A defining characteristic of the modern state is its monopoly on the use of armed force. This encompasses being the sole party with military, police, security services, judiciary, and correctional facilities, holding the power to enforce regulations on its inhabitants. The only exception is in occupied territories, where armed movements arise to oppose the occupation and seek independence.
The presence of armed organizations that do not belong to the state, regardless of their type or reason for existence, is considered a violation of the state's sovereignty. It also reveals a defect or weakness in the state's structure, mapping it on the list of fragile or failed states. Such entities are commonly referred to as militias, armed groups, or violent non-state actors. These terms describe organizations with elements of leadership and continuity that operate outside official state authority, using violence to pursue political, ideological, or economic objectives.
These groups typically organize in the form of small entities, relying on their agility and guerrilla warfare methods, with members residing in mountains and remote regions. An exception is when the group controls part of the state's territory, such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This definition does not encompass private security firms with armed personnel and combat equipment, such as the American "Blackwater" or the Russian "Wagner." These firms cooperate with their host countries and are sometimes employed as instruments of foreign policy.
The Landscape of Arab Militias
Numerous armed organizations have emerged in Arab nations. Among the earliest are the "secret organization" of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the activities of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in the 1940s and 1950s. This trend fluctuated over time, but its scope significantly expanded during the Arab upheavals that began in the early 2010s.
In general, most of these groups and militias rely on external support in the form of weapons, training, and money. Except for that, these groups cannot be dealt with as a unified bloc, given that the causes for their emergence, the nature of their objectives, and their level of social support vary. A single element cannot explain the rise of these groups. Rather, the reasons are numerous and intersect with one another.
Armed organizations associated with identity issues are believed to be prevalent in Arab countries. Those rooted in religious identity include jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, as well as their affiliated groups across various Arab nations. The sectarian identity encompasses the Houthi militia in Yemen, Hezbollah, and militias connected with political entities in Lebanon. In Iraq, this includes the Mahdi Army, Popular Mobilization Forces, and other similar militias. Additionally, tribal and regional identities influence various groups in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Darfur exemplifies the multiplicity of ethnic and tribal-based armed organizations, with many seizing control over portions of the state's land. Notably, these include the Janjaweed, the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur, the Justice and Equality Movement led by Gibril Ibrahim, and numerous other smaller militias.
The emergence of armed militias has been tied to the underperformance of governmental institutions, their fragility, and their inability to deliver fundamental services like employment, education, and health care to their citizens. When the state fails to perform these duties, residents in underserved areas perceive discrimination and inequality in service allocation, and when the government doesn't address their concerns through peaceful political channels, the environment becomes conducive to the rise of armed militias.
Economic and political factors became increasingly significant in the aftermath of the popular uprisings in 2011, coupled with the descent of several Arab countries into a spiral of civil conflicts and proxy wars. As a result, regional and international actors, such as Iran, have increased their backing for armed groups in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon. The evolution of communication and information technology, which facilitated the spread of ideas, promotion of activities, and recruitment of members and supporters, further elevated the prominence of armed militias and their impact on both internal and regional political stability.
It is vital to distinguish between two types of militias. Armed militias attempting to secede from the existing state entity, as happened in South Sudan, and militias seeking to remove the existing administration in the capital, change the ruling system, and reform what they perceive as unfair policies such governments have implemented.
In evaluating any militia or armed group, it's crucial to examine its current status and whether it has dominion over sections of the state's territory. ISIS, for instance, once held expansive regions of Iraq and Syria, establishing such a sophisticated governance system that some analysts labeled it a "semi-state." With Raqqa as its capital, it operated police forces, courts, and prisons. It even circulated its own currency and undertook various administrative duties. Similarly, the Houthis seized large parts of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sana'a, establishing unauthorized rule. Various militias also dominate territories within several Sudanese states.
When militias exert control over portions of a state's territory, they inherently assume governance roles and responsibilities, engaging in state-like activities. Combat or warfare is not their sole focus. This contrasts with militias constantly moving between safe zones, intermittently engaging in terrorist activities such as assassinations and assaults on governmental establishments, as observed in contemporary Iraq and Syria.
A Vision for the Future
The future of these militias and the paths they might take hinges on multiple interconnected factors:
1. In nations characterized by strong social integration and robust state institutions, militias predominantly face a trajectory towards defeat. Algeria offers a compelling case: post the "Black Decade," the state reclaimed authority over its entire territory through both military confrontations and a subsequent general amnesty. Similarly, in Egypt, effective state mechanisms pushed these groups out of urban locales, cornering them in the Sinai's desolate terrains, where a significant number were neutralized.
2. For countries fragmented by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divides, resolving militia influences becomes decidedly more complex. This complexity stems from the fact that societal divisions often underpin political differences. State institutions, in such scenarios, need to work towards neutralizing these divides by implementing fair and unbiased policies across all regions and for all citizen groups. Complicating matters further, external powers and nations might have vested interests in perpetuating such conflicts, often by backing various militia factions. Moreover, inefficiencies and corruption within state institutions can hamper their credibility and effectiveness in the eyes of the populace.
3. For countries where militias emerged primarily due to political rifts post the 2011 upheavals, their endurance largely hinges on international geopolitics and the balance of power. Taking Syria as an illustrative example: multiple factions are at play. On one side, there's the Syrian army, bolstered by allies like Russian forces, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Lebanese Hezbollah, and groups such as Nujaba, Fatemiyoun, and the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas brigades. Conversely, there are entities like the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Free Army, the Al-Nusra Front, and the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – the latter having the backing of the US and its military base in northern Syria. Furthermore, Turkish military interventions in Syria, ostensibly to safeguard borders from the Kurdistan Workers' Party's militant activities, add another layer to this intricate web.
In summary, if we revert to theoretical frameworks in international relations, we will find two options. The realist school prioritizes state interests and national security above all, advocating for the use of military might to assert political and security dominance, followed by reconciliatory efforts once a position of strength has been achieved. On the other hand, the liberal, pluralistic school recommends engaging with insurgent elements, aiming to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements. While each approach has its proponents and distinct methodologies, when faced with militias that seek secession or control over the capital, the recourse often leans towards the use of force.
