Russia’s growing influence in Syria, specifically in the military scene, is strongly associated with the intensified Israeli communication and coordination with Moscow. Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has already visited Russia on four occasions since last September, breaking the record number of visits made by a Prime Minister to Russia in Israel’s political history.
The Israeli military and political strategy regarding Syria lies at the center of these evolving ties and can be summed up in four motives. Netanyahu clearly detailed two of these motives during his last visit to Moscow: preventing the use of Syrian territory by Iran to launch operations against Israel and inhibiting any attempt to supply Hezbollah with advanced arms in Lebanon.
However, observers of Israel’s involvement in the Syrian crisis since the onset of the revolution five years ago are aware of two additional axiomatic Israeli motives. First, Israel seeks to prevent the fall of the Syrian regime that would lead to the collapse of the regime’s security institution that has been adopting a cold enmity stance regarding Israel for more than forty years. Second, Syria intends to halt the dominance of Sunni Islamist movements over the Syrian political scene. Both Israel and Russia have a common interest in fulfilling these two motives.
During the past few months, the region has witnessed three determining events that would influence the traditional Israeli strategy and suggest new dynamics for Israel’s military and political action on the Syrian scene:
1- The appointment of Lieberman as Israel’s Defense Minister:
The first determining factor is related to the military mind and strategy of Israel’s new Defense Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, towards what he calls “Israel’s national security.” The appointment of Lieberman after the resignation of Moshe Yaalon does not represent a mere replacement of the Defense Minister’s persona, but rather reflects a transformation in the Israeli Government coalition after the Prime Minister agreed to intensify Israel’s military influence amidst the developments in the region.
Lieberman’s performance during the first couple of days of his mandate reveals such prospects as further pressures are imposed on the Palestinian Authority. Some experts in internal Palestinian affairs believe that Lieberman prefers seeing the Palestinian Authority led by a president with a clear and decisive vision towards Hamas and the general situation in the Gaza Strip. This strategy drove Lieberman to imply that a new war on Gaza might be inevitable, but should be the “last war” that leads to the fall of Hamas.
Lieberman’s confrontational discourse is not only tackling Palestinian internal affairs but also the Middle East as a region. During his first visit to the US as Israel’s Defense Minister in June 2016, both parties expressed the common stance of the “two strategic allies,” who refute the supply of Hezbollah with advanced missiles and consider that its interference in the war in Syria destabilizes security in Lebanon. They have also linked Hamas to ISIS and stressed the need to “defeat the threats represented by Iran.”
Change in Lieberman’s strategy is reflected in the steps recently undertaken by Israel’s military forces in Syria. The Israeli Air Force targeted a mobile surface-to-air missile system (SAM-6) in the South of Daraa province. The missiles belonged to the militias of Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Waleed, a group strongly tied to ISIS and were seized from the Syrian Army by the Islamic Muthanna Movement two years ago in Al-Shaykh Maskin in Daraa. Israel also struck headquarters and storage facilities belonging to Hezbollah in the Southern part of Homs.
The Israeli army has apparently gone beyond its conventional bombing operations in Syria since the outburst of the Revolution. Israel used to attack weapon storage facilities that were suspected to supply Hezbollah with arms or bomb some strategic weaponry to prevent their use by unorganized armed groups. However, the strikes were limited to the northern outskirts of Damascus and countryside, and had not targeted areas actively involved in the Syrian conflict, such as Homs, nor had they targeted strategic locations of armed opposition groups.
This new Israeli behavior could mean that Israel might become a major player in the military conflict in Syria where it will strive to prove to all military parties involved the important and efficient role of Israel in determining the side that would achieve a relative victory on the Syrian scene. Israel would attack various targets linked to organizations affiliated to Iran that might replicate Lebanese Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and radical Sunni Islamist groups that might occupy areas near Israeli borders.
2- The Russian military role in Syria:
This determining factor stems from the clear Russian military role in Syria that jostles its Iranian counterpart and proves Russia’s determination to reach a political solution in Syria in the near future. The visible role performed by Russia would determine the Syrian regime’s strategy, hence, the current and future Israeli strategy in Syria. Tel Aviv is concerned about Russia’s endeavor to reconcile between Iranian influence and US strategy. Israel is well aware of the military and political concessions made by the US to Russia in the Syrian Crisis, Iran’s complete control over armed militias and the strategic decision surrounding Bashar Al-Assad’s fate. Thus, Israel is mindful that half of the Syrian deal is under Iranian control, and that even the Russian tide, though accepted by the US, cannot outstrip the Iranian leverage and tools, especially after Geneva’s negotiations that were held against Iran’s will and have subsequently been to no avail.
Israel trusts the Syrian military and security institution and considers it as the only entity that could fulfill the Syrian political and military commitment towards Israel. Although Tel Aviv sees Sunni Islamist organizations as a living threat to its borders, it is aware that if Syria becomes a full-fledged “Iranian satellite,” it would constitute a huge peril to Israel’s strategy and a future military intractability. In this context, Israel’s strategy leans towards supporting Russian efforts in Syria, especially during the few months left in the current US administration mandate, while awaiting the new administration’s policy that would allow Israel to draw a new strategy in Syria.
3- Transformations in Turkey’s policy in Syria:
The last determining factor that might influence Israel’s role in the Syrian crisis is the transformed Turkish policy in Syria. Turkey’s opposition to Assad’s regime and his attempts to oppress the Syrian revolution was followed by a deterioration in the harmonious strategic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Moreover, it seems that the Turkish government is modifying its strategy in Syria as it is reformulating its ties with Israel.
Israel has always considered Turkey to be the only Muslim state in the region that holds an objective and rational stance without any ideological disposition towards Tel Aviv. However, Israel’s views on Turkey had changed completely especially after the Arab Spring, when the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) sought to become the political spearhead of the Muslim Brotherhood movements in the region, building on their expansion in many countries after the Arab revolutions. Such Turkish ambition challenges the Israeli strategy that would never welcome the emergence of a new phenomenon replicating Abdel Nasser’s cross-border experience in the region.
Israel sees in the current Turkish retreat an end to Ankara’s pursuit of creating a trans-boundary radical political group in the region that would adopt an ideology and a discourse against Israel. Tel Aviv considers that Turkey’s behavior in Syria would represent a benchmark to Ankara’s strategic transformation. On the other hand, Israel will push Turkey towards three directions in Syria to regain its positive political relations with Tel Aviv. Turkey would have to control Islamist extremist groups flowing from Turkey to Syria. It would also need to impose some clear political commitments on the Syrian political groups associated with Turkey, namely the Syrian Muslim Brothers and similar factions. Lastly, as Turkey represents an escalation tool in Syrian developments, it should not be dragged towards a military confrontation with Russia or Iran in Syria.
