Europeans are closely watching the results of the upcoming US presidential election scheduled for November 5, 2024, because of their potential implications for Europe and the transatlantic partnership. This is especially pertinent given the importance of this partnership and the contrasting approaches of the presidential candidates—Kamala Harris and Donald Trump—regarding it, whether through their previous governance experience or their campaign pledges. For Europe, the significance of the relationship with the United States is emphasized by the continent’s reliance on American security guarantees through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, in addition to the two sides’ extensive economic interests; the United States is Europe’s largest trading and investment partner, and both share a commitment to Western liberal values.
US-European relations had experienced previous periods of tension, including the European division over American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and during Trump’s presidency (2017-2020) when he questioned the utility of NATO. This is why Europeans are apprehensive that a potential return of Trump to the White House would have negative repercussions for Europe.
Common Issues
The US presidential election raises numerous questions regarding significant foreign policy issues for Europe and the potential repercussions of either candidate’s victory over the continent’s nations. Some of these issues can be outlined as follows:
1. European security and the future of the transatlantic alliance:
The future of American security guarantees is a primary concern for Europe in the current US presidential election, especially in light of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. European leaders have concerns over Trump’s possible return to the White House and its implications for Washington’s commitments to NATO and support for Kyiv. Some European decision-makers have stated that Trump’s return would imply that Europe will be on its own. During his first term and currently, amid his campaign, Trump adopts an antagonistic stance toward NATO, questioning its effectiveness and even describing it as “dead.” He has repeatedly criticized member states for failing to meet their obligations of allocating 2% of their GDP to defense, labeling them as free riders benefiting from NATO’s security umbrella without sharing the burdens.
Regarding US support for Ukraine, Trump has said that continued support for Ukraine is untenable, emphasizing the need to end the ongoing war. Western concerns persist despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s assertion, in an interview with Fox News aired on September 28, 2024, that he received “very direct information” from Trump that the former US president would support Ukraine in its war against Russia if he is reelected in the November presidential election. Should Trump win, Western fears arise that Trump would reduce US support for Kyiv, even pressuring Ukraine into reaching a settlement with Moscow that could involve significant concessions.
A Harris victory is expected to alleviate European concerns due to her support for NATO, Ukraine, and the strengthening of America’s key alliances. However, regardless of the election results, certain enduring aspects of the US policy will continue to affect Europe. Since the administration of former President Barack Obama, Washington has been advocating for a fairer distribution of burdens among NATO members and for European nations to increase their defense spending, following years of austerity measures in the wake of the euro crisis. If Harris wins, and despite her support for Ukraine, she is likely to press European countries to bear a greater share of the support burden, particularly as this aligns with Washington’s strategic shift from focusing on Europe and the Middle East (especially prior to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza) toward Asia and the Indo-Pacific, in an effort to contain China, which is seen as the theater where the fate of the global order will be decided.
One sign of this shift is the current administration under President Joe Biden signing a new defense agreement with Papua New Guinea in May 2023, as well as establishing the Quad alliance, which includes the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. The US focus on China places pressure on the European Union to enhance its defensive capabilities, which currently face multiple challenges. This issue will become even more pressing if Trump wins the presidential election.
2. Multilateralism vs. unilateralism and the future of the global liberal order:
The global role of the United States and the importance of multilateral institutions represent clear points of divergence between Trump and Harris. This comes at a time when the global liberal order, led by the US and the West, is facing significant challenges and undergoing a period of transformation. Amid heightened competition with China, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the dispersal of power among state and non-state actors, the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation frameworks is increasingly under pressure. Some within the US and Europe fear these institutions may become more antagonistic toward Western interests.
For Trump, embracing unilateralism and disregarding multilateral arrangements when they conflict with American interests is a hallmark of his “America First” doctrine. He sees no need to invest time and effort in maintaining influence within these institutions. During his presidency, the US withdrew from several multilateral agreements and institutions, including the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic, UNESCO, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Paris Climate Agreement, and a range of international security arrangements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. More withdrawals are expected if Trump wins the election.
Harris adopts a different vision, one that became clear during the Biden administration. Under Biden, the United States rejoined many international institutions and agreements from which it had previously withdrawn during Trump’s presidency. These divergent positions have significant implications for Europe. If Trump wins, Europe will face the challenge of Washington abandoning multilateral cooperation in several areas, such as climate change and renewable energy. This could place increased political pressure on Europe to slow its transition towards a green economy and renewable energy sources.
3. Relations with China:
There is bipartisan agreement between Republicans and Democrats that China represents the greatest challenge to the United States, a stance reflected in both the 2018 and 2022 National Security Strategies. However, the two parties differ on how to address this threat. Regardless of who wins the presidential election, it is expected that Washington will adopt a tough approach toward Beijing.
This bipartisan consensus is particularly evident in the economic sphere, as Washington strives to outcompete Beijing in the technological arena. During his presidency, Trump imposed tariffs on certain Chinese imports and placed restrictions on the export of US advanced technology to China, a move some described as a “trade war.” The Biden administration has continued along the same path, implementing additional tariffs on a wide range of Chinese imports, including electric vehicles and semiconductors. It has also placed further restrictions on US technological exports to China, especially in the field of advanced microchip production.
Harris is expected to maintain the same policy if she wins. In her statements, she has expressed dissatisfaction with China flooding the US market with substandard products, stealing intellectual property, and distorting the global economy with subsidized goods. Harris also emphasizes the importance of the United States prevailing in the technological competition with China.
This tough US approach, coupled with the intensifying competition between the US and China, will lead to the US increasing pressure on its allies, including Europe, to adopt firmer and clearer stances toward Beijing. As a result, Europe will find it difficult to distance itself from becoming entangled in the U.S.-China conflict and will become more vulnerable due to its greater economic exposure to China. If Trump wins, he could take unilateral actions and even penalize European allies if they fail to adopt decisive positions. Furthermore, Europe may find itself flooded with Chinese products seeking an alternative market to avoid US tariffs, among other potential consequences.
