The US Administration of President Donald Trump has started to deal with the nuclear agreement -reached two years ago between Iran and the P5+1 group on July 14, 2015- in such a manner that separates between its political and technical aspects. The new approach was evidenced by the US Administration’s July 17 announcement that President Trump agreed to certify again that Iran is complying with the international nuclear agreement. This means that, among other compliance measures, Iran is operating 5060 first generation centrifuges, configured to enrich uranium to only 3.67%, a level well below that needed to make an atomic weapon, while also moving heavy water outside of Iranian territory.
However, the announcement coincided with signals from the Trump Administration that the issue with Iran does not lie in the technical compliance with the nuclear deal. Iran’s deliberate exploitation of this deal to bolster its presence in the region and its expansion in crisis-ridden countries is the matter in question. This explains the Administration’s keenness on accusing Iran of "not living up to the spirit" of the agreement.
This particular position illustrates the U.S. approach to the agreement. This approach relied primarily on the view that the states which concluded the nuclear deal with Iran sought to further promote their efforts to achieve regional stability and support any opportunity to settle regional crises. Nonetheless, this did not happen because of Iran’s destabilizing policy that further escalated turbulence within crisis-hit countries and obstructed settlement efforts.
The US Administration expressed this approach by accusing Iran of taking advantage of the funds freed up under the nuclear deal to support terrorism and develop its stockpile of advanced weapons, including ballistic missiles, which it started using outside its territory, including in Deir Ezzor City in eastern Syria on June 19, 2017.
Within this context, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, on July 20, stated that Iran is extending its reach in the Middle East and wants to be a “kingpin” in the region. This is yet another sign that the United States’ sole priority in its interaction with Iran is no longer the nuclear deal, where its other priorities are Iran’s role in crisis-hit countries such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
To present justifications, Washington, on July 18, built its accusations on an announcement of new sanctions on 18 Iranian individuals, groups and networks over non-nuclear behavior, such as support for ballistic missiles development. Seven entities and five individuals were sanctioned for involvement in activities carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The new blacklist also includes an Iran-based international criminal organization and three other individuals involved with it. Moreover, this provided a motive for the US House of Representatives to approve new sanctions on both Iran and Russia on July 25.
Preemptive Threats
In response, Tehran considered the United States’ re-certification that Iran is complying with the nuclear agreement does not show any positive change in the US Administration's position. It even described the move as a prelude to a new move through which the US aims to negatively impact the continued implementation of the agreement and initiate an open-ended conflict with Iran, where the Trump Administration does not conceal its resentment over the deal. This is especially so because the latest sanctions might not be the last, meaning Iran’s military establishment, and the elite Revolutionary Guard Corps in particular, is is likely to be targeted with more severe sanctions in the coming period.
That is what pushed Tehran to escalate its threats to Washington hinting once again that it would unilaterally withdraw from the nuclear deal if the United States continues to take such measures. The escalation was reflected in statements made by Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to the National Interest on July 17. Zarif said if it comes to a significant nonperformance by the United States, then Iran has other options available, including withdrawing from the deal.
However, Iran’s most severe threats were issued by its top military commanders. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, on July 19, demanded the U.S. withdraw all of its military bases within 1,000 kilometers of Iran's borders, if it insists on imposing sanctions against Iran.
Limited Options
However, it is not possible to say that Iran can take the risk of entering into a direct confrontation with the United States. That is because available options within this context are limited, which means that it will face a predicament in the current period because of the nuclear deal. That is because it will not be easy for it to carry out its threats to withdraw from the deal and revert back to the pre-agreement levels.
At the same time, Iran cannot put pressure on Washington to support the chances of continued implementation of the nuclear deal and pave the way for the government of President Hassan Rouhani’s efforts to gain as much economic benefits from the deal as possible.
Moreover, Iran’s threats to US interests are not in harmony with the reality on the ground that indicates that Tehran would not opt for direct confrontation and risk tasking its allies to conduct strikes against American interests. The reason is that Washington will hold Iran responsible for any such attacks, in particular because Iran is focused now on establishing its strong relations with terrorist and armed groups in crisis-hit countries. Through these groups, Iran seeks to establish the so-called “Shiite Crescent”, a term that is being more frequently used by US officials, including CIA Director Mike Pompeo who stated on April 15, 2017, that the Shiite crescent is close to being developed, “And that is not in America’s best interest to permit that to happen.”
The irony is that the US Administration’s insistence on Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal might exacerbate the predicament that Iran found itself in currently. This is especially true because it would prevent the hardliners - conservative fundamentalists and the Revolutionary Guard Corps- from seizing the opportunity to put more hurdles to block the continued implementation of the nuclear deal. This is particularly so because Iran, currently, cannot afford the possibility that the international community will hold it responsible for halting the implementation which will impose disastrous consequences for its own security and interests.
Hence, the most likely course that Iran would take is that it will continue its current “pull and push” tactics in the coming period as long as the sanctions imposed by the US remain limited and do not impose severe impact, as was the case with sanctions imposed before the nuclear deal was concluded.
What stands out within this context is that despite its criticism of the policy pursued by the current US Administration, Rouhani's government believes that there is still an opportunity for opening communication channels with Washington, based on the view that this might prevent the US Administration from taking more effective measures that can increase the possibility of the Nuclear deal's collapse.
Iran’s top diplomat Zarif expressed this approach when he noted, during a conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on July 17, 2017, that there are no communications between him and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. He added that “It doesn’t mean that there can’t be, because the possibilities for engagement with regard to the nuclear deal have always been open. My colleagues have regular contact with U.S. colleagues on the implementation of the nuclear deal.”
This exchange of threats and the intertwined moves overall mean that tensions between Tehran and Washington will continue in the coming period and could possibly lead to severe consequences on the nuclear deal that is already facing no easy challenges.
