“All red lines have been crossed”, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said. His remarks sum up the motives behind the latest Israeli airstrikes on the T-4 military airbase near Homs in Syria on April 8, 2018. The latest attack is a message of protest against the exclusion of Israel’s interests from the recent arrangements in Syria made by Iran, Turkey and Russia. This entails the ability of Iran and its regional allies to achieve significant field gains, as well as projecting air dominance and breaching the new rules of engagement, imposed by the Syrian air defence following the shooting down of the Israeli jet fighter on February 10, 2018. These developments indicate that Israel will start escalating its moves to counter Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad regime over the next period.
Air Dominance
Since the outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria, Israel has pursued a policy of maintaining a “balance of vulnerability” between the conflicting parties. Israel deems that the escalating and raging conflicts serve its interests because they lead to the depletion of various parties’ capabilities. Such conflicts further avert the complex calculations that would ensue as a result of the victory of any of them. In such context, Assad’s victory would lead to Iranian dominance over Syria. It will further enable the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah fighters to threaten the “soft flank” of Israel, and hence threatening the occupied Golan Heights. The same is true for the Syrian opposition factions, which, according to Israeli assessments, include some extremist groups such as Fatah al-Sham (formerly al-Nusrah Front).
Against this backdrop, Israel has in recent years adopted a policy of “cautious neutrality” based on non-alignment to any of the parties involved in the Syrian conflict. Israel rather confined its role to protecting its immediate interests through “domination over the Syrian airspace” and launching a series of air raids to respond to threats to its borders, or to destroy the flows of arms across the Syrian-Lebanese border. In addition, Israel’s role entails preventing the breach of the armistice line southwest of Syria, and killing some Hezbollah leaders, such as Samir al-Qintar, and Jihad Mughniyah, who was targeted in an Israeli strike on the southern province of Quneitra in January 2015.
Evolution of the Israeli airstrikes on Syria
Source: "Israel, Hezbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria", International Crisis Group, February 7, 2018 accessible at: https://goo.gl/uzsoVZ
The Israeli Air forces carried out an average of 67 airstrikes against Syria between 2013 and 2018, according to the International Crisis Group in a report on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and Iran on the Syrian territory published in February 2018. During this period, Israel carried out an average of nearly nine airstrikes per year, except 2015, which witnessed 23 airstrikes, the year during which Russia intervened militarily in Syria starting from September 30, 2015.
The Russian military engagement has set new equations in Syria. The Russian support provided to the Assad regime and its allies restricted the Israeli dominance over Syrian airspace. In addition, it increased likelihood of Iran and Hezbollah seizing control over areas close to the occupied Golan Heights and developing their military capabilities and weaponry after they gained experience from battles on the ground.
Tel Aviv has reached temporary understandings with Russia through channels of rapid communication between the Israeli army and the Russian leadership at Khmeimim airbase. In addition, Israel managed to take advantage of the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict. The intensification of the Syrian conflict led to a decline in the regional attention to the Palestinian issue, Hezbollah’s preoccupation with the Syrian war and maintaining a long truce with Israel, and a relative rapprochement between Tel Aviv and regional powers, to counter the growing Iranian threats.
Crossing “the Red Lines”
The Israeli political and security leaders realized that the reality of the conflict in Syria has fundamentally changed and has posed direct threats, prompting them to pursue a policy of escalation since the beginning of 2018. According to Amos Yadlin, the former head of the Israeli army’s Military Intelligence Directorate, the new arrangements crossed Israel’s “red lines” in Syria. The most important motives behind the Israeli escalation are as follows:
1- Ankara Summit’s arrangements: The Israeli military leadership viewed the Ankara Summit, which brought together the Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and their Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as an indication of arrangements for de-escalation, sharing roles and spheres of influence across Syria, which means excluding the Israeli interests from this equation.
According to the Israeli assessments, the summit sent several implicit messages, namely ending the debate over the stay of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at helm in Syria. All influential regional and international actors accept this new reality and the Assad regime is in its way to resolve the conflict to its favour, amid the fragmentation of the opposition factions and Turkey’s curtailment of the Kurds’ military capabilities and reducing its support for the armed factions, in addition to the expected US withdrawal from Syria.
Source: “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of a U.S. Pullout From Syria”, Stratfor, April 4, 2018, accessible at: https://goo.gl/xaAgtG
Meanwhile, Tel Aviv considered the Ankara Summit a declaration of victory for Iran in Syria. Tehran’s participation in the post-civil war “gain-sharing” summit, the recognition by Ankara and Moscow of its role and military presence, and their tacit acceptance of its continued military support for the Assad regime, means that Iran has been able to establish full control over the areas under the rule of Bashar al-Assad and “take over Syria”, in the words of Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman.