At present, Washington and Europe neither seem to be in agreement about their perception of China as the primary threat, nor about their approach to dealing with it. This division also extends within the European Union itself. The collective European stance views China as both a partner and a strategic competitor, emphasizing the need to reduce the risks of economic dependence on China while protecting the single market. However, there is a clear disagreement among some EU members on how to implement this approach.
4. Shift toward trade protectionism:
During his presidency, Trump adopted a protectionist trade policy, imposing tariffs on certain imports from China and on steel and aluminum imports from nearly all countries, including European imports. He also criticized the World Trade Organization (WTO) and threatened to withdraw the US from it. In his current election campaign, Trump has vowed to impose tariffs ranging from 10% to 20% on most imported goods, with the possibility of raising them to 100% for countries that attempt to trade outside the US dollar-based financial system.
As for Harris, during the first debate with Trump on September 10, 2024, she criticized his plan for broad tariffs, describing it as a sales tax that American citizens would bear. However, the irony lies in the fact that the Biden-Harris administration has continued to adopt protectionist measures. For instance, voluntary export quotas and restrictions were introduced to replace tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from the European Union. Additionally, several pieces of legislation reinforce this protectionist trend, most notably the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes a financial package offering subsidies and tax breaks for businesses investing in electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy projects.
To address international competition, the decline in manufacturing, and the struggles of the working class, there is bipartisan agreement—between Republicans and Democrats—on the need for certain protectionist measures, though they differ in their specifics. These measures aim to ensure US economic security by protecting and bolstering working-class jobs. This is to be achieved by restoring the United States’ manufacturing capabilities, encouraging domestic production, and enhancing its competitiveness. Certain industries and technologies are viewed as strategic, and there is a consensus that they must be localized within the country and not outsourced abroad.
This shift toward protectionism has led to tensions in US-European relations. For example, the Inflation Reduction Act, which offers tax breaks for electric vehicles manufactured in North America with locally produced batteries, effectively excludes cars manufactured in the European Union. In response, the EU accused Washington of engaging in protectionist practices that contradict global trade rules and of implementing discriminatory measures by providing exceptional support to companies producing within the US to the detriment of European firms. The President of the European Commission, Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen, has called for what she described as a “structural response” to the US’s new industrial policy. These disagreements are likely to intensify further if Trump wins the election.
Impact on Europe
The current US presidential election, and especially if Trump wins, could have significant repercussions for the European Union and the internal political landscape of several European countries, as outlined below:
1. Potential boost and legitimization for right-wing populist parties:
Europe is on the brink of witnessing a second wave of far-right populist parties that adopt an anti-establishment discourse, are skeptical of the European Union, and oppose immigration and multiculturalism. These parties have succeeded in either increasing their electoral shares or participating in ruling coalitions, with some even attaining leadership in several governments, most notably in Italy. This trend also extended to the European Parliament elections held in June 2024, where far-right parties achieved significant successes in countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria, and others.
On the other hand, some central countries have resisted this far-right surge with arrangements that appear fragile. For example, the governing coalition in Germany, led by the current Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his Social Democratic Party, along with partners the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, faces recurring internal disputes and is in a challenging position following the historic win of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in the local elections in the state of Thuringia in early September 2024, just ahead of next year’s federal elections.
In France, both right-wing and left-wing parties managed to prevent the far right from gaining power in the early legislative elections held on June 30 and July 7. However, the country seems to be on the brink of a political crisis due to the absence of an absolute majority in the parliament. In the European Parliament, despite the clear gains made by far-right parties, the center-right managed to maintain its position as the largest bloc in the parliament.
In this fragile context, where the European Parliament and some key countries have stood firm against the far-right surge, there is growing concern that a potential return of Trump to the White House could provide a boost and further legitimacy to populist far-right parties. This would increase pressure on the centrist mainstream parties in Europe, both on the right and the left, pushing them toward adopting a more hardline rhetoric and policies on various issues, particularly immigration and European integration.
Far-right parties are considered natural allies of Trump, which he himself emphasized in his first debate with Harris, praising Viktor Orbán, the right-wing Prime Minister of Hungary, who is skeptical of the EU and opposes its policies in many areas. This anxiety is supported by studies on electoral behavior, which suggest that the success of ideologically similar parties abroad can influence the success of comparable parties domestically, and vice versa.
In addition to these concerns, there is European anxiety about the damage that Trump’s potential return could inflict on democratic values in the United States and worldwide. These values are part of the European identity, and Trump’s success could amplify the momentum of illiberal trends in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, posing an existential threat to the European Union.
2. The danger of deepening divisions within the European Union:
Most experts and decision-makers in various European capitals believe that the solution to the widening gap in transatlantic relations, which is likely to increase if Trump returns to power, lies in formulating a unified European response. Some argue that failing to achieve this consensus will lead to further division within Europe, particularly among Central and Eastern European countries that heavily rely on the American security umbrella and may seek to establish bilateral arrangements with Trump. Additionally, Atlantic-oriented countries may have differing views on the goals of Europe’s strategic autonomy.
The disagreement over how to engage with the United States has a greater potential to divide the European Union than the disagreements over how to handle China or even Russia, given the significance and depth of US-European relations. The European split over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 serves as a prime example of this dynamic.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that regardless of the differences between Harris and Trump regarding the transatlantic alliance, climate change, and other issues, there is a shift in the US grand strategy. The gap in priorities, visions, and interests between the United States and Europe is widening. Consequently, many European decision-making circles and think tanks are raising questions about how to address this issue amid internal divisions and a lack of European leadership.
