The escalating crisis between the United States and North Korea is of special importance for Iran. Firstly, the US Administration of President Donald Trump has designated both Iran and North Korea as an imminent threat to the national security of the United States. The approach builds on the administration of former president George W. Bush’s repeated labelling of Iran and North Korea, as well as Iraq, as key rogue states of the so-called axis of evil, who sponsor terrorism and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

This US vision was evidenced by Trump’s signing of a sweeping sanctions measure against Russia, Iran and North Korea on August 2, 2017. 

The vision, though not new, has probably experienced a shift during the previous administration of former president Barack Obama (2008-2016). Obama’s administration focused on sealing a nuclear deal with Iran, which was conducted through secret and public negotiation that culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, on July 14, 2017. 

However, Trump’s many reservations about the nuclear deal, which he believes it would not prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if it wants to, are what prompted him to relabel Iran as a member of the axis of evil along with North Korea.

Hence, it can be argued that the US Administration believes that Iran can follow the North Korean model in 2023, eight years after the signing of the nuclear deal, when it is due to lift some of restrictions imposed on Iran through the deal becomes due. 

This, as per the US Administration’s view, requires preemptive moves and that now is the time to do so. Hence, linking together the two sources of danger, North Korea and Iran, has become of vital importance for Washington.

Moreover, there are indications that Tehran is keen on promoting cooperation at various levels with Pyongyang. Most recently, on August 5, the head of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly (parliament) Kim Yong Nam was in Tehran to attend the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani.

Interestingly enough in this context, is that the North Korean media reported that Nam, who is also the ceremonial head of state, returned the country on August 11, which means that his visit was not planned for the sole purpose of attending Rouhani’s oath-taking ceremony. More importantly, however, the visit provided an opportunity to hold talks about various issues of common concern. The most important of which is military and perhaps other forms of cooperation that some inside Iran believe that it can continue in the coming period. 

Careful Reading

Iran is closely following the current escalation of tensions between Washington, which threatened military action, and Pyongyang which threatened to fire missiles near the US territory of Guam. 

Iran’s increasing interest in assessing the potential trajectories for the current crisis between the US and North Korea can be explained by Tehran’s recognition of the fact that any trajectory will inevitably affect its relations and reactions with Washington, which insists on linking its long-standing issues with Tehran to the current crisis with Pyongyang.

In other words, it can be argued that Iran believes that it can draw lessons from the current US- North Korea crisis to gain benefits during its own potential crisis with the US, especially if the Trump Administration insists on going ahead to take steps that would affect the implementation of the nuclear deal.

That is, there are views in Tehran that any escalation by the Trump Administration against North Korea would possibly lead to easing the United States’ pressure on Iran, and may even pave the way for it to leverage its intervention in various crises in the Middle East. Moreover, according to these views, preoccupation with the crisis with North Korea as well as shifts in South American countries such as Venezuela, the US Administration may not be adequately capable of following up its issues with Iran, such as the nuclear deal, Iran’s support for terrorism as well as its role in destabilizing the Middle East.

Hence, what makes Iran more interested in this possibility is that it is apparently preparing to take steps that would strengthen its influence within crisis-hit Arab countries. For one, Iran would continue to work on establishing a land corridor to Syria via Iraq to reach the Mediterranean. The aim of this strategy is to ensure uninterrupted supply lines to its allies, primarily Lebanon’s Hezbollah group, which is also under pressure from the US with President Trump describing it as a "menace to the Lebanese state" during a July 27, 2017 meeting at the White House with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri.

Moreover, Iran seeks to restructure its alliances and bolster its influence inside Iraq, following the liberation of Mosul from ISIS, ahead of the next legislative elections due in spring 2018. 

Direct Impact

In Iran’s view, if the US succeeds in achieving its goals of reducing the threats posed by the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs to its national interests, further pressure will be put on Iran. Emboldened enough by such success to go beyond sanctions, the US Administration is likely to pursue the same approach to deal with Iran and threaten, once again, military action to counter its perceived threat. These measures would also include tougher measures by Washington to counter Iranian provocative behavior in the international waters of the Arabian Gulf, rather than only describing it as “unsafe and unprofessional.”

However, in case Washington fails to dissuade North Korea from continuing its escalatory approach against the United States, Iran would be emboldened to continue its own escalation against the United States. In such a case, Tehran, perhaps, would not be satisfied by only carrying out more ballistic missile tests - the most recent of which involved the launch of a Simorgh space launch vehicle that can be used to send satellites into space. Encouraged by the view that North Korea’s ability to threaten the interests of the United States would be the most important variable that led to the failure of the US policy, Iran would continue to develop its missile program and work on increasing the range of its ballistic missiles. 

Hence, maintaining communication with Pyongyang has become more important for Tehran, which might seek to take advantage the current US pressure on North Korea to launch a new stage of cooperation between Iran and Asian country, in nuclear and missile programs in particular. 

Overall, the variable and even contrasting trajectories and consequences of the US-North Korea crisis will impact, in varying degrees, whatever approach Iran would take to deal with the trajectories of its own interactions with the United States in the coming period.