Despite the escalating tensions between the United States and Iran since Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2017, Iran may attempt to pursue a back channel diplomacy approach in order to seek rapprochement with the new US administration. These channels are bound by factors that regulate the extent to which Tehran is able to tackle the pressures imposed by successive US administrations since the Iranian revolution in 1979. Iran is also constantly striving -- despite its own claims -- to adapt and customize its ideology to serve its protective interests in case of approaching threats.
The possibility of rapprochement remains merely an inkling in the midst of lack of indicators highlighting Iranian efforts to utilize such channels. In other words, Iranian intention to realize this idea cannot ultimately be guaranteed, in the light of difficulty of foreseeing the Trump administration’s reactions towards them. The Iranian government still appears to be in a phase of evaluating available alternatives on both domestic and external fronts, before eventually implementing any announced policies.
Levels of Escalation
In this regard, one can argue that Iran’s possible intention to seek mutual points of agreement with the Trump administration does not deny the fact that it will maintain its adopted escalatory positions against decisions made by the administration either through its officials, or through its allies of armed militias in areas of conflict.
A statement made on February 11, 2017 by Aws al-Khafaji Al-Khafagi, Secretary General of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces -- one of the most prominent Iraqi armed militias in alliance with Iran -- threatened to, “strike US brigades on Yemeni coasts” in retaliation for Trump’s decision to ban nationals of seven countries, including Iran and Iraq from entering the United States. The threat is correlated to the ongoing escalation between the US and Iran. Furthermore, this statement can also be linked to hints made by US officials regarding the possible designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organisation.
The escalation anticipated by Iran will primarily depend on the US administration’s adopted alternatives, more specifically the utmost levels of threat that the US may reach. For example, Trump’s administration has hinted at the possibility of resorting to a military intervention for dealing with Iran. However, that might trigger Iran to adopt a catastrophic alternative in response. Iran will attempt to avoid the fallout, utilizing several tools in addition to escalation, while simultaneously working to reach an agreement through establishing back channels to diffuse the situation and settle gridlocked disputes. The ultimate goal is to avoid entering a full-on war with the US.
Primary Variables
There are several variables motivating Iran to adopt a non-confrontational approach in the coming phase. These variables include:
1- Historical Experience: The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has been keen to emphasize the difficulty of having a full rapprochement with the US, and having doubts concerning the reliability of the nuclear deal in achieving its goals. Yet, at various historical points, Iran has in fact attempted to reach agreements with successive US administrations.
Iran has benefited from the dynamics upon which the Islamic Republic system was formed, enabling it to deal as various entities, or specifically, employ manoeuvre tactics using external parties. During Ruhollah Khomeini’s rule (1979-1989), Iran held both public and secret negotiations with the United States, such as the meeting held in Algeria in November 1979 between the Iranian former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the National Security Advisor of the United States Zbigniew Brzezinski, during the Jimmy Carter administration.
Even in the darkest stages of conflict, when tensions peaked between both parties during the invasion of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran (November 4, 1979 - January 20, 1981), Iranian officials held secret talks with the Republican candidate’s team at the time, Ronald Reagan, in several European cities, in addition to the formal talks conducted with Jimmy Carter’s administration. However, several sources pointed out that the release of the hostages on January 20, 1981 -- Reagan’s first day in office -- was not coincidental. Some anticipate that it was part of the agreement with Reagan’s team, while other argue that Iran was intending to prove its good intentions for the US administration then. The Iran Contra affair also marked one of the most prominent examples of reaching a tentative common ground between Tehran and Washington in the 1980s.
These understandings persevered even while the conservative right was in power in both Washington and Tehran, especially in the first decade of this century. Even though tensions escalated between the former US President George W. Bush and the former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, due to the latter’s insistence on developing the Iranian nuclear program, both parties did not stop participating in political talks concerning several regional issues, primarily the issue of Iraq.
2- Proxy War: Iran is keen to adopt an escalatory policy in facing U.S. pressures and threats to ensure its readiness to oppose any alternatives Washington may resort to, including a military option. However, this does not deny Iran’s desire to avoid direct military confrontation, especially with one of the world’s superpowers. Thus, Iran prefers to engage in proxy wars through forming and supporting allied armed militias in different areas of the region, seeking to achieve goals that serve its aspirations and regional role, and pressure its rivals.
Despite al-Khafagi’s assertion on correlating his threats as a response to Trump’s decision to ban nationals from seven countries from entering the US, one can interpret that the significance of his threats’ timing can’t be detached from the escalating tensions between Iran and Trump’s administration. Additionally, this threat could be followed by others made by Iranian allied militias towards the United States in light of the ongoing escalation between both parties.
3- Employing Ideology: Iran always claims that it adheres to its ideological constants when interacting with regional and international developments. However, this does not deny the fact that in several cases, Iran has ensured that these constants are utilized to serve defined interests within its vision for interactions with regional and international parties, especially the United States.
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, used these constants as a justification for Iran’s participation in direct negotiations with the United States to reach the nuclear deal in July 2015. On January 9, 2014, he said, “We have stated previously that if we felt that the general interest prevails a certain issue, then we will negotiate with the devil to avoid evil.”
Several indicators confirm that Iran has adopted policies contradicting the ideological constants it claims to adhere to in order to serve certain interests, including positions it has taken on dealing with various regional developments in the area.
Finally, despite what was mentioned previously, one can state that escalation will remain the most likely scenario for interactions between Iran and the United States in the upcoming phase, especially in light of the latter stressing how disputes with Tehran are not confined to the nuclear agreement, but also extend to Iran’s support for terrorism. However, this does not rule out the possibility that Iran will consider more flexible and pragmatic alternatives to cope with the American threat looming at its borders.
