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The repercussions of liberating Jroud from ISIS on Lebanon

17 أغسطس، 2017


The Lebanese state, its army and security apparatuses are preparing to liberate the lands, which ISIS controls in Jroud, i.e. the barren, mountainous border area between Lebanon and Syria. Their most important measures are militarily targeting ISIS to exhaust it and besiege it and providing political cover to the army to launch the battle while taking into consideration that the army rejects any foreign or internal help, particularly from Hezbollah that is trying to coordinate with the Lebanese army to eliminate ISIS.

Despite the possible repercussions resulting from fighting ISIS, the state insists to finish this battle to liberate its territories. This is while taking into consideration that they must mitigate the future repercussions of the battle, which may include human and financial losses. These repercussions may include vengeful acts against Lebanon and enabling Hezbollah in Syrian-Lebanese border areas thus strengthening Iranian influence. This is in addition to the possibility of halting American military aid to Lebanon if there is coordination between Hezbollah and the Lebanese army.

The Lebanese state took several political, military and security measures to pave way for the battle to clear the Jroud (Jroud Arsal in the South to Jroud Ras Baalbeck north in northeast Lebanon) from terrorist organizations and particularly from ISIS. The most important measures are:

1. Intensifying security measures in cities and towns adjacent to the Syrian borders, like Qaa in northeast Lebanon. The most important measures include a curfew at night out of fear of suicide operations and placing Syrian refugee camps under the army and security forces’ continuous surveillance. As a result, security forces in North Lebanon foiled a Lebanese man’s attempt to avenge for ISIS and shoot worshippers in the Mansouri Great Mosque in Tripoli on August 7.

2. The army will target ISIS posts using heavy artillery and missiles. It will also control some strategic hills between Jroud Arsal and Jroud Ras Baalbeck (like al-Najasa and Dawar al-Zunar hills), isolate and besiege ISIS members in the Jroud away from the town of Arsal. There are also ongoing negotiations with Saraya Ahl Al-Sham (which is affiliated with the Free Syrian Army) to leave from Jroud Arsal and retur to Syria thus allowing the Lebanese army to deploy in the area to confront ISIS.

3. Provide the army with political cover in its war against ISIS. This was seen in the decisions made by the Higher Defense Council on August 9 as they confirmed the council’s confidence in the army’s command and authorized it to liberate the outskirts of al-Qaa, al-Fakiha and Ras Baalbeck from terrorist groups. The council also stated that only the army decides when to launch the attack, as it is more aware of the situation on ground.

Hezbollah’s stance

Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah confirmed (in a televised speech after liberating Jroud Arsal on August 4) the following:

1. “We, Hezbollah, are at the service of the Lebanese army, and we will do whatever it asks. We are with the army, at its service and by its side and we want it to accomplish a quick and decisive victory.”

2. “The front against ISIS will be opened in the mountainous area in the Syrian side. This is a bigger front and the Syrian army and Hezbollah will be there.”

3. “Political distempers and maliciousness must be distanced from the battle in order to have a unified front. The timing to fight on the Lebanese front is the decision of the Lebanese army as we are prepared for the fight on the second front.”

Within the same context, Hezbollah’s military media confirmed on August 6 that Hezbollah members targeted ISIS gunmen with missiles and rockets near Kherbet Daoud at the Lebanese-Syrian border. The attack killed and injured some ISIS members. Hezbollah also negotiated with al-Nusra Front to exit Jroud Arsal and swap hostages under the supervision of Lebanese security forces and the Lebanese Red Cross. 

Clearing strategy

According to the measures taken by the Lebanese army and to some clarifications by army sources, it seems the adopted strategy is based on the following principles:

1. The army does not want to coordinate with anyone in the battle that will be launched on Lebanese territories against ISIS while emphasizing that there is no coordination with anyone inside or outside Lebanon (such as with the Syrian army and the international coalition forces especially the US). The Lebanese army is the only party concerned in the war on Lebanese territories and it will not cross a single centimeter outside its borders.

