Ammar al-Hakim’s announcement on July 24, 2017 that he is stepping down as the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) came after generational conflicts surfaced between a number of the Council’s senior figures, who had visited Tehran to demand that he should be pressured over his reliance on the youth. Moreover, al-Hakim himself rejected attempts by senior members of the council to assume government positions, and even sought to build unique relations with Arab and Western countries by presenting himself as an acceptable moderate Shiite figure. The outgoing leader is preparing for the upcoming elections to be held across Iraq. 

Al-Hakim’s withdrawal will now bear significant implications for the Shiite polity. Most significantly, the ISCI is inching closer to its demise because a majority of its supporters and financial assets were withdrawn to join Al-Hakim’s newly-formed political bloc known as the National Wisdom movement, at a time when the predominantly-Shiite National Iraqi Alliance is poised to suffer from widening cracks due to current internal political volatility. Also known as the Watani List, the Alliance is an Iraqi electoral coalition that contested the Iraqi legislative election, 2010. The Alliance is mainly composed of Shi'a Islamist parties

Al-Hakim’s announced that his new bloc rejects militarization of society under any pretexts, and that Iraq in 2017 is far too different from what it was in 2013. He demanded the loyal influential political forces to adequately recognize this difference. 

The Islamic Supreme Council

The senior Shi’it cleric Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim founded the “Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” in 1982 while he was in exile in Iran. Al-Hakim pledged full allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih (guardianship of the jurist), despite that Iraqi marja’s (the highest-level Iraqi Shi’ite authorities) never recognized the Khomeini’s doctrine. During the Iraq-Iran war, the Council deployed underground cells across Iraq to operate secretly against the regime of Saddam Hussein and seize power. The Council’s militia wing, known then as the Badr Brigade and later as the Badr Organization, operated under the command of Hadi al-Ameri, who later became minister of transportation under the then-prime minister Nouri al-Maliki.

After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, members of the Islamic Supreme Council, who were exiled to Iran and other countries, returned to Iraq to join the Iraqi Governing Council and joined the governments formed subsequently. 

Although the ISCI announced in 2007 that it was shifting its religious loyalty from Iran’s highest marja’ Ayatollah Khomeini to Iraq’s highest marja’ Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani thus giving up the Wilayat al-Faqih as its guide, the party’s veteran leaders continued to adopt Iranian arguments and positions. 

Motives of Withdrawal

Ammar al-Hakim’s withdrawal from the ISCI was driven by the recent escalating disagreements within the council. His motives can be presented as follows: 

1- Getting free from Iranian pressure: A large number of the ISCI veteran leaders who are followers of Wilayat al-Faqih visited Tehran to complain to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about their boss Ammar al-Hakim’s bid to alienate them and replace them with youth, which revealed an ongoing generational gap within the ISCI.  The delegation was headed by senior parliamentarian Jalaleddin al-Saghir, a senior parliamentarian, Baqir al-Zubaidi, former minister of transport, and head of the al-Muwatin (citizen) parliamentary bloc, Hamid al-Khudeiri. 

Al-Hakim viewed the visit as a violation of the ISCI’s internal affairs and general frameworks, as some members are attempting to solicit foreign support to strengthen their positions inside the party. 

2- Al-Hakim rejected the efforts of some members to assume governmental positions: Al-Hakim implicitly rejected of bids by some senior partisan members such as Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Baqir al-Zubaidi and Humam Hamoudi to hold government positions. 

Moreover, the veteran members gave up organizational work to al-Hakim gradually since he became the party’s leader in 2009. This drove al-Hakim to establish several affiliate organizations, such as Fursan al-Amal (Arabic for Knights of Hope) in which he counted on youth leaders. The move created a gap between the top leadership and lower levels dominated by the mindset of the youth, thus leading to an inevitable conflict between the old and the new generation.

3- Al-Hakim’s attempts to build strong relations with Arab and Western countries: Through withdrawal from the ISCI, al-Hakim seeks to introduce himself to Arab and Western countries as a national consensual figure and also as an acceptable Shiite figure in the post-ISIS era in Iraq. This bid was evidenced in al-Hakim’s recent flurry of visits to a number of regional countries, including Egypt and the Arab League, as well as in his intensive meetings in Baghdad last month with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq and ambassadors of Kuwait, Russia and Spain. 

