Political and military developments in Libya are fast, and sometimes unexpected. The situation in the country six years after the uprising against Muammar Gadhafi is still fluid, with different centres of power, a significant number of stakeholders and different ‘spoilers’, who are impeding any rapprochement between rival factions. In this context, the meeting between the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord (GNA) Fayez al-Sarraj and General Khalifa Haftar at La Celle Saint-Cloud near Paris on July 25th marked a significant step forward.
Challenging Opportunity
Even though it was not signed by any of the two parts, the joint declaration contains important provisions that could facilitate the dialogue. In the 10-point document, both parties committed to a ceasefire, recognising that the solution to the crisis can only be political and agreeing to implement the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on December 17, 2015. Moreover, both rivals committed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible, with different press sources speculating about a date agreed in the first half of 2018.
Several observers welcomed the meeting and the declaration as a major breakthrough that offers a new chance for peace. However, different obstacles still lie ahead. Firstly, the declaration is neither binding nor specific, as the ceasefire does not apply to terrorist groups, including ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Benghazi Defence Brigades. Secondly, the international stage offered to Haftar could affect the balance of power in the country, already tilted in his favour after significant military developments during the last year, compromising any chance of reconciliation. Lastly, Sarraj will certainly find himself in an uncomfortable position, due to the increasing opposition inside its ranks and the consternation of his traditional partners abroad.
Opposing Factions
Most of the provisions included in the joint declaration were already discussed by Sarraj and Haftar in two different occasions earlier this year, at a failed meeting in Cairo in February and in Abu Dhabi in May. On both occasions, the meetings were greeted with disdain in different Libyan milieus. Factions opposing any possible convergence between Sarraj and Haftar, particularly the Islamist militias affiliated to the Government of National Salvation of Khalifa al-Ghwell, took the occasion to resume clashes, especially in the capital Tripoli. The Paris meeting could suffer a similar fate, as on the same day of the joint declaration the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, affiliated with the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood) expressed its criticism, saying that such gatherings organised by individual countries are a deviation and a distortion of the LPA. In a statement, the JCP said that any change to the LPA must be done according to its terms and under the umbrella of the United Nations.
It is still unclear if hardliners could be able to launch a new offensive in Tripoli. The most recent attempts were unsuccessful and, as a result, armed groups supporting the GNA strengthened their grip on the capital and the surrounding areas. The weakening of the opposition groups is mainly due to the external pressure of regional powers, which has increased in the last months following the crisis in the Gulf region. The spat between a quartet of Arab States (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Qatar is having deep consequences in Libya, while the proliferation of the terror list is badly affecting the different terrorist organizations, particularly, and Islamist movements, generally, in the country.
Competing European Forces
In order to understand the ever-changing dynamics of the Libyan conflict, it is worth reminding that after six years of civil war Libya’s fragile institutions suffer from persistent dysfunctions caused by three main factors: internal players, regional powers and international partners. On the international level, given the explicit disinterest of the new US administration and the low priority of the Libyan dossier for Russia compared to the more relevant Syrian scenario, the burden now falls on Europe’s shoulders. Nevertheless, different positions emerged among European countries, displaying how difficult it is to present a common foreign policy on the issue, turning presumed partners into competitors.
After Paris, it became more evident that France and Italy are at odds over Libya. The new French President Emmanuel Macron was successful in bringing together the main actors of the current crisis, putting France in a privileged position to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis. The new President maintained France’s more recent foreign policy towards Libya, which consists in the official support to the GNA and the LPA, while substantially backing Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). This course of action is best represented by the new Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le-Drian, former Defence Minister in the previous administration; and by Franck Paris, appointed presidential adviser for African affairs and a strict associate of Le-Drian himself.
On the other side, Italy has been a staunch supporter of the GNA since its establishment. It is worth noting that the former Italian Foreign Minister (and current Prime Minister) Paolo Gentiloni was the first foreign representative to meet with Sarraj in Tripoli after the GNA managed to enter the Libyan capital; and that in January 2017 Italy reopened its embassy in Tripoli, the only western country that took this decision so far. However, with the new US administration ushered in, the Italian government had to face a predictable isolation on the Libyan issue, as well as the increasing hostility of Haftar, who in different occasions accused Rome of supporting the city of Misrata, whose powerful militias oppose the LNA.
Marginalized by Macron’s diplomatic activity, Italy’s reaction was virulent, raising doubts about the odds of success of the Paris declaration. The day after Paris, Sarraj was in Rome, where Gentiloni announced that the GNA had already asked for Italy’s support to fight against human traffickers off Libya’s coasts, including the presence of Italian vessels in Libyan territorial waters. A controversy emerged the following day, when Sarraj denied having asked for the presence of the Italian navy, saying that the GNA only needed technical support and training for the Libyan coastguard and that the sovereignty of Libya is a red line. The subsequent remark of the Foreign Minister of GNA Mohamed Taher Siala displayed the chaos inside the GNA. Siala said that the Italian support requires the presence of some elements of the Italian navy at the port of Tripoli, but only for this purpose and only if necessary. Beside the evident fracture over the Italian mission inside Sarraj’s team, it is interesting to note that Italy’s action was perceived as detrimental to the meeting in France. Indeed, the Prime Minister of the GNA also said that the baseless reports about Italian vessels operating inside the territorial waters of Libya intended to undermine the outcome of the Paris meeting.
For all these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the joint declaration will produce tangible results in the medium-term. Considering the revived competition between France and Italy over Libya, the interference of regional powers with conflicting agendas, and the political, ideological and regional divide inside the country, future developments remain unpredictable. While the Paris meeting offered a showcase to the international ambitions of Haftar, it also undermined Sarraj’s position, revealing the weaknesses of the GNA, displaying its internal fractures and paving the way for an unbalanced partnership between Sarraj and Haftar that could complicate Libya’s path towards the reconciliation.
