Head of the Sadrist Movement and powerful Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has announced that a truce reached to observe the Shia religious observance of Arbaeen was extended for another two weeks to mid-October to give political forces a chance to respond to his demands. The announcement coincided with the Iraqi parliament’s rejection of the resignation of Speaker of the parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi on September 28. It also came while the Shi'ite Coordination Framework, the largest bloc in the parliament, claimed that, along with the Kurdisd and Sunni parties, it succeeded in establishing a new political coalition, reportedly named “Running-the-State Coalition.”
Successive Developments
Various political forces made moves in recent days as part of efforts to find a way out of the year-long political stalemate. These moves are outlined as follows:
1. Renewing confidence in al-Halbousi:
In a parliament session held on September 28, 222 MPs voted against the resignation of al-Halbousi, while only 13 MPs voted in favor. Additionally, Mohsen al-Mandalawi, who is close to the Coordination Framework, was elected first-deputy speaker of the legislature, replacing Hakim al-Zameli of the Sadrist Movement who, along with other representatives from the bloc, resigned in mid-June.
Al-Halbousi submitted his resignation to try to reiterate his legitimacy, always doubted by some forces of the Coordination Framework. In other words, he resigned in order to renew his tenure at the helm of the parliament using the votes of the newly formed Running-the-State Coalition, replacing the previous tri-partite coalition which voted for him. Al-Halbousi was kept in place for lack of a viable alternative and willingness to name one to succeed him.
2. Al-Sadr’s conditions for ending the crisis:
The Sadrist Movement’s decision to extend the unwritten truce until mid-October to observe the death anniversary of Prophet Mohammad. The three conditions laid down by al-Sadr include keeping the government led by Mustafa al-Kadhimi in power, announcing new elections, and dissolving the parliament and amendment of Article 76 of the constitution which states how the major blocs may form a new government and amend the law of Supreme Court to reinforce its independence of political parties. The conditions are likely to further complicate the crisis once again, especially because the Sadrist Movement has reservations about amendment of the electoral law, which is one of the major demands set by the Coordination Framework for approving early elections within one year.
3. The promotion for a new coalition:
Media organizations affiliated with the bloc, on September 25, reported that some political forces signed an agreement on announcing a new alliance including all the major Shia forces except the Sadrist Movement, as well as the Sunni forces represented by the Azm Alliance and the al-Siyada (sovereignty) Alliance and the Kurdish forces represented by the two major parties i.e. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in addition to the Babylon Movement, a Chaldean Catholic political party. The Coordination Framework, in a statement issued on September 28 in response to the parliament’s resumption of regular sessions, said that the new alliance will be named Running-the-State Coalition. The Coordination Framework reiterated that the new alliance was formed to run the state during transition and prepare for early elections.
The Coordination Framework made the announcement as a trial balloon and is waiting for reactions, especially from the Sadrist Movement, as well as the Sunni and Kurdish political forces.
Meanwhile, chief of the Asai’ib Ahl al-Haq, Qaid al-Khazali threatened to withdraw the militia’s candidate for the premiership, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, a threat backed, on September 25, by the Hikma Movement, led by Ammar al-Hakim, who also showed preparedness for an agreement with the Sadrist Movement on dissolving the parliament, but later noted that the two blocs disagreed on the mechanism for implementing such an agreement.
Al-Khazali too noted that the Sadrist Movement can participate in the government and get half of the portfolios (six ministries) in the quota of the Shia parties in the new government, which shows that the Coordination Framework recognizes the fact that it is impossible to form a new government without a deal with the Sadrists, especially after an MP from the State of Law Coalition, a rival of the Sadrists, emphasized that any new government will not be stable without the Sadrists being partners.
4. Rishreen movement’s comeback:
Thousands of Iraqis took part in a massive rally on October 1 to commemorate the third anniversary of the October Protest Movement protesting the ruling elite’s corruption and failure to efficiently run the country. The protestors chanted the same slogans they had used back in 2019, including the popular one which reads: “the people want to bring down the regime.” Police used teargas to disperse the protesters. In the southern city of Nasiriya too, hundreds of protestors commemorated the October 2019 protests.
