Recently, Iran has begun to further promote its alleged role in fighting terrorist organizations. In this context, the Ministry of Intelligence and its officials have issued a slew of statements on dismantling terrorist cells that were preparing to stage terrorist attacks in the coming period. The latest was the remarks by the Iranian Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi on June 7, 2018, in which he announced the arrest of several terrorist cells in western and southwestern Iran in recent days.

Remarkably, this growing trend coincides with the first anniversary of the attacks on the Islamic Consultative Council (Parliament) and the shrine of Khomeini, the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic, on 7 June 2017, which left 17 people dead and about 50 injured. This seems to be inseparable from the overall developments currently taking place in Iran, whether the spiraling internal protests against the regime’s policies or the increasing pressure on Iran because of its subversive roles in the region, which have led to chaos, instability and exacerbation of terrorist organizations threats in crisis-ridden countries.

Multiple objectives

Iran’s attempts to shed light on its own allegations of facing terrorist threats at home and its role in combating terrorist organizations in some countries of the region, particularly in Syria and Iraq, can be outlined in the light of many considerations, the most notable of which are: 

1- Containment of internal pressures: Popular resentment is building up at the regime’s policies, which have failed to address the economic and social crises facing Iranian citizens due to its preoccupation with supporting terrorist and armed organizations in crisis-ridden countries.

Criticisms leveled by some community groups are no longer limited to government executives, including President Hassan Rouhani himself, but it extended to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, suggesting that the tensions at home have reached an unprecedented stage.

This was evident in the strong criticism of the regime by Sahar Mehrabi, a student, in front of the supreme leader, during an Iftar event, upon invitation by the latter on 29 May 2018; as she focused on economic disparity, erosion of public confidence, the collapse of moral values and widespread violations of political and social rights, among others.

More strikingly, in parallel with these developments, some Iranian citizens smashed the boxes of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF), which makes donations to such organizations, according to social media.

Therefore, the regime is trying to adopt several mechanisms to counter these criticisms and justify depletion of the Iranian treasury on its foreign adventures, which have not yielded any positive results for Iranian citizens.

One of the most important mechanisms is the allegation of terrorist threats; the regime seeks to stress that terrorist organizations are planning to carry out terrorist operations at home to undermine its stability. A significant step in responding to these threats, in the regime's view, is to proactively target those organizations abroad, so as to reduce their ability to infiltrate the country.

“We are fighting terrorism in Damascus before hitting Tehran”, the supreme leader Ali Khamenei said, implying that the main objective of Iran’s efforts to strengthen its role abroad lies in giving precedence to protecting the country’s interests and security over the interests and security of others.

That is why the Iranian authorities were particularly alarmed by the attacks on the Consultative Assembly and the shrine of Khomeini. It views such attacks as evidence that terrorist organizations are not far from Iran’s borders. Thus, it feels incumbent upon it to take action to ensure that such attacks would not occur again, by beefing up its presence in crisis-ridden states and continuing support for its allies and allied organizations.

2- Confronting external crises: The growing differences between Iran and many international powers, concerned with the crises in the Middle East region, are no longer confined to the nuclear program, which may go back to square one after the US withdrawal from the agreement, signed between Iran and the “P5 + 1” group on July 14, 2015. In fact, these differences extend to the roles of Iran in those crises, as Iran has contributed to aggravating them, hindered political settlement, and has even helped terrorist organizations strengthen their influence within the crises-ridden states.

Ties between Iran and those organizations have become a particular concern of those powers, which have imposed sanctions on several military entities in Iran, such as the (Quds Force) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, along with those organizations, because of their involvement in many terrorist operations in the past.

It can be argued that one of the main reasons behind the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement is Iran’s insistence on pursuing those roles and not only the extent of its commitment or violation of its terms, since the agreement was intended from the outset to allow for the promotion of stability in the Middle East and settlement of various regional crises, which did not happen. It may also be noted that a major part of Iran’s discussions with European states in support of continuing the agreement, especially Britain, Germany and France, is focused on its regional role and, of course, the exacerbation of various regional crises.

This helps explain the regime’s deliberate attempts to shed more light on the dismantling and arrest of terrorist cells and their aims in Iran, as this strengthens its negotiating position in with the European officials and helps the regime respond to the accusations over its strong ties with those organizations, which actually avoid explicitly targeting the regimes’ interests inside and outside Iran.

3- Strengthening the role of the Pasdaran: This is done through the promotion of Pasdaran’s internal and external roles, where it leads external operations in crisis zones, in parallel with its readiness to step up its economic activities in various projects, following the decisions taken by some foreign companies to withdraw from the Iranian market to avoid US sanctions. This in turn offers an opportunity for the Pasdaran’s companies to return to fill the ensuing void, without the government of President Hassan Rouhani being able to prevent them, due to its diminishing political position at home in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the agreement and the re-imposition of US sanctions.

Finally, the steps taken by the Iranian regime are unlikely to succeed in alleviating the pressures, amid its insistence on pursuing the same policy that has caused internal crises to persist. This is evident in the continuous protests and increasing likelihood of entering into an unprecedented new phase of isolation and international sanctions.