Destroying the Great Mosque of Nuri was the symbolic finale to the end of the battle for Mosul. This 12th century mosque from which ISIS declared the so called "Caliphate State" three years ago collapsed on June 21st, 2017. Nonetheless, the end of military operations and turning the page on "ISIS" on the ground brings challenges that might go beyond Mosul to all of Iraq.
In this context, Iraq may face ten challenges after the end of the battle for Mosul:
1- Cloning syndrome: this means the ability to replicate such scenarios in an environment full of the root causes that give rise to such organizations. This raises a question about the possibility of considering the defeat of ISIS in Mosul as an actual demise of the organization. To answer this question, one undoubtedly needs to read the future of the organization in post-Mosul phase, taking into consideration the previous experiments, particularly the “Islamic State of Iraq” founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, given that some leaders of "ISIS" considers themselves an extension to him. This brings us to another equally important battle related to the "ISIS" idea machine that can reproduce the organization in the future if the problems that caused the fall of Mosul were not addressed, particularly the political and sectarian conflicts, corruption, partition and fragmentation projects with their various ramifications.
2- Addressing the human cost: according to international estimates, including United Nations estimates, the estimated human cost in Mosul, since "ISIS" captured the city and during the liberation battle until mid- June 2017, approximately 15,000 dead, and 25,000 injured, 150,000 displaced, thousands of lost persons, and thousands of corpses that have not been recovered. Although those reports largely put the responsibility of the human toll on ISIS, it does not absolve the Iraqi government, Popular Mobilizations militia, and the coalition forces from the same responsibility during their offensive campaign that lasted about nine months.
UN reports monitored repeated violations committed by the Popular Mobilization militia in Mosul despite advanced warnings from the UN and international community, especially against the Sunni community. Violations included extrajudicial liquidations of civilians and extensive looting, as well as arrest campaigns targeting those allegedly belong to the organization, in addition to systematic reprisal expulsions in Mosul in order to alter the demographics of the city.
At the end of March 2017, the UN Human Rights Commission said that it would welcome international investigation about casualties in Iraq, to include all investigations and accidents. Failure of compensation and national reconciliation efforts constitutes one of the grave challenges facing the Iraqi government in the near future.
3- Identity crisis: Nineveh Governorate has in general a unique social mosaic comprising multi-ethnic groups, which have been subjected under ISIS to massive violations. In addition to violations against Christians, Yazidis and Turkomans, forcing most of those communities to flee their homes, ISIS destroyed the identity of Mosul, the last of which was the Great Mosque of al-Nuri which dates back to more than eight centuries. Prior to this, ISIS had blown up the monuments in Mosul, such as Mosul Museum, and ruins of the historic Nimrud city.
Overall, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Archaeology and archaeologists in Mosul, ISIS blew up about 90% of such monuments, some of which were destroyed under extremist pretexts, and much of which were stolen and smuggled out of the country to finance the organization.
4- Political entitlements: there are several entitlements as the political and security forces that participated in the liberation seek political gains, among those the Kurdish forces which plan to hold a referendum on independence in September.
Despite that the Federal Government, as well as many international and regional powers, reject the announcement of the Kurdistan Regional Government to hold the referendum, the current indicators suggest that it will be done unilaterally. The Kurdistan government considers the matter a foregone conclusion under the demarcation of the area along the "blood borders", as announced by leader of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani. This challenge may emerge more clearly after the anticipated liberation of Tal Afar after declaring the liberation of Mosul.
5- Position of the "Popular Mobilization": the popular Mobilization militia considers itself the main force that contributed to the liberation of Mosul, a matter that, according to its view, necessitates granting it wide powers in Mosul and the rest of the liberated areas after the military operations end. Such powers will not only be limited to security, but extend to the political side, considering that many member of the "Mobilization" militias constitutes the military arm of political and religious forces. Thus, many observers argue that the Mobilization militia will most likely seek to play a role in politics and security, not in Mosul only but in the future of Iraq as a whole, through taking charge of the entire security in the country.
