According to the 2021 Report of the Fund for Peace, 11 of the world's 15 most fragile states are located in Africa. These include chronically unstable countries such as: South Sudan, which has been in civil war since its independence in 2011 and the Central African Republic (CAR), which is largely dependent on a UN peacekeeping forces. Another example is Somalia, where Al-Shabaab militants control most of the rural areas, and where the efforts to build the national state are at risk of collapsing once more, leading it to slip into civil war due to the desire of members of the political elite, led by President Farmaajo, to cling to power. What is also alarming is the slow breakdown of countries in the Sahelo-Saharan region, and the expansion of jihadist terrorist groups from Mali to neighboring countries, including Niger and Burkina Faso. Despite the accomplishments of the French forces in eliminating some of the leaders of these groups, France now seeks to reduce the amount of its forces in the region. Furthermore, following the military coups in Mali, Chad and Guinea, the prospects regarding the Sahel remain extremely bleak. Thus, this article seeks to: First, outline the general features of the conflicts and security challenges in Africa during 2022, and secondly, crystallize the three major trends around African conflict hotspots.
Features of Security Risks
Four general features of the security risks and challenges faced by African countries can be tackled below, as they shape the geostrategic landscape of the continent during 2022:
1. Multi-dimensional threats:
There are multiple diverse security threats to African countries and their allies in the region and beyond. Extremist groups continue to follow the ISIS slogan that they are here to stay and are expanding in several countries in the region. Moreover, the civil war that has erupted in November 2020 in Ethiopia has led to the displacement of two million people, triggering massive human rights violations, and threatening to cause the outbreak of a famine in the Tigray region. The Gulf of Guinea is also a hotbed for piracy in the world. Meanwhile, drug trafficking is a constant source of concern in West, Central and East Africa. Additionally, cybercrime is a serious security problem, now more than ever, for law enforcement in Africa. Finally, emerging powers are expanding widely in Africa, building naval bases, selling surveillance technology and drones, and sending mercenaries to conflict zones.
2. Geographical spread of challenges:
The new security threats are marked by their geographical expansion and lack of localization, as no region is spared of these challenges. The Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, Eastern DRC and Mozambique face the brunt of extremist threats. Russian mercenaries operate in the Central African Republic, and the military government in Mali has sought their services in the Sahel. China has a base in Djibouti and is seeking to build another one on the Atlantic coast of Equatorial Guinea. Moreover, China has either built, operated or financed at least 46 commercial ports throughout the region. Obviously, no African country is immune to the stresses of climate change and the devastation wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. Complicated hazards:
Notably, the challenges faced by African countries defy the traditional means of settlement, as they are extremely complicated and intertwined. It is not enough to settle these challenges with sanctions and dispatching of peacekeepers, or by providing assistance in the fight against terrorism. Many of these challenges are systematic, stemming from marginalization, mismanagement, as well as lack of opportunity and hopelessness among young people. There is an increase in what may be described as "ethnic wars", such as the case in Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Ethiopia. However, several of these wars are not necessarily ethnic in nature but are driven by a small group of elites seeking power and control over the government. Leaders, who are already in power, are meddling with the ethnic card to lobby the opponents while discrediting them. So, wars that are ethnic in nature are not essentially caused by ethnic differences alone, but also involve political maneuvering and seeking self-interest by a particular group of elites. The same is true of the issue of religion being a cause of conflict, as leaders deliberately use religion to advance their political ends.
4. The threat of climate change:
African countries contribute the least amount of global carbon dioxide emissions. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to impose a one-size-fits-all solution for climate adaptation and mitigation in sub-Saharan Africa. Climate change is increasingly impacting the African continent, afflicting the most vulnerable and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and pressure on water resources. Over the past years, devastating floods have taken place, in addition to an infestation of desert locusts, and the emergence of the specter of drought due to the "La Niña" phenomenon, which affects the climate of the tropical region. To make matters worse, the human and economic toll has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Three Governing Paths
1. Repercussions of the Ethiopian Civil War:
The civil war in Ethiopia will be a primary source of tension in one of Africa's most promising economies and across the broader Horn of Africa in 2022. Although instability preceded the war that broke out in November 2020, the Ethiopian conflict has since gained impetus. The country is heading towards the brink of the abyss, with all the negative repercussions on the unity of the state as well as the safety of the countries of the region. Enforcing a negotiated settlement is a top priority to stop the bloodshed and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the North of the country. No matter which direction things go, settling deep societal divisions will be a key challenge. Mediation endeavors by the African Union and other entities are unlikely to achieve much progress and the US may resort to imposing sanctions on those perceived to be prolonging the crisis. Ethiopia has actually been suspended from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
If not resolved, the Ethiopian civil war will have serious implications, as it will lead to an ongoing humanitarian disaster and may affect the unity and cohesion of Ethiopia as well as neighboring countries. The Ethiopian conflict may deter some traders and investors from investing in Ethiopia and possibly the broader Horn of Africa in 2022. Along with that, tension will escalate and relations between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan will deteriorate, as the former seeks for the third year in a row to fill the Renaissance Dam in 2022. The filling of the dam has been viewed as an existential threat, since it impacts the water supplies in the downstream countries, namely Egypt and Sudan. However, the chance of an international armed conflict is ruled out given the high cost of military confrontation for all parties involved, as well as the significant international endeavors to mediate and prevent military escalation.
