Conservatives have ramped up their criticism of President Hassan Rouhani's government, especially after winning in the first round of presidential elections held on May 19, 2017. Their focus is mainly on poor outcome of policies adopted by Rouhani's government at the political and economic levels, limited powers of the president in some internal and external issues, and the independence of some institutions from him such as the military establishment.
Hence, it was evident that the conservatives seek to impose limited options on President Hassan Rouhani to reduce his ability to deal with controversial issues during his second term, which will begin in August. However, these efforts in its entirety may not achieve outstanding results in the end, for several reasons, most importantly the severe vulnerability of the conservatives at the present time, sharp divisions expected to worsen in the coming period, especially given the struggle over the movement's leadership after defeat in the presidential elections.
Sustained Campaign
Strikingly, some leading conservative figures sought recently to mount fierce attacks on President Hassan Rouhani. After a period of relative calm due to its preoccupation in pursuing regional developments related to establishing a strategic corridor between Iran, Iraq and Syria, and coordination with sectarian militias loyal to Iran in Damascus and Baghdad, Qassem Suleimani - Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)- ratcheted up criticism of the President, on the background of the latter’s calls to reduce the economic clout of the IRGC.
Suleimani used the activities carried out by the "Pasdaran" on the foreign arena to send domestic messages, especially to President Rouhani, that the IRGC is the essential pillar on which Iran has relied on in strengthening its presence and role in various regional crises. During a military conference held in Kerman city, on 4 July 2017, he said that “without Guards Iran wouldn’t have survived", adding that "sowing the seeds of doubt about the pillars of the regime is a great treason".
These remarks reveal a significant point that the IRGC, at the current stage, may have its eyes on obtaining new political and economic gains as a reward for its efforts at the foreign front, especially as it tries to portray itself as the force that was able to protect Iran. This comes amid allegations that the IRGC promotes its involvement in external roles as to confront Iran's adversaries before approaching Iranian territories. Those allegations are incompatible with the realities on the ground which indicate that Iran sought to reach understandings and establish strong ties with most of the "presumed adversaries," such as the terrorist organizations that reside near its borders.
Potential Leader
In parallel with the Pasdaran’s attacks on Rouhani, it was clear that Sadegh Larijani, Head of the Judiciary, whom numerous reports indicate that he is one of the potential candidates to succeed the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was keen to limit the importance and role of the President within the Iranian regime's decision-making institutions. In this regard, Larijani’s brother, Ali Larijani the President of the Islamic Shura (Parliament), on 29 May 2017, opposed any role to be assumed by the President of the Republic to lift the house arrest of leaders of the so-called "Green Movement" Mir Hussein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, believing that Judiciary system is the only body that decide on this matter.
In this context, what is striking is that the "new role" played by Sadegh Larijani began to receive special support from the Supreme Leader. Khamenei called, during a meeting with senior officials of the judiciary on July 3, 2017, to expand the functions of the judiciary, to include some international issues such as U.S. sanctions on Iran and lawsuits through which some international powers use frozen Iranian assets abroad to pay damages. In addition, the so called "sectarian issues" such as the Shiite Muslim Movement's leader in Nigeria, Ibrahim Zakzaky, who did not hide his interest in copying the Iranian model in Nigeria.
Filing the Vacuum
This may explain the mounting efforts to support the role of Sadegh Larijani, given the regime’s endeavours to reinforce the influence of President Rouhani’s opponents in power, to impose more pressure on him and narrow the available options during his second term, which will begin next month.
However, the most important goal may be to try to find a new leader for the conservatives, in light of the "leadership vacuum" at the current period and the clear split after the resounding defeat in the recent presidential election. Numerous trends are clearly emerging within the conservative movement, seeking to expand their influence and lead the movement in the coming period.
In this vein, Saeed Jalili, former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the representative of the Supreme Leader, started to attract leading figures and cadres inside the conservatives’ movement to enhance his opportunities to assume the leadership. It was remarkable in this context that he mounted a vigorous campaign against President Rouhani, especially with regard to the management of the nuclear negotiations with the international powers. Moreover, after the outcome of the recent presidential election, he called for a "shadow government" in Iran, which indicates his desire to lead the anti-government movement during the next four years.
In contrast, there is no signs that Ebrahim Raisi, the losing candidate in the presidential election, will isolate himself and shy away from the political scene after the crushing defeat in the first round. He may seek to capitalize on wining 15.8 million votes in the elections not only to maintain his position within the conservatives, but to press ahead towards leadership in the future. He runs against the moderates, in a way that may enhance his chances to win the presidency of any of the major institutions in the country, and reinforce his ability to draw more support in the next presidential election, though Iran has never relied on the likelihood of a losing candidate to make it in a coming election.
Deepening the Split
On the other hand, Rouhani will probably try to deepen the split within the conservatives during the next phase, which will see parliamentary elections in 2020. Rouhani seeks to consolidate the moderates’ control over the Parliament and enhance the opportunities of one of its leading members to run in the coming presidential election in 2021, especially that Rouhani will not be able to stand in that election.
Therefore, Rouhani will most likely seek to reach political understandings with the conservatives in order to put obstacles in front of the latter’s ability to unify its ranks. This tendency is evident in his determination to establish strong ties with key cadres of the movement inside the Shura Council, such as its president, Ali Larijani and Vice-President, Ali Motahari. In addition, Rouhani may try to "neutralize" some other leaders, or at least avoid going into open conflict with them, especially Sadegh Larijani.
To conclude, one cannot exclude the conservatives splitting into more than one political wing, similar to what happened before the arrival of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power in 2005. If that would be the case, Iran will witness a new map of power balance, which will determine, to a large extent, the ability of the moderates to continue in power and turn this conflict with fundamentalists to their advantage during the next stage.
