Political parties and coalitions, often referred to as the “establishment” parties or the parties sponsored by the regime and the president, face in the coming months escalating crises impacting their performance, their alliances, and their survival. These crises are evident in the current state of the dominant parties in the Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Djibouti, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. These parties suffer from a legacy of repeated failure in attaining domestic achievements, the escalation of conflicts involving party leadership, and the formation of fluid institutional party alliances. In addition, there is increasing intersection between executive functions and party roles, conflicts on the fringes of party coalitions, the absence of ideological harmony between these ruling coalitions, and the purging of the party structure from dissenting elements. Furthermore, there are doubts being cast on the legitimacy of their social representation, as well as the incompetence of party leadership in confronting major crises and their alliances with armed militias. 

Mainstream literature on ruling parties and coalitions in the region seeks to explain their failure to carry out their political functions to the detriment of internal stability through the following factors:

1- Repeated failures to attain domestic achievements: These failures are epitomized by the experience of Egyptian political parties. The regime’s parties have failed over six decades, beginning with the July 23rd Revolution of 1952 until the June 30th Revolution of 2013, to attain domestic success. This was one of the main reasons behind the refusal of Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi to set up a new political party to enhance his popular backing, in addition to the stipulation in the Egyptian constitution that a president may not join a party, and must suspend any party membership prior to taking office.

Vast segments of the Egyptian population participated in two uprisings within two and a half years, first to depose the ruling National Democratic Party under President Hosni Mubarak, then to depose the Freedom and Justice Party under President Mohamed Morsi. These uprisings express an undermining of the regime’s legitimacy under two different administrations. Authoritarianism was also rampant under the ruling parties during the tenure of Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, the Socialist Union under the former, and the Egypt Party (which later became the National Democratic Party) under the latter. Because of this history of failure, Sisi wishes to avoid the founding of a “June 30th Party”, an initiative proposed by Dr. Huda Abdel Nasser. 

Prior experiences of ruling parties in Egypt have strengthened the current president’s convictions that the regime’s parties, despite their differences in name and formation and the context of their function, presented more a burden upon the president than an asset to his political and popular appeal. In light of this, it would not be feasible to replicate old circumstances given new transformations, transformations which are resistant to the formation of regime-sponsored party with no vision or role in policy-making except for propagandistic support for the president’s decisions. This was illustrated by the journalist Abdallah El-Sennaw who wrote: “there is a different between a political ally which supports and one which simply pledges loyalty”.

Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party had suggested to President Sisi, during his visit to Chinain December 2014, the establishment of a political party to aid his rule. They offered support from the Communist Party in training the cadres of such a party, especially in communicating with support bases among the population. President Sisi replied that it was too early to consider such a move, and would later state his desire not to establish such a party during the National Youth Convention on the 27th of October 2016. This was significant, as it was rumored that the attendees of this conference would form the backbone of a political entity which the President would lead in the coming period. 

2-The intensifying conflicts among political leadership: The National Liberation Front, the ruling party of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has suffered from repeated struggles over its leadership. The most prominent manifestation of this struggle occurred over the last two years, during which Abdelaziz Belkhadem was excluded from becoming the party’s General Secretary, and the resignation of the incumbent Secretary, Amar Saidani, on the 22nd of October 2016. This occurred despite the latter’s instrumental role in the removal of the head of Algerian intelligence, known as the Department of Intelligence and Security, Lieutenant General Mohamed Mediene. Mediene, often referred to as “General Toufik”, was known as Algeria’s “kingmaker” (or president maker in this case), to the extent that he would be referred to as the “lord of Algeria”. 

Due to the increase of Saidani’s power, influential elements within the military and the office of the presidency sought to either dismiss him or have him resign due to health concerns. The ruling party’s central committee approved of the appointment of Djamel Ould Abbes as Saidani’s successor, in recognition of his seniority, an indication of the existence of a ‘corrective’ campaign taking place within the party, which maintains the balance of power within the small groups charged with decision making in Algeria. 

3-The formation of new institutional party alliances: Studies reveal new alliances being formed with an eye on the future of the rulership of Algeria after 2019, the year in which the current term of President Bouteflika ends. Certain civilian groups seek to nominate the president for a fifth term despite him having not addressed the Algerian public since May 7th, 2012. The pro-Bouteflika camp is led by Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, the incumbent General Secretary of the ruling party Damel Ould Abbes, and the former Minister of Trade Amara Benyounès. In this context, the General Secretary stated the following in an interview with the newspaper “Al-Hayaa” on November 5th, 2016: “whoever stands behind Bouteflika’s program is with us”.