Persistent Challenges
The recent political developments in Iraq appear to be a harbinger of dynamics yet to come in the coming period. These can be outlined as follows:
1. Continued government-forming issues:
Although the Running-the-State Coalition was established, and despite claims by the Coordination Framework that it reached agreement with the Sunnis and the Kurds, the development does not reflect the reality on the ground, where the Sunni forces have already many demands. These include enabling the displaced to return to their homes, removing the Shia Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF, from Sunni governorates, giving Sunnis a reasonable quota of jobs in the Iraqi military and security institutions, especially at branches in the Sunni governorates, and eliminating the accountability and justice commission and the de-Baathification committee, set up to eliminate former members of the Baath Party. These demands were rejected by major forces of the Coordination Framework. That is why, the Sunnis are unlikely to approve the formation of a new government before significant progress is made on meeting their demands.
2. The Kurds’ failure to agree on naming one presidential nominee:
Up to October 1, the Kurds have not reached agreement on naming one presidential candidate for the elections. Moreover, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP, insists on reaching an agreement with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan before the parliament can hold its sessions, which means that the KDP rejects a repeat of the two-nominees issue i.e. one candidate for each one of the two Kurdish parties, and having to resort to the parliament members’ votes to solve the issue.
On the other hand, the two Kurdish parties agreed on establishing a joint central administration for the oil industry in the Kurdistan Region, and placing pressure on the federal government to ensure that any oil fields that are discovered or exploited after the Iraqi constitution is approved, will be owned by the Kurdistan Region, and that the Kurds’ demands will be included in any local legislation, especially after the Supreme Court, the highest court in the country, on February 2022, ruled that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Oil and Gas Law of 2007 is unconstitutional. The ruling forced some foreign companies, such as oilfield services company Schlumberger, to leave the region. No doubt this demand will be prioritized by the two Kurdish parties during negotiations with the Coordination Framework over the forming of the next government.
3. The framework’s expected concessions:
The Framework is likely to make concessions to the Sadrist Movement to have its government approved. That would be achieved through naming another candidate for the premiership who can be approved by the Sadrist Movement. One such candidate is the governor of Basra Asaad Abdulameer Al Eidani, who is close to Muqtada al-Sadr and maintains a good relationship with the forces of the Coordination Framework, and can be accepted both regionally and internationally. The aim of the Coordination Framework is to try to convince al-Sadr of giving up his condition of keeping Mustafa al-Kadhimi in power at the helm of the government.
4. Al-Sadr maintaining ability to stage popular rallies as a bargaining Chip:
Al-Sadr kept silent about developments in recent days, but he still has influence on the country’s political landscape, acknowledged by his rivals from the Coordination Framework. The powerful cleric’s surefire choice is to resort to the streets and back popular rallies which have already begun to form in Baghdad and other cities.
The Coordination Framework will undoubtedly try to avoid this scenario, especially because of unrest in Iran, the main supporter of the Shiite bloc, following an ongoing series of wide anti-regime protests which began in Tehran on September 17, and witnessed armed clashes causing casualties from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The development indicates that Tehran might show less interest in the Iraqi crisis while it is trying to regain control of the domestic situation on its own territory.
The conclusion would be that the Coordination Framework took a step back and announced that it is prepared to give up on Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in return for naming an alternative candidate in order to convince al-Sadr of giving up on al-Kadhimi. It is not clear yet how prepared al-Sadr can be for meeting this demand, especially because Iran’s domestic unrest reflects negatively on its allies in Iraq, and on the Coordination Framework in particular. On the other hand, the Sunni and Kurdish parties are not willing to back the formation of a new government in partnership with the Coordination Framework without receiving guarantees that their demands will be met, especially because influential forces within the Framework rejected giving any concessions to the two blocs, which means the government-forming crisis is set to continue.
