There is a stark contrast between the hype generated by the US media ahead of President Joe Biden’s visit July 13-17 to the Middle East and the outcomes of his meetings with Israeli, Palestinian and GCC+3 leaders. More so were the conclusions of the Jeddah Security and Development Summit, attended by all GCC countries plus Egypt, Jordan and Iraq – also known as GCC+3.
Israeli Gains
President Biden outlined four key goals in his op-ed titled Why I'm going to Saudi Arabia, published in the Washington Post on July 9. Biden and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan made several statements that summarised the aims of Biden’s visit, which were: preventing a political vacuum in the region which Russia and China would want to exploit; establishing an Israel-Arab air defence alliance to face Iran’s growing threat; working to deepen and expand the budding relations towards full normalization between Israel and the Arab world; and hoping to convince the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to increase their oil production to deflate soaring energy prices owing the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Looking at the outcomes of Biden’s visit, progress on the Israeli front was a considerable success. This shouldn’t come as a surprise as Biden on more than one occasion asserted his ardent support to Israel, saying “you need not be a Jew to be a Zionist.” He signed with his Israeli counterpart a new agreement dubbed The Jerusalem US-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, renewing US commitment to Israel’s security. The official statement said that “the United States further reiterates that these commitments are bipartisan and sacrosanct, and that they are not only moral commitments, but also strategic commitments that are vitally important to the national security of the United States itself.” The joint declaration also emphasised US commitment as it works with Israel to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear arms.
The agreement further promotes cooperation in science and technology sectors. “The countries express enthusiasm” the joint statement explained, “to move forward the US-Israel defence partnership through cooperation in cutting-edge technologies such as high energy laser weapon systems to defend the skies of Israel and in the future those of other US and Israel security partners.”
Although sharing a common goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the US and Israel seem to differ in how this goal could be achieved. While Israel Prime Minister Yair Lapid said the way to deterring Iran is chiefly by military force, President Biden gave priority to diplomatic dialogue and economic sanctions, leaving military force as last recourse.
In West Bank, differences between US and Palestinian presidents were more evident. Biden gave a rather generic and vague commitment to a two-state solution; he did not reference the 1967 borders or its capital being Jerusalem; neither did he outline a clear roadmap for implementing this aim. On the contrary, Biden said the current ground is not suitable now to relaunch the peace process but has urged the Palestinians “not to lose hope in a better future.” Biden did not react to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas request to move back the US consulate to East Jerusalem or withdrawing Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from US list of terrorist organisations.
However, he focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance and announced aid package estimated at $300 million: $100m will be for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network and another $200m will go to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.
US-Arab Differences
The contrast between US and Arab visions for the region were clearest at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit, attended by 9 Arab state leaders. Whereas the US president overlooked the Palestinian question, leaders of participating states asserted their view that security in the region could not be achieved without reaching a sustainable resolution under binding international laws. Many of the country leaders criticised Israeli settlement and discriminatory measures in the occupied territories.
None of the Arab leaders referenced an anti-Iranian alliance. Statements made by Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud and Emir of Kuwait Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah both outlined a desire by the Arab states to improve their relations with Iran, inviting the Islamic Republic to dialogue and mutual understanding. Prince Mohammed bin Salman called Iran a neighbouring country. And leaders of the UAE, Egypt, and Qatar stated that they are not willing to join an anti-Iran Arab defence alliance in the manner of NATO.
Moreover, one could note in speeches given by attending leaders the absence of any worry or anxiety at their relations to China or Russia; nor did they mirror US president’s sentiment that a supposed vacuum in the region needed to be filled by the US.
Though no claim can be made of animosity amongst participating Arab states and the US, differences in visions for the region are clearly noted during the summit. What could be the cause of such discord?
One main reason may well be Washington’s passivity in the past decade, for America’s security concerns has shifted to the Indo-Pacific region, where China’s growing power is becoming a source of threat to the US. To this effect, US aim is to limit China, the only global power with potential to pose considerable threat. Consequently, the US has decreased its military presence, being no longer prepared to lose more numbers in prolonged and perhaps pointless wars. The US government, nevertheless, has remained critical of human rights situation in the Arab world, accusing Arab state governments of not doing enough.
Another reason equally important is a growing sentiment towards the US being an ‘unreliable’ ally, manifested by the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, creating the perfect storm for the Taliban return to government – the same group whom the US attempted to remove by invading the country in 2001 –, or its inaction when the Houthis repeatedly attacked Saudi and Emirati oil infrastructure. Failure on the US part to stop in has contributed to growing disillusionment in the Arab world.
Biden’s visit to the region so comes after what is seen as decades of US unaccountability. Perhaps a little too late, considering Arab states have begun shaping their foreign policy independent of Washington. They fully realise that a new world order is emerging (multi-polar that is) in which China and Russia are playing increasingly active role. Turning to other major powers such as France and Germany, Arab states firmly believe the days of a unipolar world are numbered, if not well over. Officials in Washington must have followed developments in the Mideast with a pinch of worry as Arab regimes did not side with the West as they had expected. None of the Arab states took part in Western sanctions; a sizable portion of the Arab public voiced their understanding to Russia’s security concerns over NATO expansion towards its boarders and in Ukraine; and Arab leaders did not openly condemn the operation but adopted a more balanced position by encouraging Russia and Ukraine to diplomacy and dialogue.
Mutual Interests
Thus, Biden meets with Arab leaders who contrary to past encounters are prioritising the region’s interests above any historical alliances; Arab leaders are willing to advance ties with Washington to the extent that they serve the region’s security and economic interests. This climate of new sentiment was quite apparent during the Jeddah summit, clearly reflected in opening speeches by participating Arab leaders. The summit symbolised a new era in Arab-US relations, one moving forward is guided by mutual benefits and interests.
Clear was Prince bin Salman’s message: The Kingdom’s oil production is at maximum capacity and have nothing more to offer. Biden’s attempt to signal his own message by way of a fist bump was met equally by the symbolism of a state president being received by the emir of Mecca – strikingly far less ceremoniously to the reception of former president Donald Trump in his visit to Saudi Arabia in 2017.
Opening speech by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi signalled parallel symbols, too: in clear terms he addressed ‘the Arab nation’, outlining his vision for Egypt, the region, and social and security priorities. Similarly, other Arab leaders voiced the importance of respecting the region’s culture and values. Such points did not overshadow the positive aspects of Arab-US relations, however.
We may conclude that Biden’s visit to the region conveyed several aspects of the shifting and evolving Arab-US relations. The visit was preceded by extensive coordination among the Arab states. The Jeddah summit revealed a new level of understanding between the GCC+3, which may indicate a new approach to building relations with major powers and dealing with global challenges moving ahead.
