The outcome of various elections in Iran, such as the presidential elections, the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) and the Assembly of Experts, represents the outcome of interactions between internal political forces that support key institutions in the Islamic Republic system, particularly the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards. These institutions have adjusted their balances so that they do not drift away from the framework set forth in advance; however, this interaction does not negate some of the developments in the foreign arena that are of special interest to Iran. In fact, these factors could potentially impose indirect effects which may in turn contribute to the determination of the election results, especially the presidential elections.
In other words, it can be said that general trends of development in the foreign arena somehow contribute to the reformulation of the internal balance of political forces in Iran. THIS contribution is so strong that it may increase the opportunities of one of the political currents to reach power or to establish control over mainstream decision-making institutions. Without a doubt, the impact of these external developments is linked to the vision of key institutions in the system regarding what opportunities or threats they could present to Iran's interests and national security.
Counter-effects
In the Iranian presidential elections in 2005, it can be argued that one of the reasons for the rise of the right wing, fundamentalist conservatives in Iran is due in part to the external pressures imposed upon Iran during the period, particularly after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The fundamentalist conservatives are currently represented by the former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after his "surprise win" in the June 2005 presidential elections against one of the most prominent symbols of the revolution and the pillars of the regime, former President and chairman of the Expediency Council Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Although the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime worked in Iran's favor and paved the way for the significant expansion of Iranian influence inside Iraq; it does not negate the policy adopted by the former U.S. President George W. Bush's administration which, dominated by neo- conservatism, imposed heavy pressures on Iran, and had an indirect impact on the domestic political balances that tilted in favor of the conservative fundamentalists. In a twist of irony, this prompted many currents to point out that the balance of internal political forces in both Washington and Tehran were moving in parallel lines.
Threats by the American Republican administration during that period, evidenced by Iran's position on the list of the so-called "axis of evil" with both Iraq and North Korea, and the threat of using military force to resolve the nuclear crisis, supported the influence of conservative fundamentalists within Iran. Moreover, the conservative movement was helped to power by a largely unknown executive personality, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Prior to holding the presidential post, Ahmadinejad was the governor of the city of Ardebil, then mayor of Tehran.
New policies adopted by U.S. President Barack Obama's administration toward Iran, even before reaching a nuclear agreement in July 2015, have also had an indirect impact on Iran's internal dynamics. Although Iran has refused numerous letters sent by Obama to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in which he called for a reduction in the sharp differences between both parties, this has also had a role in changing the balance of power within Iran in favor of a more moderate current. This current includes leaders of the former reformist movement under the leadership of former President Mohammad Khatami, and the traditional wing of the conservatives led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. This eventually contributed to another surprise outcome for President Hassan Rouhani when he won against four candidates from the conservative fundamentalists' current in the first round of presidential elections held in June 2013.
Khamenei’s Power
Undoubtedly, the senior leadership, represented by Ali Khamenei, has had an unavoidable role in directing the balance of internal forces in favor of specific candidates. In other words, Khamenei’s power, which forces him to be neutral towards the elections, does not prevent him from indirectly intervening to boost the chances of one candidate over another. This was the case in the presidential elections of 2009 and 2013. In 2009, Khamenei interfered in favor of Ahmadinejad, refusing the Green Movement’s demands to recount the votes. In 2013, he refrained from intervening to unite the lines of the Conservative Fundamentalists in favor of one candidate, because the multitude of candidates in this movement was a chance for Rouhani to win the election in the first round.
Many currents indicated that Khamenei wanted a president who would sign the nuclear agreement he sought. The evidence for this is when he agreed to negotiate secretly with the U.S. at the end of Ahmadinejad’s term, after realizing how hard it was to continue to adopt a strict policy towards the nuclear crisis, which had led to an unprecedented rise of the level of international sanctions imposed on Iran.
Remarkably, in this context, this vision has been adopted by the U.S. Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, as per many of her emails published on WikiLeaks reveals. According to these emails, Clinton believes that Rouhani only came to power after Khamenei and the clerics gave permission, following the unprecedented pressures the international sanctions had imposed upon the Iranian economy and its subsequent attrition.
Early Messages
Iran’s interest in the American presidential elections is important to the country’s regional role. The stance towards Iran was an essential pivot in the debates between the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and the Republican candidate Donald Trump, particularly in terms of how to deal with the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the 5+1 Group in July 2015.
This does not mean that Iran prefers one American candidate over the other, especially since it realizes the limited impact of personal variables inside the decision-making circles in the U.S. Iran is also keen on showing strong doubts in Washington’s intentions and the aims it seeks to achieve through negotiations with Iran, whether related to the nuclear file or other files of mutual interest. In contrast, it means that Iran seeks to assess and anticipate the potential political paths that Washington may adopt immediately following the American presidential elections, in such a way that could indirectly contribute in determining the trends of the internal political power balances before the Iranian presidential elections take place on May 17th, 2017.
Iran’s keenness on sending early messages to the U.S. can be explained by its threats to ‘burn’ the nuclear agreement, try some Americans of Iranian origin, and accuse Washington of striving to infiltrate its borders through cultural and economic means while pressuring Iran to withdraw from supporting its allies in the region.
Nonetheless, these messages, some of which are full of clear threats, indicate that Tehran, contrary to what it claims, may be seeking to convince Washington with the importance of adhering to the nuclear agreement. This is on the basis that other options they could choose following the presidential elections may pose direct threats against the security and interest of the two parties, particularly in light of the open conflicts that the Middle East is currently witness to.