2. Adopting the nibble strategy with ISIS members by restricting their activity, completely exhausting them, preventing supplies from reaching them, pursuing their members’ movement and using jets to monitor their movement and attack them. This all aims to get the organization surrender and withdraw from Lebanese territories without engaging in direct confrontations with Lebanese forces.

According to Lebanese officials’ stances, there is no operational coordination between the Lebanese army and the Syrian army regarding the upcoming battle to liberate Jroud from ISIS. At the same time, there are also signs that there is indirect coordination between the two parties. This was noted by Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah in his televised speech in which he addressed the phase after liberating the Jroud and said the Syrian army and Hezbollah are prepared for the battle once the Lebanese army decides that.

News websites affiliated with Hezbollah reported that coordination between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah is definite. This is specially because the situation in the field makes it investable for the army to coordinate with Hezbollah and the Syrian army especially that the enemy, i.e. ISIS, is one and that the area which ISIS controls is around 300 kilometers square of elevated areas that give it the upper hand in the fighting. Media sources in support of Hezbollah (Al-Akhbar newspaper’ August 11 edition) said the Resistance’s command made a final decision which stipulates rejecting the exhaustion of the Lebanese army and rejecting attempts to drag it into ambushes which can lead to huge human losses in its ranks. The report added that the Resistance would do what it deems appropriate to help the army achieve a decisive victory with the least possible losses.

Possible losses

Lebanon confronts several possible challenges as a result of liberating its territories from ISIS. They are:

1. Human and material losses: The Lebanese army is not rushing into specifying zero hour and it’s taking its time until it finishes all its preparations as it wants to have the least human losses in its ranks. The expected battle’s circumstances are difficult considering the nature of the land and heights in the Jroud and considering that ISIS will not be able to retreat inside Syria because the Syrian army and Hezbollah are there, thus their martyrdom is inevitable. At the same time, the army is trying to keep the soldiers who have been abducted by the organization since August 2014 alive to prevent stirring the public opinion in Lebanon.

2. Vengeful operations inside Lebanon: The recent phase witnessed some attempts targeting Lebanon. The last was an attempt by a 14-year-old boy to shoot worshippers in a mosque in Tripoli. This warns of vengeful plans against the Lebanese state. These plans may also have personal motives. What supports these schemes are the refugee camps which some terrorists infiltrated and the cluster cells which may become active in the upcoming phase to carry out terrorist operations.

3. Enabling Hezbollah in the border area: Hezbollah thinks its border area has strategic importance because it strengthens its control over the Syrian side of the border. It also thinks that Syrian refugees in these areas pose future threats against sectarian balances on the Lebanese side – a threat that is in favor of Muslim Sunnis. Emptying these areas from ISIS will achieve the Iranian vision “Useful Syria,” i.e. create vital geographic communication between Syria and Hezbollah to strengthen Iranian influence in Arab countries in the Middle East. This will create several domestic political crises with March 14 parties, particularly with the Future Movement.

4. Suspending foreign military aid: The US warned of the threat of Hezbollah’s presence in the Lebanese authority and of its participation in any military operations under the state’s wing. The last warning was made by US Department of Defense spokesperson Eric Pahon as he said: “If we learned of credible reports of coordinated integration between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah then that would prompt serious inquiry and outreach to convey our concern.” This may lead to suspending American and European military support to the Lebanese state.

A cover for success

Despite the aforementioned losses, the gains that the state will make from eliminating ISIS will provide a cover for this battle’s success without looking at the negative aspects especially that there is domestic consensus regarding the importance of launching the battle as soon as possible. This may enable the state from restoring control over its territories. As for the losses, the Lebanese authorities can mitigate their repercussions in the future, especially in terms of foreign military aid. Therefore, Lebanese commanders view losses as a natural result of any battle that a state launches against any party and not just against ISIS in particular.