In what is seen as a preliminary step to the upcoming Geneva IV Conference, which will be held in February 2017, Turkey and Russia have called for the participation of various Syrian armed factions during the negotiations in Astana between January 23rd and 25th, 2017. The Syrian factions were divided according to their positions regarding the Astana conference, with some viewing the move as an attempt to develop political solutions as an alternative to military confrontations with the regime and the various allied armed militias. Yet, others believed that the conference would not achieve positive results since, similar to previous conferences, there are doubts concerning the sponsors’ intentions and their abilities to implement and enforce the agreed upon solutions.
Despite the ongoing disputes about the feasibility of the conference and its potential impact on efforts to reach a political settlement for the Syrian crisis, the conference could represent a crucial step in the transition from military confrontation to political negotiations between the various actors in Syria, with the exception of ISIS and the Fateh Al-Sham Front (formerly Al-Nusra Front). The conference aimed to maintain the ceasefire reached on December 30th, 2016; a step which could pave the way for the secondary goal of the conference, which is to negotiate an agreement to resolve the major political issues at the Geneva IV conference.
Two Main Approaches:
Armed factions were divided into two main groups based upon their political stances regarding participation in the Astana Conference. The first group was led by the factions which supported participation and accordingly formed a delegation under the leadership of Mohammed Alloush, the leader of Jaysh Al-Islam. The delegation was supported by a technical team comprised of various political advisors and jurists, who were selected by the High Negotiations Committee. The most prominent of which included the Sham Legion, the Sultan Murad Division, the Levant Front, Jaysh Al-Ezza, Jaysh Al-Nasr, First Coastal Division, Martyrs of Islam Brigade, Fastaqim Union, Jaysh Al-Islam, Free Idlib Army, and Ajnad Al-Sham.
The pro-factions justified their participation in the conference based on two main considerations:
1. Political confrontation: These armed factions aim to utilize diplomacy as a mean to gain political clout in negotiations with the Syrian regime. This was emphasized in a statement released by the Fastaqim Union claiming, “The Astana Conference has political value just as there is military value.”
2. Declining influence: These factions believe that participating in negotiations with the regime at the present stage would comply with the recent developments on the battlefield indicating a decline in influence of various factions. This trend has been exacerbated in the aftermath of the battle for Aleppo, which ended in the evacuation of fighters from the city, under Russian and Turkish supervision, following an agreement. This decline resulted in emerging disputes between various armed groups as each groups accused the others of bearing the responsibility of the battle for Aleppo’s results.
The second group was made up of the factions that refused to participate in the conference. These parties issued a statement in which they emphasized that they were, “not interested in the negotiations expected to take place in Astana.” The most prominent of which included, Ahrar Al-Sham, Suquor Al-Sham Brigade, the Al-Rahman Legion, the Thuwar Al-Sham Battalion, the Army of Mujahideen, the Nour al-Din Al-Zenki Movement, and the Al-Bayan Movement.
To justify their refusal to participate in the conference, these factions had the following motives:
1. Failure to comply with the ceasefire reached at the end of 2016: Various breaches occurred The regime and its allied armed militias were both accused of breaching the ceasefire in the Wadi Barada area, a major water source for the capital of Damascus. The armed factions considered these breaches as an indicator of the regime’s lack of eagerness to demonstrate political commitments under the auspices of regional and international support. They further believe that the regime has adopted a policy of “buying time” in a manner which hampers the ability of negotiations to achieve positive and timely results which could help reach a lasting political settlement.
2. Lack of confidence in the countries supporting the conference: Some of the factions strongly criticized Russia due to their political and military support for the Syrian regime. Russia’s support to the Syrian regime was evident in the use of veto power several times during UN Security Council sessions in order to prevent the adoption of any resolutions, which condemn Assad’s regime. These groups also report that Russia escalated their military participation in the conflict in a manner that altered the balance of power within Syria in favor of the regime, which was clearly reflected during the battle for Aleppo.
Furthermore, some of these factions have accused Turkey of pressuring them to participate in the conference. They argue that Turkey is striving to pursue purely self-serving interests, which are consolidating their role as a major political actor in the Syrian crisis and preventing the Kurds from achieving political gains. Turkey opposed Kurdish participation in the conference, leading the latter to reject the speculated outcomes of the negotiations. The refusal was similar to that of the Syrian Democratic Forces which emphasized that they, “were not interested in the Astana negotiations,” explaining that, “not being invited as a party to the negotiations is a violation of their rights and sacrifices.”
Mysterious Path:
In light of the previously mentioned context, perhaps it can be said that the broad disputes between parties participating in the Astana conference, along with the various parties concerned with the Syrian crisis, provided a sense of vagueness regarding the potential outcomes of the conference, which should serve as a foundation for the Geneva IV conference, according to statements made by UN Special Envoy in Syria, Staffan de Mistura.
In this context, we can also highlight the two main approaches which have provided contrasting visions about the potential implications of the Astana Conference: The first approach notes that the conference will help consolidate the recent ceasefire agreement based on the support of several armed factions, and their keenness to participate in the conference in a manner that could help pave the way for the political solution Syria needs.
The second approach anticipates a retreat in the possible outcomes of the conference based on several considerations. The most prominent of which is that many parties involved in the conference emphasize that its political goal is limited to consolidating the ceasefire agreement, rather than discussing other major political issues. They also refer to previous conferences’ inabilities to achieve significant results, such as the ones previously held in Geneva, as well as the limited impact of the factions involved in comparison to other organizations such as ISIS and the Fatah Al-Sham Front. There is also the increasing possibility that the conference will not discuss the roles of armed militias who support the Syrian regime and participate in armed confrontations against opposition forces, in light of that the opposition of various regional powers, most prominently Iran.