2- Repercussions of US withdrawal: The Israeli escalation is inseparable from the announcement of President Donald Trump on March 29, 2018 of the US’s intention to pull out its troops from Syria. Over the past months, Russian troops, their Syrian counterparts and Hezbollah fighters have stepped up their pressures to push the American troops to leave their military bases, especially al-Tanf base on the border triangle between Iraq, Syria and Jordan, to allow Iran’s armed militias safe passage from western Iraq to south-eastern Syria without facing threats from the American troops.
Russian, Iranian and Turkish interests are converging in pushing the US to pull out its troops, because Ankara opposes the US military support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as the restrictions enforced by the US forces on the Turkish army while trying to take over Manbij, under the control of the Kurds.
The delayed and limited airstrike by the US, France and UK, as punitive measures against the Assad regime alleged chemical weapons attack on the town of Douma, on April 7, has further fueled Israeli fears of a waning US involvement and inability to rely on Washington to protect its interests in Syria, prompting Israel to launch the recent airstrike on the Syrian T-4 airbase, preparing for a new phase of military escalation and direct intervention.
3- Establishment of Iranian bases: Reports published by the New York Times in February 2018, comprising maps of the Iranian bases sites that varied between logistics bases, drone platforms and militia training camps, reveal the depth of Iranian military incursions into Syria. Besides, Israeli reports released after the air raids in February 2018 revealed that Iran has three main military bases: the Iranian military base at the Damascus International Airport, where the Revolutionary Guard forces are stationed, the armed militia base in Aleppo, run by Hezbollah and the Iraqi Shi’ite militias, such as the Al-Najba, plus the Quneitra base. This is in addition to seven smaller tactical bases near the front lines.
Israel considered the killing of Col. Mehdi Dehghan, a member of the IRGC’s drone unit, in the airstrikes carried out on April 8, a proof of the extent of the Iranian military presence in Syria, which pose threats to Israel. Moreover, the Israeli air defence shoot down an Iranian drone in the occupied Golan in February 2018.
4- Shi’ite fighters’ flows: Intelligence leaks released by Debka, an Israeli website, on February 11, 2018, revealed preparations in Tel Aviv to launch several airstrikes in April or May 2018 against the Iranian presence in Syria to destroy Iraqi Shi’ite battalions of 5,000 fighters, which Iran has been militarily training and equipping for deployment in Syria.
Israeli sources pointed out that the militia was classified as an elite military force, with exceptional military capabilities, in addition to having air capabilities. It has combat helicopter unit consisting of 10 Russian and Iranian attack helicopters, as well as several Mi-17 military transport aircrafts. Israeli reports said the new force would likely be deployed in al-Bukamal and Deir ez-Zor in April or May 2018 through infiltration across the Iraqi borders towards southwest Syria.
5- Threats to maritime security: Israeli assessments confirm that the most significant development in the Iranian military presence in Syria is the deployment of military forces in Syrian ports and the establishment of Iranian naval bases in Syria. Tel Aviv detected, in November 2017, attempts by Tehran to establish naval posts off the Syrian coast and deploy submarines and naval vessels in the Syrian ports in preparation for the establishment of a permanent maritime navigation corridor between Iran and Syria, through which it can step up the transport of arms and fighters to Syria.
6- Evolution of Hezbollah’s arsenal: Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Israel has set red lines on the transfer of high-precision rockets to Hezbollah, hence most of the Israeli air raids were focused on the destruction of the missile factories that Hezbollah transported to Syria under the supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ leaders.
Hezbollah built a military base in al-Quseir near the Lebanese-Syrian border and made several cross-border tunnels to smuggle weapons and build arms and ammunition depots, as well as the transport of tanks, armoured vehicles, air defence systems and radars from Syria to Lebanon, with the aim of bolstering its military capabilities a head of the coming confrontation with Israel.
According to an intelligence estimate published by Stratfor on April 9, 2018, the windows of opportunity for Israel to strike the military capabilities of Hezbollah in Syria, and exploit its military exposure, have become extremely narrow under the de-escalation arrangements among Iran, Turkey and Russia, and the US intention to withdraw its troops from Syria.
To conclude, the Israeli role in Syria is set to witness a fundamental shift towards military escalation in an attempt to seize the last “window of opportunity” to influence the ongoing arrangements, redraw the spheres of influence and extend the buffer zone between the areas of dominance of the Assad regime and the occupied Golan Heights, in addition to destroying the advanced military capabilities of Hezbollah and exploiting the military exposure of the Iranian forces and their allies before reaching a settlement that would defuse the situation on the ground. Tel Aviv will strongly push for a strong US military presence to counterbalance the Russian-Iranian domination over the situation in Syria, and Turkey’s moves towards military expansion in Kurdish areas.
