The Biden Administration released its National Security Strategy on Wednesday October 12, with the president declaring that “outcompeting China and restraining Russia”, while focusing on restoring a damaged democracy at home would be the overwhelming challenge for the United States in the coming years. It indicated that these challenges would be met by investing at home, building a coalition of like-minded states and modernizing its military. The Strategy Report is required by law and has been regularly submitted by subsequent presidents. George W Bush’s strategy attempted to establish a “pre-emptive” doctrine. Obama, more of an internationalist, called for a move to a world free of nuclear weapons, and the expansion of American soft power to conquer disease and global poverty. Trump believed in the revival of super “revisionist” powers.
The Current American Realities
The new National Security Strategy seeks to update strategic tradition to fit current realities: such as tensions with Russia and frictions with China as well as global challenges such as climate change. It keeps democracy versus autocracy framing but through a more open approach, explicitly welcoming under its tent autocracies that reject using force to change borders. Albeit this was in reference to Iran, specifically important was the inclusion of the phrase: “We do not, however believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America’s image for us to be secure.”[i] With the additional focus on China what is new is that this should be done by greater emphasis on American strengths targeting investment in infrastructure, education, training, cybersecurity and green energy among other areas. This in itself reflects a greater involvement in the marketplace shifting away from free markets especially when coupled with restrictions on technology transfer as the recent constraints on microchips.
The report reflects as well a reduction in emphasis on the Middle East, associated with a perceived diminishing terrorism threat, American energy independence, global efforts to shift away from fossil fuels and an end to the era of American nation-building.
There was clear expression that the United States had had “an unrealistic faith in force and regime change to deliver sustainable outcome and stipulates that “it is time to eschew grand designs (in the Middle East) in favor of more practical steps.”[ii] The document asserts that the United States will support and strengthen partnerships with countries that subscribe to rules-based international order. This approach was first formulated by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1941 to describe America’s policies towards the world at large. Secondly, it affirms that the United States would not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandab. Thirdly, it will work to reduce tensions, de-escalate, and end conflict when possible through diplomacy. Fourthly, the United States will promote regional integration and finally it will promote human rights and values enshrined in the UN Charter.
The Challenges
The shift away from the Middle East and the way the policy is framed will be difficult to implement. Many in the administration still believe that what happens in the region is vital to American security interests. In mid-October relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia were shattered after the former’s criticism that the OPEC + decision to reduce production meant that the later was siding with Russia, instigating a negative rhetorical exchange including calls for a reevaluation of relations.
The Strategy contains no surprises on Iran. It stipulates that the United States will be working with allies to “deter and counter Iran’s destabilizing activities”, choosing diplomacy as the preferred tool to deter it from developing nuclear weapons and asserting it was ready “to use other means should diplomacy fail.” Much of this will be contingent on regional developments in relation to Syria and Lebanon as well as the lingering negotiations on the JCPOA.
The Strategy asserts the United States will not “tolerate” efforts of any country to dominate another including through “military means.” On the one hand, this flies in the face of its commitments to Israel to ensure its “qualitative and quantitative military superiority” in the region, an exception that has essentially become a standard. And, does this mean the United States will more substantially arm its Arab allies to counter Iranian efforts in light of diminished American operational engagement post Iraq and Afghanistan. These are important strategic questions for Arab states in the region, which have traditionally had strong security relations and implicit security assurances since the Carter Doctrine of 1980 where the president proclaimed that the United States would use force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf.
The document was vague on policies for other issues, but noteworthy was the explicit reference that “Two States along the 1967 lines, with mutually agreed swaps, remains the best way to achieve equal measure of security, prosperity, freedom, and democracy for Palestinians as well as Israelis.”[iii] No indication of a suggested viable process here, but nevertheless a useful reference.
The National Security Strategy is normally the subject of intense analysis by foreign policy analysts abroad and within the United States. Noteworthy, however is that its main audience is domestic, who is not particularly interested in foreign affairs, and when so mostly focused on real or potential threat perceptions. Therefore, the strategies are bound to be vague, rhetorical and imprecise and focused on threats only occasionally referencing opportunities. Another weakness is that each administration issues its own strategy thus limiting them to 4- or 8-year perspectives, because of the American electoral cycle. Consequently, important strategic questions are often left unanswered such as imperative changes in the world order. Add an equally important strategic ambiguity is how does the United States envisage itself? Is it as a Super, Global or a World power?
It is my strong belief that the United States correctly sees itself as a continuing world leader, yet recognizes that, in relative terms, its strengths and capacities will be more limited and less exclusive than before. It is thus imperative for Arab states to take this into account by diversifying options, reducing dependencies on foreign sources and increasing national capabilities as they look forward.
