Over the past six years, Iran and Turkey were able to set aside their differences over the Syrian conflict even though these disputes are not marginal since they each took opposite sides by supporting rival parties in the conflict. This explains the reasons behind raising the level of bilateral relations between the two on the political, economic and security levels, even as these disputes grow. When it seemed that there is regional and international intention to find a political resolution for the Syrian crisis, these disputes once again came to the surface. This is apparent in the three-way talks between the defense and foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey and Russia, that preceded the Moscow Declaration on 20 December 2016, and bilateral talks between Turkey and Russia what ended in a ceasefire in late December 2016.
These disputes appear to have reached a peak whereby existing means of containing or neutralizing differences are no longer appealing for Tehran or Ankara. However, this does not mean that Iranian escalation against Turkey will reach unprecedented heights, especially since Tehran – despite its discontent with Ankara’s policies – cannot to take the risk of entering an open conflict with Turkey in Syria, at least for now.
It is more likely that Iran will adopt a “wait and see” approach until it has a sense of the outcome of the Astana talks on 23 January 2017, and Geneva IV meetings that will follow on 8 February 2017. Iran is currently especially keen on maintaining relations with Turkey and Russia until there is clarity on the positions of US President Donald Trump’s new administration, on both the nuclear deal and accusations that Iran supports terrorism.
Notable concern:
Although senior Iranian officials welcomed Russian-Turkish effort to improve the chances of success in Astana to bolster the Russian-Turkish sponsored ceasefire reached on 30 December 2016, and reach agreement on key topics to be discussed in Geneva, this does not refute that several circles close to decision-making bodies are sounding many concerns. This includes possible repercussions from closer Russian and Turkish understandings, or possible shifts in Russia’s policies on Syria.
Becoming a spectator:
These circles believe the ceasefire agreement sent disturbing messages to Tehran. Most notably, that it demonstrated that Russia and Turkey are more capable of controlling military escalation inside Syria and promoting a political resolution, despite the key role Iran played by cooperating with armed sectarian militias by contributing to forming and training them.
In other words, these circles believe it is possible that with Russia, Turkey will replace Iran as a partner and regional guarantor of settlement efforts on the Syrian crisis, since Ankara is the regional backer of the opposition and Russia is the international ally of the Syrian regime.
Some media outlets close to the regime are expressing these concerns, such as the website Tabnak which is close to Mohsen Rezaei, the former leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) and Secretary General of the Expediency Discernment Council (EDC). In a report published on 4 January 2017, the website warned that Iran could become “a spectator in the Syrian conflict” because Russia and Turkey are “unilaterally” organizing upcoming talks and deciding the main negotiation points between the regime and opposition.
Other reports strongly criticize Russia because it is relying on new understandings with Turkey, noting that Moscow made a serious mistake when it began to raise the level of these understandings to the extent of ignoring the negative impact of the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Ankara Andrey Karlov on 19 December 2016.
Containing the Kurds:
There is no doubt that cooperation between Turkey and Russia in fighting ISIS in the city of Al-Bab raises Iranian concerns, since this could expand Turkey’s role and influence inside Syria. Especially after reports that Turkey wants to maintain a military presence in Al-Bab even after the end of military operations by Euphrates Shield forces, which were supported by Russia in the form of air strikes against ISIS positions. According to Tehran’s view, this indicates that Turkey is trying to implement the same policies it previously followed in Iraq, namely creating a military role for itself in Syria to protect the gains it made whether through Euphrates Shield operations or expanding security and political understandings with Russia.
Tehran’s disapproval of Moscow’s reliance on understandings with Ankara was evident in its response to demands by the latter to intervene to prevent violations by Iran’s militia allies, such as Hezbollah, especially in area of Wadi Bardi, which is particularly important for the Syrian regime and its allies because it is a main source of water for the capital Damascus. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on 4 January 2017, that “the Astana talks could stumble if continued violations do not end”. He accused Hezbollah, Shiite militias and regime forces of committing these violations, and called on Iran to “intervene and uphold its obligations to the ceasefire, demonstrate its weight and put pressure on militia groups and regime forces”.
Iran responded quickly and strongly. On 5 January 2017, Iran’s Foreign Ministry urged Turkey not to take unrealistic and irresponsible positions that are not compatible with reality or the truth during negotiations.
Delayed action:
Although Russia and Turkey sent many reassuring signals to Iran, such as continuing meetings between officials from all three countries to discuss the main points of the Astana talks, including the three-way meeting in Moscow on 13 January 2017, attended by Iran’s Assistant Foreign Minister Hossein Jaberi Ansari. Also, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani in a telephone conversation to express his condolences for the death of EDC Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani “Iran and Turkey are carrying heavy burdens in the region, and must bolster their cooperation to end tensions”. But all this will unlikely cause Iran to quickly support expanding understandings between Russia and Turkey on Syria. It appears that Iran prefers to take its time in assessing the new facts that these understandings have started to impose, while waiting for the outcome of the Astana talks and Geneva discussions.
Iran is adopting a “wait and see” approach because despite its concerns about possible repercussions, this does not negate its dire need to maintain strong ties with both countries. Especially since the US may escalate animosity against Iran in the coming phase at the beginning of Trump’s term, as is already apparent in some US Congress members threatening to propose legislation that would force the US State Department to list the IRG as a terrorist organization that threatens global security.
In conclusion, Iran views current understandings could contribute to the formulation of new political and security arrangements inside Syria that possibly threaten its interests and vision of post-settlement Syria. However, it will not obstruct these understandings, at least for the time being, until it has a sense of what their outcome will be before addressing them either by boosting the chances of transforming them into procedural steps on the ground, or placing many obstacles in their path to implementation.