6- Administrative arrangements: Besides the anticipated big political gains in Mosul, there are domestic entitlements for the tribal forces and clans in Mosul, which consider themselves to have played a role in the liberation. Nineveh Guards are an example of these forces. However, they have recently been excluded from joint leadership of the Mobilization Forces, in a breach of the understandings between its Commander, Atheel al-Nujaifi and Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi. Nineveh Guards are mostly Sunnis who believe they paid a price for "ISIS" control, and will not accept to pay the price again if the government ignores them, and will not accept to be victimized to satisfy the ambitions of the Shiite forces, which accuse them of being an incubator for "ISIS".
7- Regional projects: with the declaration of "victory" over "ISIS", and the imminent end of military operations in Iraq, Iran President Hassan Rouhani said that "Iran is a partner in victory in Iraq", and hence such partnership should have its benefits in the next phase. Here, comes the Iranian project to expand towards the Eastern Mediterranean traversing both Iraq and Syria. And since the Iranian-funded Popular Mobilization militia is the one to be tasked to spread on the Iraqi border with Syria and Jordan, this would make the mission easier for Iran.
In addition, there is a Turkish project, where Ankara believes that it had a role in the battle for Mosul, from which it was withheld by guarantees regarding the identity of the Sunni majority region. Therefore, the strong Shiite presence in the post-Mosul scene will prompt Turkey to intervene. This is expected to happen soon in light of the disagreement between the Iraqi government and Atheel al-Nujaifi, who is backed by Turkey, in addition to that the next operation in Tal Afar will renew the same row. Moreover, when the military operations are over, Kurdistan plans to hold a referendum, which Turkey considers a "a grave mistake", in the words of President Recep Tayyip, who sees it as a threat to his country.
8- US arrangements in Iraq: The US has played a prominent role in directing the military operations in Mosul, surged its forces and support for Iraqi forces, and rehabilitated the "Qayara" air base prior to the start of the operations as an alternative to the "Incirlik" Turkish air base, which was used before the failed coup in Turkey and impacted its relations with the US Therefore, the role of Washington, which makes advanced observations on the potential political plans and projects for future stability in Iraq, will pose a challenge, given the potential domestic or regional projects in Iraq.
9- Reconstruction: it is also a chronic challenge for Iraq given the experience of post-US occupation. With regard to Mosul, government reports speak of almost complete destruction of the infrastructure in Mosul, including destruction of five key bridges, the main power plant, water pumping stations, Mosul University, 241 primary and secondary schools, 10 hospitals and 76 health centers, Nineveh drug factory, 18 worship houses, telecommunications masts, 1800 laboratory, workshop and government factory, an oil refinery, 6 sports clubs, 54 government buildings, 29 hotels, a sulfur factory, 21 thousand housing units, textile factories, cement factory, iron and steel factory, 11 banks, sugar factories, and oil wells, which represent 60 percent of the residential neighborhoods, and 80% of the infrastructure.
The Iraqi Ministry of Planning estimates that Mosul alone would need USD 11 billion for reconstruction of total $100 billion for the comprehensive reconstruction project, over ten years, a huge challenge given the Iraqi Government budget deficit and around USD 110 billion in debt. Since the government has not been able to reconstruct other liberated areas in the past, the start of Mosul reconstruction project will remain in doubt.
10- Partition projects: there are many scenarios for the partition of Iraq which aim to divide Nineveh Governorate to smaller areas. The projects have varied between splitting the governorate into three or five provinces with the aim of fragmentation, claiming that leaving it in such large size will continue to pose a threat to Iraq. The existing plans to annex new areas of Kurdistan may reinforce the possibility of this scenario.
To conclude, it might be argued that the fall of Mosul to "ISIS" was not only due to the presence of a special environment, but also due to the repercussions of long stages of locally and regionally compound and complex conflicts in the Iraqi scene in general, for over 16 years since the fall of Saddam Hussein. With the continued deadlock in the Iraqi situation and without addressing the underlying causes of such a crisis and other crises, it is difficult to say that ending ISIS control on more than a third of the Iraqi State could solve Iraq problems and carry it to a different future that turns the page on the past.
