Lately, an unlikely sort of governance has become a sought-after solution for complex crisis in the region – collective leadership. One form in particular, namely presidential councils, is proving practical as factions endeavour to overcome political cul-de-sac and issues of trust. Understanding this form of governance has become increasingly important as newly formed collective leadership councils in countries of Sudan, Yemen, and Libya are embraced to transition away from long and devastating years of civil unrests and armed conflicts.

Different Forms

War torn states of the Middle East have seen different forms of presidential councils. Some have come to existence by way of election, whereas others through appointment; some are made up of civil members, military, or a mixed representation of both institutions. Three case studies from across the region illustrate these three variations:

1.    Libya:

The first Libyan presidential council was formed following the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015. Endorsed by the United Nations, a new 9-man presidential council was formed, headed by the prime minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Mr Fayez al-Sarraj. The council took charge of key state functions and responsibilities, including appointing the commander in chief, the head of intelligence agency, and ambassadors and other senior statemen; signing of international treaties and agreements; or declaring war or state of emergency in the country.

Following the roadmap agreement at the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in November 2020, a new presidential council was founded. By February 2021, it was agreed that the GNA would hand over its responsibilities to a new presidential council with Mohamed al-Menfi as President, Abdul Hamid al-Dabaib as Prime Minister, and Musa al-Koni and Abdallah al-Lafi as council members. In addition to previous responsibilities carried by the GNA, the new council was tasked with paving the way for a national reconciliation, and assigning the ministers for defence and foreign affairs alongside the prime minister.

2.    Sudan:

In April 2019, the Sudanese Armed Forces announced the establishing of the Transitional Military Council to run the country for two years. The council was headed by General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, then Minister for Defence, and included high ranking officers and officials. Civil protests demanding the transfer of power to civil society led to the formation of a sovereign council to oversee the 39-months power transition during which the civic and military factions would share power. It comprised of 11 members including 5 military officers. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan would head the council in the first 21 months, followed by a civil president for 18 months. As unrests continued, General al-Burhan announced the restructuring of the sovereign council to include 14 members including 5 military officials.

3.    Yemen:

In April 2022, former Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced the establishing of a new presidential council to assume the leadership of Yemen during the coming transitional period. The Presidential Leadership Council is headed by Dr. Rashad al-Alimi and is comprised of 7 members representing the entire political, social, and tribal spectrum of the legitimate front. The council is responsible for forming a unified legitimate front, developing the political, security and military aspects, and improving the dire economic situation of Yemen. Additionally, the council will endeavour to work on a permeant cease fire deal with the Houthis, either through negotiations, or military option in case the Houthis refuse political dialogue.

Complex Drivers

 Examining the cases of Libya, Sudan, and Yemen most recently, a number of reasons as to how presidential councils become a practical form of governance during transitional periods in crisis states. These may be summarised in the following vectors:

1.    Dispute over power by political elites:

Recent protests and popular unrests have worsened the political polarisation in crisis states. Political rivalry between political elites and rising factions, in addition to deep enmity between old and new guards, have exacerbated the political structures within these states. With chances of political resolution becoming slimmer, the factions resorted to collective leadership to manage conflict during power transitions. Such approach facilitates the participation of all factions until permanent resolutions are reached. Therefore, the presidential council form of governance offers a workable solution to manage a highly delicate period of power transition. The Libyan presidential council of the GNA is a case in point. Following the waning of political Islam and the rise of liberal coalitions via parliamentarian elections, and the increasing clashes on the ground, a consensus was reached to form the council in 2014, paving the way to resolving the multifactored and violent gridlock.

2.    Escalating geographic and territorial disintegration:

Historically, often following civil unrests, power in peripheral regions has been held often solely by social factions that become representative of their regions’ interests. They usually demand and seek protection against past marginalisation and aggression according to their perspectives. As each region carry their own set of demands, presidential councils offer an opportunity for representation and participation, even for a short period of time, in the state building process and re-established institutions. The Yemeni council is an example of such approach, which included representatives of both northern and southern regions. In Libya, the establishing of the presidential council provided a balanced representation across Libya’s three regions, i.e., Cyrenaica, Tripoli, and Fezzan. Each representative of these regions brings a host of demands and wants to protect their objectives.

3.    The dilemma of managing the civil-military relations:

The various crisis in the Middle East have produced a host of challenges that have marred the civil-military dynamic in managing periods of power transition. The precarious relation is compounded by the persistence and prevalence of the military institutions vis-à-vis the ambitions of the rising civil factions. Often the two blocs clashed, driving the need for an adjusted collective approach to governance. Whilst the military institution is more advantaged to rule in previous periods, a more balanced approach become much needed. Thus, the presidential council formula offered a much workable solution to such stagnant political conditions. Indeed, the sovereign council in Sudan produced a delicate balance that met popular demands by incorporating a more active civil role that complement the integral role of the military institution.

The above outlined conditions have produced a paradigm framework for effective management of political crisis in the Middle East. As trust amongst political factions diminishes, and protecting parochial interests become the main objective, the collective approach to leadership presents an opportunity for all political players in crisis states to break away from political stalemate.     

Achievable Opportunities

The collective leadership model offers various possibilities to overcome complex political landscape. These opportunities can be summarised in two key vectors:

1.    Overcoming impasse of representation:

The model of presidential council addresses the issue of trust. It is a suitable formulation of power that encompasses the wide spectrum of factions by establishing a shared space and a common ground.  Moreover, councils offer a non-violent alternative to armed conflict. The platform offers better incentive for all factions to resolve conflict through sustainable political dialogue.

2.    Regional support to council formation:

The success of these councils often relies on active regional and international support. State mediators can facilitate dialogue, offering viable alternatives to futile armed conflict. They also offer assurances that instigate trust amongst council members that bridge differences and perspectives. This is a key aspect: it ensures a balance share of power amongst council members to prevent power control by a single member in sensitive transitional periods during which institutions and constitutions are being built collectively.

Risks and Challenges

Whilst the opportunities are myriad, risks of this model failing remain real. Some of the challenges that may hinder the success of this mode include:

1.    Prolonging periods of transition and conflict:

Maintaining the status quo at times seem to political rivals a lesser of evils. Long-standing armed conflict produce a bottleneck that often push factions to preferring to keep their political gains instead of regressing to pre-agreement conflict, or worse plunging into a power vacuum that leads to nowhere. This was clearly demonstrated by the international recognition of GNA in Libya until 2021, despite the council’s responsibility having legally and constitutionally elapsed several years prior.

2.    Institutionalising power quotas:

As presidential councils gain power to transform the various institutions of their countries, there emerges a host of political factions who may want to capitalise on quotas for distribution of power based on regional, social, or territorial demands. These factions tend to challenge the main role of councils and they risk them becoming a mere fragile assurance for national treaty based on sharing government positions – defeating their original purpose as agents for political reform that steer their countries from conflict to peace. If quotas become institutionalised, they often aggravate political division as factions become overly protective of their own agendas.

3.    Disharmony amongst council members:

The legitimacy of any presidential council rests on its own cohesiveness and its ability to keep a balance between the various components within it. As often is the case, presidential councils contain different social and political factions that normally sit at opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. These irreparable differences risk the council becoming incapacitated, failing to achieve reform. It would lead to the disintegration of the council when faction members decide to withdraw, or others manage to dominate, causing unrelenting disagreement amongst council members.

In summary, presidential councils have become an effective platform to overcome prolonged political standstill in the Middle East. Despite its promising advantage, it could turn into just another tool for protecting parochial agendas, obstructing true reform in crisis countries, in which case risking going back to square one– that of division, war, and despair.