The three summits between the leaders of China and Gulf and Arab countries, held during a visit of China's President Xi Jinping to Riyadh from December 7-9, 2022, are proof that Sino-Arab relations are witnessing a historic qualitative leap.
Not only will Arab states enjoy more considerable manoeuvrability for their foreign policies and their quest for support for their political causes, such as the Palestinian cause- where China backs Arab views and the Palestinian people's struggle for their rights- but they will also be further empowered to forge cooperation. There will be strategic partnerships with significant powers to serve their own security and stability and achieve development and prosperity for those states that suffered from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and, later, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war.
Fruits of the 'Turtle Diplomacy'
Two decades ago, a significant development occurred in the relations between Arab states and China when the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) was launched in 2004 as the first Sino-Arab partnership. The pace of the development was slow and diverse in nature. In the case of the UAE, relations with China became at the centre of a whole new strategy after the president of China made a historic visit to the Gulf Arab country in 2018.
The Arab-Chinese relations used to be criticized for not undergoing profound political and security shifts due to China's strategy based on the communist country's desire to be friends with all because it wanted to lose none. The most evident example was China's position on Iran's interference in the internal affairs of Arab states, where Beijing did not oppose Tehran's behaviour. But the recent summits in Riyadh showed that moves taken by Arab states to strike a balance in their foreign relations are no longer in question but represent an actionable strategy.
The most significant remark that observers would come up with about President Xi's visit to Riyadh is that China is no longer finding it hard to reinforce its strategic relations with Arab countries as a whole bloc. In fact, it started to prepare for this move after the Cold War ended in the late 1990s. Moreover, China has been steadily moving closer to Arabs since 2004 when it launched the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004 and signed an economic cooperation agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the same year was, followed by several bilateral agreements. Later, in 2010, the China-Arab economic cooperation agreement was signed, only to be followed by China's launch of a series of strategic projects in Arab countries with a focus on infrastructure. These include the construction of the Port of El Hamdania in Algeria, a power plant in Sohar, Oman, and logistic investments in Port Khalifa in the UAE. These efforts show that China is moving slowly but steadily to implement its "turtle diplomacy" to expand its foreign relations with Arab states and Gulf Arab countries in particular.
New Characteristics for Sino-Arab Relations
The first Sino-Arab Summit held in Riyadh reflects a shared willingness to initiate strategic cooperation. China wants to take advantage of the historical moment of the Arabs' rift with their ally, the United States, and more specifically at the administration of President Biden, who seeks to give up the firm foundations of strategic relations that are based on defending the region's security in return for energy. He is doing so either by underestimating the Middle East or by seeking to sign a nuclear deal with Iran. That is why Arab states believe that because they are already suffering from unipolarity, benefiting from the rise of new world powers would create a beneficial balance for their own relations with the world order, which has always attempted to control Arabs' decision-making to serve its own approaches to international issues.
Consequently, following the Sino-Arab Summit, we should brace for significant momentum in Arab political and security arenas. Moreover, we should expect Iran to show concern and the United States to express annoyance because it would be far from happy at the rise of rival world power in the Middle East. The conflict between Washington and Tehran features implicit understanding, away from the Gulf states' view, about the region's future, where this political file is managed, by both the US and Iran, according to their understanding or disagreement. That has strained relations between the US and the Gulf states over the past years.
Moreover, we should expect to see significant momentum driving trade and investment relations between China and Arab states, especially because collective Arab political weight, represented by the Gulf region, is becoming more active and effective in the international arena. This scene takes shape with time. Collective Arab action appeared to be more organized and concerted compared with the period between 2011 and the lead-up to the al-Ula Summit, held in Saudi Arabia in January 2021.
Through its long-term policy, China achieved its goals and made strategic advances in a historical moment in which the world order might be reshaped. It began to drain the influence of the US, the traditional ally of the region, and scattered political and economic cards long believed to be unable to be moved. It even expanded these cards to include other issues currently prioritized by Arab states. These include the issue of climate change which became a priority for Arab states, especially after Egypt hosted the COP27 UN climate conference. Moreover, the UAE expressed interest in hosting the next climate summit (COP28). Perhaps, in the next stage, further cooperation will feature relations between China and Arab states, which will render traditional allies unable to restore their relations with the region to normal. However, the communique of the China-Arab Summit underscored continued cooperation with the United States.
The US Determinant
Undoubtedly, US-Arab relations will continue to be entangled because of intricate dynamics. But the Gulf states and other Arab countries have gained an influential presence in relations with major powers. Indeed, there will be long before Sino-Arab relations can make that qualitative leap. The objective reasons have to do with the stature of the United States, now the world's largest economy, and its international influence and dominance. But what happened in the Riyadh summits in December 2022 will accelerate the rapprochement between Arabs and the Chinese.
Arab capitals and Beijing are likely to expand coordination on political positions. But the issue of political alignments that Washington wants Arab states, and Gulf states, in particular, to abide by, is no longer there because such alignments do not serve the stability of the region and beyond.
