Since being elected as the Somali President on February 8, 2017, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo seeks to prioritize confrontations with Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Youth Movement, more commonly known as al-Shabaab). Farmajo aims to isolate and dismantle the terrorist group, especially that its attacks have increased dramatically during the recent period. The movement launched several terrorist operations, especially in the capital Mogadishu, in clear defiance of the government’s new strategy, suggesting that Somalia is on the threshold of escalations between the government and the movement. These developments are inseparable from the war on terrorism in the region in general, particularly after defeating ISIS in Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria.
Various Options
Although Al Shabab movement has not claimed responsibility for the October 14 attack in the capital Mogadishu, which killed 358 people and injured 228 others, making it the deadliest in the history of Somalia, the Somali government accuses the movement of carrying out the attack. Accordingly, the government indicated that it will step up its operations against the movement, using a new strategy that will be based on several components, most notably are the following:
1- Rebuilding the military: The government gives massive attention to rebuilding the military and raising its capacity. Such steps aim to strengthen the military's role in combating the movement, especially that the latter exploited the waning influence of the military in the past period to expand its sphere of influence and control new areas.
Remarkably, President Farmajo was keen to declare his determination to eradicate the movement while visiting Gordan military training school, on September 9, 2017, where he asserted that the military will play a key role in the government’s new strategy to confront the threats posed by the movement.
2- Activate the role of AMISOM: The government still looks forward to strengthening the participation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the fight against al-Shabaab movement, particularly that upgrading the capacity of the Somali armed forces might take a long period. It seems that supporting this role was a major focus of the talks between President Abdullah Formago during his regional tour, started on October 23, which included Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Numerous reports expected that he would seek to obtain weapons from neighboring countries, as part of his efforts to confront the movement’s terrorist operations.
In his meeting with officials of the countries visited, Farmajo tried to confirm that the movement does not pose threats to Somalia only, but also to neighboring countries, in a bid to expand its influence and attract new terrorist elements. This was evident in his emphasis during his visit to Addis Ababa on the “need to support each other and strengthen [their] solidarity in order to effectively fight al-Shabaab.” He further stressed that “this is not only a threat to Somalia, but also to our neighbors.”
3- Deepening the divisions within al-Shabaab: In its confrontations with the movement, the government focuses on breaking apart the movement from within through deepening divisions among its leaders and militants, leading some of them to split. One example includes the former leader Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur), who handed himself to the authorities along with his splinter group, on August 13, 2017. Through this mean, the government aims to weaken the movement and reduce its ability to carry out terrorist operations that exacerbate instability and turmoil on the domestic scene.
Several reports revealed that Abu Mansour held negotiations with the government before turning himself to the authorities. According to some claims, the negotiations were held in collaboration with the US, which two months before the incident canceled USD 5 million worth reward for information about Abu Mansour and lifted his name off the list of sponsors of terrorism.
After its split off from al-Shabab, Abu Mansour's group participated with the government troops in the confrontations against the movement in Hudur, capital city of Bakool province.
4- Counter-tribal alliances: Al-Shabaab movement managed to establish numerous alliances with some tribes, especially those to which some of its leaders belong. Those tribes helped the movement to expand its funding resources and recruit new members. Apparently, this was one of the reasons that prompted President Farmajo to take new measures to rally tribal support for the military operations against the movement’s positions and elements.
5- Increase coordination with the states involved in the war on terrorism, particularly the US, which launched many strikes against the movement in the last period. In this context, the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation announced in early September 2017, that it submitted a formal request to the US demanding more military assistance, and issued a statement saying that “the Somali army in cooperation with AMISOM made great efforts, leading to their victory over the militias that hinder security and stability, but they are unable to purge the entire country of terrorists because of declining aid allocated to peacekeeping forces operations.”
Current Challenges
However, there are many challenges that may face the new strategy of the Somali government. The most prominent of which are the movement’s deliberate control of vital areas surrounding the capital, Mogadishu, enhancing its ability to carry out massive terrorist attacks, as well as growing resentment within several units in the military due to delayed salaries, which led to the withdrawal of government forces from certain vital areas close to the capital, paving the way for the movement to easily control them.
There are multiple factors indicate the deep differences among the political and security regarding addressing the threats posed by the movement, which led to the resignation of Defense Minister Abdirashid Abdullahi Mohamed and Army Chief General Mohamed Ahmed Jimale on October 12.
Consequently, it can be argued that escalation will be a key feature in the ongoing confrontations between the government and Al Shabab. On one hand, the government is keen to assert its ability to manage state affairs and tackle various political and security challenges. On the other hand, the movement is bent on continuing its attempts to control new areas and launch high-profile operations within Mogadishu.