2. The ongoing crises of the Great Sahel region:
The humanitarian and security crisis sweeping through the Sahel region in West, North and Central Africa is likely to worsen, given the increased ethnic violence and political and societal conflicts. Security hotspots include the civil wars in Libya and Somalia, the Anglophone crisis in two western regions of Cameroon, as well as the conflict over natural resources in Eastern DRC. Conversely, over the past five years, no sufficient attention was paid by regional and continental actors to the conflict in North and Southwest Cameroon, which began as protests against mismanagement and marginalization, then turned into a violent rebellion and a threat of secession to realize the dream of Ambazonia. This has caused numerous deaths, turned thousands of lives upside down and created a humanitarian crisis that could have been avoided with a little wisdom and reasoning by the ruling elite. The dogmatic stance and military approach adopted by the Cameroonian government did not help in reaching a settlement to the conflict. This threat is likely to continue over the coming period.
On the other hand, the Central African Republic entered a loop of violent conflict several years ago, and developments reflect that it is still stuck in an intractable cycle of violence. The political dialogue desired by the International Conference on the Great Lakes region (ICGLR) and others has been greatly hampered by the lack of political will on the part of the parties to the conflict, in addition to the fragility of the state, which necessitates the adoption of a new approach for sustainable peace.
South Sudan will also be another epicenter of conflict to monitor, as it enters the final year of implementing the revitalized 2018 agreement on conflict resolution. Despite the progress that has been achieved, much is yet to be done to end the political transition within the time allotted and to end the years of suffering for the people of South Sudan. Conflict in the Sahel and other parts of Africa is likely to exacerbate issues regarding water and food security, unemployment, poverty, organized crime, repression as well as internally displaced persons. Thus, 2022 will be a difficult year for those living in potential conflict zones in Africa. Political and security risks will also remain extremely high for traders and investors doing business with insecure African countries – which implies fewer opportunities for foreign capital inflows.
3. Terrorist expansion in Africa:
Since 2017, when ISIS lost its caliphate in Syria and Iraq, Africa has become a new hotbed for the fight against terrorism. Although violent extremism in the continent is not novel, incidents of violence linked to ISIS and al-Qaeda have escalated dramatically over the past years. Fragile states struggle against terrorist armed factions in vast insecure expanses, where central governments have limited powers. The Sahel witnessed escalating bloody events, mostly due to the battles in which terrorist groups were involved, and which extended from Northern Mali to the center of the country, then to Niger, passing through the countryside of Burkina Faso, and then reaching the coasts of West Africa.
Last year, the Boko Haram insurgency lost swathes of Northeastern Nigeria. The movement disintegrated after the killing of its leader, Abubakar Sheikawi. However, dissident groups continue to cause massive losses of life and property around Lake Chad. In East Africa, Al-Shabaab remains an active force which controls large parts of rural areas in Southern Somalia. It even runs Sharia courts and collects taxes forcibly from the people of those areas, and sometimes launches terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, such as Kenya. Northern Mozambique and Eastern DRC represent the latest violent jihadist front, which is also a source of concern. Rebels demanding the establishment of a new ISIS province in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique have stepped up their attacks on security forces and civilians. Nearly a million people are estimated to have fled the combat. The militants have loose ties with ISIS networks that straddle the continent's Eastern coast and into the civil war-ravaged Eastern Congo. Another Islamist rebel group by the name of “The Allied Democratic Forces”, a Ugandan militia that has long operated in the Congo, has pledged allegiance to ISIS, and has already launched attacks in the Ugandan capital Kampala last November.
The Mozambican government, which had long resisted outside interference in Cabo Delgado, finally agreed to allow Rwandan troops as well as units from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to enter and fight the terrorist groups. Indeed, those forces have tipped the scales in favor of the government forces, although the militants appear to be reassembling their ranks, which means that the Rwandan forces and SADC may be embroiled in a prolonged war.
In Somalia and the Sahel, the withdrawal of Western forces may be a crucial factor, as foreign forces (the European Union-funded AMISOM, as well as French and other European forces in the Sahel) are helping to contain terrorist groups. However, military operations often repel the local population and further degrade their relations with state authorities. In any case, if foreign endeavors decline, the dynamics of the battlefield will undoubtedly, and perhaps decisively, shift in favor of terrorist groups. In Somalia, the Afghan scenario may be repeated, where Al-Shabaab seizes power in Mogadishu as the Taliban did in Kabul.
In conclusion, the decision makers in Africa should reconsider and redefine the security challenges facing African countries and the means to address them, as well as identifying the best approaches to dealing with international partners to confront these current and future security threats. One appropriate course would be to stop tackling these threats as separate issues. Africa must respond to the challenges posed by violent extremism, wars, as well as local and cross-border conflicts, and begin to chart effective ways to confront them by addressing their root causes.
These multiple challenges facing Africa also require concerted regional and continental responses, and although there are several mechanisms in place, their implementation depends significantly on the will of states and on their using their own means without relying entirely on external decisions. Although such mechanisms and frameworks provide direction and potentially decisiveness in the short term, addressing the systematic weaknesses associated with post-colonial state fragility will remain the primary responsibility of African governments.
