Since 2009, Israel-Turkey relations have been nothing short of tense. During the period Turkey was highly critical of Israel’s policy on Palestine. From ‘Mavi Marmara’s’ Gaza flotilla raid, to withdrawal of diplomats following Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel, the tensions between the two sides reached its peak in 2010. But on 17 August Israel and Turkey announced they are restoring full diplomatic relations. What’s behind the change?
Regional Developments
While much speculation has been given over the reasons behind the recently restored relations, this paper will discuss the implications of the new era in Israel-Turkey relations, and what it could bring to the region. It must be noted that ever since diplomatic relations between the two sides were established in 1949 with the emergence of the state of Israel, it never has been bilateral in the typical sense: global and regional players and circumstances have heavily influenced their diplomacy. Oded Eran, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), in the aftermath of Mavi Marmara, wrote: “The relations between Israel and Turkey are not only bilateral, but for many years have also been part of a triangle, with the US constituting the third side” and that it has brought “Turkey’s importance as a US regional ally into sharp focus”.
Israeli leadership understood Turkey’s role in the region. Ehud Barak said in March 2011 that Israel had to have strong ties with at least one of the most influential players in the region: Iran, Egypt, Saudi, or Turkey. Considering Egypt’s preoccupation post Arab Spring, Iran’s regional aggressions, and Saudi’s reserve, Israel had to invest heavily in restoring relations with Turkey.
Much has happened in the region since Barak and Eran’s observations. Egypt has restored stability after the Muslim Brotherhood, designated as terrorist organisation by major Arab states, were toppled in 2013; the establishment of East Mediterranean Gas Forum; and most recently, the signing of the Abrahamic Accords. US President Biden visited the region recently and met major Arab leaders, asserting the importance of the Middle East to US foreign policy. And while Turkey has been hostile to the region’s states, including Egypt, the GCC, and Israel, with the spark of Arab Spring in 2011 until last year, its leadership may have come to realise eventually the damage this has brought to Turkey and the need for a new foreign policy on the region.
Thus, Turkey’s revision of its foreign strategy comes within a context of highly developing circumstances in the region. It began with increasingly warm statements by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan towards Egypt and the GCC, and efforts to rebuild relations with neighbouring Syria, whose Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad met his Turkish counterpart last October in Belgrade during the Non-Aligned Conference.
This shift in Turkey’s foreign policy on the region reflects a longer-term strategy that aims to opt for stability rather than confrontation. But, mindful of the negative public sentiment towards Israel, Turkish policy makers were careful to overhaul Turkey’s entire foreign policy without singling out Israel.
Three Implications
The Israeli-Turkish decision to restore full relations would impact three key regions, which may be outlined as follows:
1. The Mediterranean:
To make up for its deteriorating relations with Ankara, Israel went to strengthen its ties with Cyprus and Greece in areas of security, military, and trade. Increasingly, Ankara became isolated, especially as it was excluded from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum which was formed by Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine in 2019. Having missed on the opportunity to be a conduit for gas exports from these countries to Europe, Ankara’s revenue losses were mounting. The war in Ukraine exacerbated Turkey’s losses as Europe inches closer to abandoning Russian gas. On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey’s involvement in Libya and its hostility to Egypt following the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood heightened the tensions between the two countries, as well as with Greece and Cyprus.
Turkish policy makers, therefore, have realised they couldn’t take on the entire region. Instead, they have begun repairing Ankara’s relations in the region, starting with Israel, who has offered no guarantees it would cease its cooperation with Turkey’s historical rivals, Cyprus and Greece. Yet Turkey continues to show more leniency, having slowed down its gas exploration in disputed international waters, which may signal a willingness by Turkey’s leadership to sit to the negotiation table with its adversary neighbours.
Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, mindful how Jordan and the Palestinian Authority may perceive his country’s restored ties with Tel Aviv, was quick to reassure his Arab counterparts that Ankara still supports a two-state solution.
2. Iran:
The latest development may worry the leadership of Iran, especially considering the highly tense relations between Ankara and Tehran. In this respect, four implications could be anticipated:
a) Syria’s destructive decade: Israel had been isolated on the ongoing war in Syria as Iran, Russia, and Turkey dominate the scene in the war-torn country. But with Israel’s relations back to normality with Ankara it is seeking to increase the pressure on Tehran and drive it out of Syria, and perhaps Russia too with it. This poses a threat to Iran’s existence in Syria and the region.
b) Central Asia: which has become a sphere of influence in recent years, where competition among Iran, Israel, and Turkey have been intensifying. The newly restored relations between Israel and Turkey might break decade-long efforts by Tehran aligning with Ankara to keep Israel away from the region.
c) Military advantage over Tehran: the restored relations may lead to increased security and military cooperation between Ankara and Tel Aviv akin to their relations in the 1990s. This could also lead to Turkey joining the regional and international campaign demanding more restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme. With Turkey gaining access to latest military and spying technologies from Israel, Iran becomes at a considerable disadvantage in the region.
d) Dwindling Iran-Turkey trade: as Turkey desperately looks for a way out of its desperate economic situation, Iran looks with deeply worry at the Israeli-Turkish trade agreement announced in July, which will see the trade between the two countries increase from $7 billion to $30 billion in the coming decade. This, Iran reckons, might lead Turkey to abandon its ambitious trade plans with Tehran.
3. The GCC:
Turkey’s initial reaction was hostile to the Abrahamic Accords, the treaty signed between Israel and a number of Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain. And while Arab countries welcomed the move seeing it as a step towards stability in the region, Turkey perceived this agreement as an effort to isolate Iran in the region by forming an alliance.
While Iran’s fears have been proven unfounded, the recently restored Israel-Turkey relations may add to Tehran’s uncertainty in the region. And Ankara might join the pact in the future, cementing the view that the Accords could include non-Arab Islamic countries.
Moreover, Iran’s relations with countries party to the Accords might further deteriorate, as Tehran finds itself at a military and economic disadvantage to those countries.
Israel would certainly see the revival of its relations with Ankara as an opportunity to bridge new relations with other Arab and Islamic countries, mediated by Ankara.
Ongoing Test
The above views remain predictions that would have to stand the test of time. One must keep in mind that Israel-Turkey relations are bound by conflicted interests and fragile relationships in the region. Also, the current Israeli government is a care take government, which may well change in the upcoming elections in November, which is strongly predicted to see Benjamin Netanyahu, a strong antagonist of President Erdogan, return to office.
Finally, President Erdogan’s popularity has been suffering a steep decline, as his country goes through one of its worst economic crises in recent history. Unpopularity right ahead of elections, is a dreaded nightmare for any politician. President Erdogan, therefore, hopes to attract foreign investments that would revive his country’s economy, and manage to remain in office for the longest possible period. But policy experts remain maintain caution when attempting to analyse Erdogan’s strategy, for he may switch back to previous tactics which relied mainly on coercion to achieve one-sided political gains.
