The Shi’ite Coordination Framework, the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament, which consists of all Shi’ite parties excluding the Sadrist Movement, on July 25, unanimously nominated Mohammed Shia al-Sudani for the position of prime minister after National Security Adviser Qassim al-Araji withdrew his bid.
Why Was al-Sudani Nominated?
The nomination of al-Sudani as a compromise between the parties to the Coordination Framework, reveals the following significant matters:
1- Understanding between al-Maliki and al-Ameri:
Al-Sudani was nominated after an agreement was reached between the State of Law Coalition, led by former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the Fatah Alliance, which includes the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) led by Hadi al-Ameri, who hosted the meeting in his house. al-Ameri placed pressure on al-Araji to withdraw his bid.
Additionally, pressures were placed on both the Hikma Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, and the al-Nasr (victory) Coalition, led by former prime minister Haidar al-Abadi, to force them to approve al-Sudani’s nomination, but were both offered ministerial portfolios to support his nomination. The outcome was that the Coordination Framework unanimously voted for al-Sudani’s nomination.
2- Iran’s influential role:
Iran pushed hard for the nomination of al-Sudani to speed up formation of a new government, take Iraq out of the political void and put an end to the term of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.
Al-Sudani is a close figure to Iran and belonged to the Islamic Dawa Party- Iraq Organization. In the 1991 uprising, he joined members of other Shi’ite parties, who stormed government institutions before the government restored control over them.
Al-Sudani, with support from Iran, was previously named as a potential head of the Iraqi government to succeed then prime minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi who resigned on December 1, 2019 following popular protests. Yet, al-Sudani lost his nomination after he was accused of corruption and rejected by the popular movement. Protestors wanted to nominate someone who was not a politician. Then, a representative of the Sadrist Movement stressed that Iran put pressure to secure al-Sudani’s nomination as a successor to Abdul-Mahdi.
3- A return of sectarian policies:
Independent Iraqis believe that the Shi’ite Coordination Framework’s selection of al-Sudani without consulting the Sunni or Kurdish blocs indicate the Iran-backed bloc’s insistence on sectarianism and the quota system that guarantees protection for Iranian influence. Tehran, and more specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps believe that Muqtada Al-Sadr’s first attempts to form a government that does not reflect sectarian rifts represent a threat to its interests in Iraq.
Existing obstacles
Al-Sudani’s chances of success in forming a new Iraqi government will hinge on several dynamics that can be outlines as follows:
1- Approval from al-Sadr:
Despite losing his parliamentary majority after representatives from his bloc resigned from the parliament, al-Sadr still enjoys significant influence on determining the future of the next Iraqi government due to his popularity among Iraqis. Should the cleric decide to mobilize supporters, the government in Baghdad will be crippled.
It can be said that certain dynamics would prompt al-Sadr to reject al-Sudani’s nomination because of the nominee’s close ties to al-Maliki. Al-Sudani was elected twice to the parliament to represent the State of Law Coalition, led by al-Maliki, in 2014 and 2018.
Al-Sudani was also appointed Minister of Human Rights after al-Maliki formed his second government in December 2010, and served in the position for four years. From 2011 to 2016, al-Sudani served in seven ministerial positions as acting minister. These positions were: head of the Supreme National. Commission for Accountability and Justice (2011); minister of agriculture (2011); Chairman of the Political Prisoners Foundation (2013); Minister of Migration and Displacement and Minister of Finance (2014); minister of Social Affairs (2014); Minister of Trade (2015); Minister of Industry (2016).
In late 2019, al-Sudani resigned from the Islamic Dawa Party and established the al-Foraten Movement and served as its secretary-general. Currently the movement has three out of 329 seats in the Iraqi House of Representatives. Sources say that he has been training to enhance his political image and to distance himself from Nouri al-Maliki who lost his popularity and political influence. Although al-Sudani resigned from Islamic Dawa Party, he continues to be fully endorsed by al-Maliki, which is why al-Sadr may refuse to endorse al-Sudani viewed by the cleric as one of al-Maliki’s men. Recently, enmity between al-Sadr and al-Mailki was exacerbated after al-Maliki, in leaked audio recordings, attacked the influential cleric. Previously, al-Sadr rejected al-Sudani’s nomination as successor to Adil Abdul-Mahdi.
2- Unresolved issue of electing a new president:
The election of a new president for Iraq should be achieved before approving the nomination of Mohammed al-Sudani to head the new government. Leading figures from the Coordination Framework announced that they are not willing to wait for the Kurds forever to make up their mind and choose a nominee for the presidency.
Disagreement continues between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Bafel Talblani. The KDP insists on nominating Reber Ahmed, the interior minister of the Iraq Kurdistan Region, while the PUK wants to back the bid of current president Barham Saleh.
The two parties recently held intensified meetings to resolve this disagreement. The KPD offers to support the PUK’s nominee Barham Saleh if the PUK gives up certain sovereign positions in the Kurdistan Region government and agrees to hold the next legislative elections of the region as per the old elections law. The PUK declined the offer because its leaders believe that agreeing to these demands would lead to the party’s end and give the KDP an opportunity to dominate the Kurdistan Region.
3- The PUK’s threat of bypassing Barzani:
Ahmed al-Haki, a leading figure in the PUK, believes that the Kurdish party will resolve the issue of the presidential nominee after the Coordination Framework resolves the issue of nominating a new head for the Iraqi government. He says the house of representatives is likely to hold a session next week to resolve both issues.
Al-Harki noted that to date, the Kurdish powers have failed to reach agreement, and that this failure means that the 2018 scenario is likely to happen once again in the region where one of two presidential nominees would be elected in the parliament. Al-Harki also emphasized that the Coordination Framework, the Azm Movement and the al-Siyada coalition will vote for Barham Saleh against the KDP’s nominee Reber Ahmed.
However, it is not clear yet whether these statements were made to put pressure on the KDP or whether there are agreements already that were reached with the said powers in such a way as to allow the Kurds to choose their nominee regardless of any internal agreements.
4- Economic and security deterioration:
Iraq is experiencing security tensions. ISIS has increased its terrorist activities and carried out attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Saladine and Kirkuk against the Iraqi armed forces and the federal police force. Moreover, the economy and living conditions are deteriorating although the country’s currency reserves are poised to rise past USD 90 billion by the end of 2022.
The conclusion then would be that the chances of al-Sudani of forming a new Iraqi government will hinge on several dynamics the most important of which is al-Sadr’s position on the new government, his mobilization of supporters against it, which would eventually necessitate the holding of new elections. Another crucial dynamic is the Kurds’ ability to resolve the issue of their presidential nominee. Yet, again, if al-Sudani manages to form a new government, it will have to face the challenges posed by the deteriorating economic and security situation.
