus:
Bathily's proposal, akin to previous attempts to break through the Libyan deadlock, has encountered a persistent divide among the involved parties. The crisis of confidence and conflicting interests remain substantial obstacles to progress in the political transition. This was evident in the positions of the parties represented at the five-party meeting, where the Libyan House of Representatives and the General Command of the Army conditioned their participation or response to the initiative on the inclusion or exclusion of Osama Hammad, the head of the Government of National Stability, by al-Dbeibah, the head of the Unity Government. This further complicates the initiative's implementation, particularly as the Government of National Stability, formed within the House of Representatives, lacks both legitimacy and international recognition. Simultaneously, al-Dbeibah's government is grappling with a legitimacy crisis in eastern and southern Libya. The conflicting claims and differences regarding legitimacy could undermine any prospects for agreement on the project, as convincing one party to make concessions appears challenging.
On the other hand, al-Dbeibah expressed his willingness to participate in the five-party meeting, attempting to project support for settlement initiatives distinct from other Libyan parties. However, the conditions he outlined as necessary for the initiative's success suggest his ongoing commitment to previous stances. Al-Dbeibah introduced a third requirement by rejecting what he termed "side paths," asserting that any route leading to a new transitional phase is a futile endeavor and opposed by the Libyan people. This implies that al-Dbeibah is setting a condition to ensure his continued involvement in Libyan affairs, reintroducing the question of who oversees the electoral process.
Despite the conclusion of the tripartite meeting in Cairo on December 16, involving the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, the Head of the Libyan Presidential Council, Mohamed al-Menfi, and the Commander of the LNA Khalifa Haftar, confirming their participation in the requested round of dialogue by the international envoy may face several challenges. Saleh and Haftar's conditional participation announcement implies that their presence at the negotiating table hinges on concessions that Bathily might accept, such as excluding al-Dbeibah or including Hammad in the five-party talks and transforming it into a six-person forum.
Even if a breakthrough is achieved on this front, the meeting of Libyan parties at the negotiation table could lead to additional complications. Al-Dbeibah's insistence on remaining in power until elections are held, a stance he is unlikely to abandon, especially after Aguila Saleh's unsuccessful attempt to persuade Turkey to withdraw support from the national unity government during his recent visit to Ankara on December 13, poses a significant hurdle.
Furthermore, there are disagreements over each party's stance on the electoral laws passed by the Libyan House of Representatives. The House of Representatives views them as an expression of Libyan legitimacy, while the Supreme Council of State opposes these laws, claiming that the House of Representatives made amendments beyond what was agreed upon in the Joint Committee (6+6) meetings tasked with preparing electoral laws. This adds an additional layer of complexity to the already intricate negotiation process.
3. Excluding some important parties:
Bathily's invitation selectively excluded some key Libyan stakeholders, such as former regime members, tribal sheikhs and notables, and political parties. Despite the varied relative weights of such stakeholders, which rank lower than the five parties invited by the UN envoy, their exclusion may result in inadequate treatment, since supporters of the former government continue to enjoy popular support among many Libyans.
There are estimates suggesting that the decision of former regime supporters to withdraw from the national reconciliation project on December 15 was partially motivated by the inability to invite representatives of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's political team to the meetings requested by the UN envoy. The role of tribes in Libya is crucial for the future of the political transition process, and their influence may become more prominent if the election process is reinstated. Therefore, involving Libyan tribes in shaping the direction of the political transition might yield more favorable results compared to excluding them from these sessions. In this context, the Berber, Tuareg, and Tebu tribes, in a statement issued on December 16, demanded inclusion in the upcoming political dialogue and urged Bathily to reconsider his initiative to include effective representatives of indigenous peoples, preventing the widening of political gaps.
Bathily previously addressed these concerns in his call announced in February, emphasizing the importance of forming a high-level committee comprising all relevant Libyan stakeholders, including institutional representatives, major political figures, tribal leaders, civil society organizations, and security parties, as well as women and youth. The newest initiative, limited to the five major protagonists in the Libyan scene, lacks this comprehensive approach.
4. International and regional preoccupation with the Gaza war:
The Israeli war in Gaza has surged to the forefront of the international community's priorities, diverting attention from the Libyan issue and other conflicts in the Middle East since October 7. This shift in focus has made the events in Gaza a focal point for both international and regional power dynamics. This diversion of attention may impact Bathily's initiative in various ways, as foreign and regional engagements with the Gaza situation could temporarily hinder the application of pressure on Libyan parties to actively participate and engage positively in the dialogue.
In essence, the Bathily Initiative might encounter challenges in securing the necessary global and regional support needed to progress. The prevailing regional tensions may limit the external pressure required to encourage Libyan parties to respond positively to the call for dialogue. This suggests that the internal dynamics will likely play a crucial role in determining the success or failure of the initiative. With internal perspectives remaining stable and divided on this initiative, a significant breakthrough seems improbable unless external actors exert pressure on internal forces to respond affirmatively to Bathily's proposal.
The concept of a five-party table appears unlikely to facilitate the resolution of Libya's political stagnation and polarization. Influential Libyan parties seem determined to sustain the status quo, a situation that aligns with their interests and ensures their ongoing participation in this complex equation. Additionally, regional and international factors have dampened expectations for a substantial breakthrough in the Libyan situation for the foreseeable future.