In contrast, the former General Secretary Amar Saidani is at the head of the faction backing the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah. Though Saidani had made public his support for a fifth-term for Bouteflika upon his election as General Secretary in 2015, he received a note of congratulation from General Gaid during that time, an act of decorum that the General had not displayed with any other party leader. This would suggest an understanding between the two men and a desire on General Gaid’s part to run for the presidency. Such a run would require the backing of a political party with widespread popularity among the populace and a strong presence in municipal councils and the parliament. 

The Gaid-Saidani alliance has irked the pro-Bouteflika powers, which either support his election for a new term or him choosing his own successor. This faction is known as the “President’s clique”, a group that is convinced that Bouteflika will appoint the man who succeeds him. This may explain the ruling party’s support for Bouteflika, and his appearance at certain grand openings such as the Algerian Opera, the ‘International Conference Palace’, and the ‘Great Mosque Workshop’ in the capital’s eastern suburb, which sends a clear message that the President is physically able to rule for another term. 

What amplifies this message is a constitutional amendment carried out by the President at the beginning of this year: the annulment of an article which allowed the incumbent to the presidency to remain so for life. The constitution now holds that a president can only rule for two terms, which would effectively have Bouteflika starting at term zero as opposed to his fifth, allowing him to stay on for two more. It is in this context that the ruling party’s General Secretary Abbes expressed the party’s support for another Bouteflika term. Yet the President does not appear to share this sentiment, especially when one considers his initial refusal to run for a fourth term after suddenly falling ill.

4-Increasing overlap between executive functions and party roles: This phenomenon is most apparent in the experience of the Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) Party. It was founded by current Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsiin the middle of 2012, and was the most successful party in the parliamentary elections held on the 26th of October, 2014. The party has since been the stage of a conflict between two blocs, with each sideplaying its cards in the media and external backing and support from powerful players within the state and society. One bloc seeks to support President Essebsi’s son Hafedh, whereas the other backs the former General Secretary of the party Mohsen Marzouk for the presidency, and seeks to curtail the power of Essebsi’s family.

The pro-Essebsibloc succeeded in allocating the premiership of the government to Youssef Chahed, while simultaneously occupying the leadership of Nidaa Tounes. This situation has led the party to resemble what may be termed a sick man, as it simultaneously reflects both a crisis within the party and a crisis within the ruling regime. The party leadership has sought to monopolize vital roles within the state, with Chahed as prime minister, Essenbsi as president, while party member Mohamed Ennaceur heads the parliament. Nidaa Tounes appears oblivious to the example of the Ennahda Party, which proved the inability of a single political faction to shoulder the burden of rule alone. Remaining in power in such circumstances may eventually ‘burn’ the ruling party politically, as demonstrated by what occurred with some Islamist political parties after the Arab uprisings. 

Mohsen Marzouk has called for the formation of a supreme state council encompassing the president, the head of government and the head of parliament, to be led by President Essebsi. Essebsi, on the other hand, seeks to form a new party of “national unity”. Its aim would be to confront the disputes and divisions within Nidaa Tounes, and to form a unified front capable of guaranteeing a political balance with Ennahda, as the latter’s 69 parliament seats outnumber Nidaa’s 56 (out of 217 available). Discussions have taken place in recent weeks between Essebsi and leftist and trade unionist figures, which may lead to his abandonment of Nidaa Tounes, after its internal rifts have impacted the parliament’s makeup, and the increasing overlap between the party and the state. 

5-The struggle on the periphery of party coalitions: Conflicts on the political periphery are beginning to manifest themselves as a pattern within victorious parties in Moroccan elections. King Mohammed VI of Morocco stated as much in a speech in Senegalese capital Dakar on November 6th 2016, on the 41st anniversary of the ‘Green March’and the reclamation of the desert from Spanish colonialism. “Morocco is in need of a serious and responsible government” he stated, “yet the coming government should not be a mathematical issuerelated to satisfying the desires of political parties and gaining a parliamentary majority, as though it were a matter of dividing the spoils of an election”. He added “The government is a harmonious and effective structure, suited to programs and priorities. It is built upon competence and qualifications for specialized functions. And I will be careful to form the next government in strict accordance and conformity with these standards, and I will show no tolerance for any deviation from them”. 

There is also an escalation of factional conflicts within the ruling party in Mauritania, between the head of the party Mohamed Ould Mohamed and the head of the Senate Mohsen Ould El Haj. The schism intensified after Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz declared his intention to disband the Senate without consulting its members, citing its expenses and its impediments to legislation, and replacing it with regional local councils. A referendum regarding the disbandment is planned, which has raised protestations from the Senators. 

The crisis peaked in June of 2016, exposing the fragility of the ruling coalition. The senators demanded the resignation of party president Ould Mohamed, and the removal of 14 ministers who spearheaded the anti-Senate campaign from their posts. Some senators even went as far as threatening to file defamation lawsuits against some members of the government, should the dispute fail to be resolved. 