4- Preparing for forthcoming elections: Among al-Hakim’s other justifications for forming the new National Wisdom movement is to run for the elections under slogans that unites all political constituencies and  reject sectarian polarization. Accordingly, al-Hakim’s withdrawal from the ISCI came after he failed in mending the party’s internal cracks, before the local elections scheduled in September, as well as the legislative elections scheduled in April 2018. Moreover, Al-Hakim’s move aims to preempt any possibility by the State of Law Coalition to achieve success that would be exploited by its leader former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to serve his own personal interests, i.e. to return to head the government once again. 

Extensive Consequences 

Al-Hakim’s withdrawal from the ISCI will impose significant repercussions on the Shiite political map that can be explained as follows:

FIRST: Impact on the ISCI

1- ISCI’s performance in the coming elections is likely to decline, while the National Wisdom movement is likely to play a prominent role in Iraq’s political scene. The ISCI is doomed to vanish after 90 percent of its members withdrew to join the National Wisdom movement. This is due to the fact that a majority of young people dominates the National Wisdom movement’s leadership, thus boosting its actions and activities. 

2- The ISCI no longer has a historical or popular prominent figure that can prop it up after the withdrawal of its leader Al-Hakim, who is also the heir of its founders. This is especially significant because the ISCI has always been associated with the al-Hakim family. 

3- With only five representatives remaining, Al-Muwatin bloc will not play a significant role in the Council of Representatives after the majority of its members withdrew to join the new National Wisdom movement. 

SECOND: Impact on the National Iraqi Alliance

4- The predominantly-Shiite alliance is likely to suffer from widening internal rifts due to the current highly-volatile situation. Such negative development is driven by the following: 

A- The State of Law Coalition, led by Nour el-Malki, is likely to make counter-movements against the National Iraqi Alliance and take advantage of the Coalition’s weakness. Within this context, the Coalition- which is largest Shiite bloc in the Iraqi parliament, with 93 seats out of a total of 328- still recognizes Ammar al-Hakim as its leader. This is based on the belief that Al-Hakim is the most eligible figure, and that Ali al-Adib, his candidate from the Islamic Dawa Party and the head of the parliamentary bloc of State of Law Coalition, is also the most legitimate choice for this position. 

B- The Sadrist Movement, led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, is likely to continue its boycott of the National Iraqi Alliance. The likelihood is further supported by continued long-standing rivalry between al-Sadr and Ammar al-Hakim over the leadership of Iraq’s Shiite population as well as failure of recent bids to achieve rapprochement.

It is worth noting in this context that the Sadrist Movement boycotted the meetings of the National Iraqi Alliance since the April 2016 protests staged by al-Sadr accusing the alliance of consolidating corruption and opposing reforms. Moreover, the Sadrist Movement and the Alliance formed a commission to oversee their negotiations in early October 2016. However, the commission failed to reach an agreement between the two sides.

Yet al-Sadr’s attempts to present himself as a leader for the Shi’ites never ended. He visited Saudi Arabia, and met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in his first visit in nearly 11 years. The visit represents a breakthrough in the Saudi-Iraqi relations, and an indication of the Saudi willingness of playing a prominent role in Post Iraq ISIS. It also represents a threat to the Iranian influence over Iraqi shi’ite political parties.

Shiite Turbulence

The general map of Iraq’s political alliances and that of the Shiite alliances in particular, goes through fast-paced changes ahead of any elections. Obviously, the withdrawal of Ammar al-Hakim from the ISCI within this context.

Through his recent moves, Al-Hakim aims to become the key player in the country's Shiite politics. His movement is likely to be confronted by counter-movements from both the State of Law Coalition and the Sadrist Movement, already competing for the leadership of the country's Shiite population.

To conclude, the disintegration of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq provides a strong blow to the ruling Shiite National Iraqi Alliance. This occurred as the contrasting positions of its members about loyalty to Iran as well as internal divisions have become only too evident, with prominent Shiite figures now publicly demanding that subordination to Tehran should be curbed. 

Amid the ongoing disagreements within the Shiite bloc, the Iraqi government is not likely to achieve reconciliation with the Sunni population, at least in the near future. The reason is in specifically that these disagreements will delay start of any serious plans for political settlements in the post-ISIS era.