6-The absence of intellectual cohesion within ruling coalitions: This applies to the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, made up of Nidaa Tounes, Ennahda, the Free Patriotic Union, and Afek Tounes. The alliance between Nidaa Tounes with unionists, leftists, and former members of the now-defunct Democratic Constitutional Rally, the ruling party under deposed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, demonstrates a political alliance lacking cohesion. The alliance prioritizes checking the power of Ennahda over having an ideological basis or an economic, social and cultural project. Having a coherent political identity is important in light of the necessity to preserve the secular nature of the state and resist ”takfiri” terrorism, as well as reestablishing the authority of the Tunisian state which was severely eroded during the ‘Troika’ period. 

This incoherence is also evident in the ruling coalition formed after the Moroccan elections on October 7th, 2016. No individual party was able to attain an absolute majority, and thus followed the logic of “partnership not domineering”, which led to negotiations to form a coalition government with three other parties.

The Justice and Development Party previously spearheaded a governmental coalition after the November 2011 election with three non-Islamist parties: Istiqlal Party, the Party of Progress and Socialism, and the Popular Movement. Istiqlal withdrew from the coalition to be replaced by the National Rally of Independents. These are ideologically and politically incoherent party formations, an issue which is expected to surface in the upcoming coalition. This is also the case with regards to the situation in the Sudan, with the current negotiations between the opposition and the ruling party, the National Congress.  

7- The purging of dissenting elements within political parties: This is reflected by the experience of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, after the failed coup in mid-July 2016. The party leadership is attempting to purge the party from elements suspected of being aligned with the Fethullah Gulen movement, which the Turkish government accuses of being a “state within a state” and has classified as a terrorist organization. This was made clear by the party’s Vice President Hayati Yazıcı on August 5th 2016, as reported by the Anadolu news agency, which quoted him as stating: “There is an order given for an immediate purging of the party”. 

A government may adopt the goal of outlawing or uprooting the party itself, as seen in Iraq with the Council of Representatives issuing a law outlawing the Baath party, preventing it to gaining power of participating in political life. The law also includes penalties for its supporters and promoters, though this conflicts with the Iraq constitution’s provisions guaranteeing freedom of political thought, as well as international law and the UN Charter guaranteeing freedom of political opinion and persuasion. 

It should be pointed out that there is a fundamental contradiction in the actions of the Iraqi ruling elite, their exclusion of the Baath party domestically contrasting sharply with their cooperation with its Syrian branch. This is shown by the exclusivist and sectarian inclinations of the ruling Iraqi parties, which prioritize curtailing domestic dissent and supporting Iranian policies of dominating decision-making in certain Arab capitals, particularly after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

8- Casting doubt on the legitimacy of social representation: The example of the Baath party in Syria is illustrative, as the party and its allies won a majority of the parliamentary seats in the elections held in regime-controlled area on April 13th 2016. The opposition, both in Syria and abroad, voiced its opposition to this, as did some Western countries such as France. Roman Nadal, spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, stated that the elections were carried out “without a proper election campaign, under the supervision of an oppressive regime, and without international supervision”. 

9- Weakness of party leadership during moments of crisis: This applies to the performance of the nationalist leadership of the Socialist Baath Party in Syria, which was disbanded on the 21st of January, 2016. The party leadership had all its property confiscated, including real estate and cars and offices, in response to its feebleness and negligence in performing its role in the political arena for many years. This failure was especially pertinent after the March 2011 uprising which escalated into an armed conflict between the Assad regime and the armed opposition and terrorist groups. 

Another reason for this disbanding is related to the application of a law regarding the establishment of political parties which prohibits Syrian parties from opening foreign branches. Such foreign expansion is probably seen as surplus to requirements by the Assad regime, as the Baath is no longer necessary to provide ideological cover for its interventions in Lebanese, Jordanian and Palestinian affairs. Party slogans like “the people are our route to Arab unity”, and “one eternal Arab nation”, no longer have any basis in reality.

10- Aligning with armed militias: This is exemplified by the dominant party in Yemen, the General People’s Congress, formerly headed by ex-Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh came to align with the Houthi rebel group as part of a plan to regain his lost power and take revenge against the youth movements that sparked the 2011 uprising, which forced him to resign in accordance with the dictates of the Gulf initiative. However, there are disputes between the two parties which are not marginal, nor easily resolvable, in light of the complicated struggle occurring in Yemen at present.

In conclusion, the disputes, crises, and splits within Middle Eastern establishment political parties, or ruling coalitions, be they in the executive branch or the legislative, are expressions of conflicts of interest as opposed to genuine concern over the fate of nations. Such crises can become never-ending, thus compromising the stability of the ruling regimes, which should focus on establishing their legitimacy via tangible achievements, and not simply an instinctive drive to survive at all costs.