Eight months into the war on Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now facing what may be the most complex moment of his tenure, which began in December 2022. Unlike the situation caused by the October 7, 2023 attack, which Netanyahu leveraged to alter his political and military failures into support for his government, he now finds himself politically besieged without a significant military achievement in Gaza to bolster his position. This situation raises questions about the future of his government and its ability to maintain cohesion and continue in power.
Exacerbating Rifts
Internationally, Israel is experiencing one of the most challenging phases of its international relations, marked by ongoing disputes between Netanyahu and the White House, a relative decline in Western support, increasing demands to halt the war, and a growing number of countries moving towards recognizing the Palestinian state.
Netanyahu's major dilemma, however, lies in the internal crises. Protests by the families of Israelis detained in Gaza continue, demanding a deal with Hamas. The opposition is tightening its grip on his government, demanding his resignation and attempting to split the Likud party.
Additionally, Netanyahu faces escalating disagreements with various military levels over the management of the war, which have increasingly been leaked to the media. On May 15, 2024, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant held a press conference to launch a fierce attack on Netanyahu for delaying a decision on Gaza's post-war political future, arguing that this undermines the Israeli army's military achievements in Gaza.
Channel 13 reported on May 12, 2024, that Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi criticized Netanyahu for "failing to develop and announce a strategy for the "day after" in Gaza." Halevi was quoted saying, "We are now operating again in Jabalia. As long as there isn't a diplomatic move to develop a governing body in the Strip that isn't Hamas, we'll have to act again and again in other places to dismantle Hamas's infrastructure." Similar tensions arose between Netanyahu and the head of the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet or Shabak), Ronen Bar.
Within the government, War Cabinet Minister and leader of the National Camp bloc, Benny Gantz, continues to pressure Netanyahu to make a deal with Hamas and outline a clear post-war vision for Gaza that excludes an Israeli military occupation. Gantz threatened to withdraw from the war cabinet and dissolve the Israeli War Cabinet in a press conference on May 18. He set specific conditions for his party's continued participation in the emergency government. Gantz gave Netanyahu until June 8 to formulate a strategic plan for the ongoing war in Gaza, which includes the return of Israeli hostages, establishing international and Arab civilian administration in Gaza, repatriating northern residents to their homes, and pushing for a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu's principal rival made good on his threat and left the government.
Adding to the pressures within the War Cabinet, Israeli Army Radio reported on May 29 that war cabinet observer and former chief of staff Gadi Eizenkot accused Netanyahu's government of severe security and economic failures and called for early elections and the replacement of the prime minister.
In culmination, the National Camp announced on May 30 a draft law to dissolve the Knesset and call for early elections. However, Israeli analysts suggest that the right-wing bloc will likely withdraw the draft law from voting in the Knesset, failing to secure the required majority. Bills debated and rejected in the Knesset cannot be reintroduced for another six months.
Netanyahu's Dilemma
The question arises: Why is Netanyahu, unlike his usual self, unable to handle internal political disputes or employ his old tactics of neutralizing some crises or opposing figures to confront others?
Undoubtedly, the exceptional moment Israel is experiencing and the complex situation in Gaza burden Netanyahu's political maneuvering. However, the decisive factor restricting Netanyahu and narrowing his political maneuvering space is his ruling coalition, particularly Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.
To form his sixth government in December 2022, Netanyahu resorted to aligning with the far-right (religious and nationalist), creating what Israeli and American analysts deemed "the most extreme government in Israel's history." This government was perceived as a political lifeline for Netanyahu and a shield against the criminal charges he faces.
Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, the most prominent figures in this government, have been attempting from day one to impose their agenda on Netanyahu's government, even if it escalated opposition internally and externally. They aim to bolster their political positions among their electoral bases and achieve tangible success in reinforcing far-right policies in Israeli society, preparing for a future phase where one of them might lead the Israeli government.
Smotrich and Ben-Gvir recognize that Netanyahu needs the government to continue in power and that he cannot replace or abandon them. Hence, they repeatedly threaten to withdraw from the government and topple it whenever a disagreement arises or when Netanyahu considers a policy contrary to their agenda.
Smotrich and Ben-Gvir's statements during the seventh and eighth months of the Gaza war oscillate between threatening to dissolve the government, criticizing Netanyahu's intended steps, or pushing policies to entangle him domestically and internationally. On April 26, 2024, Smotrich criticized the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, describing it as a "complete surrender for Israel." Both Smotrich and Ben-Gvir rejected US President Joe Biden's initiative for a Gaza ceasefire on June 1, threatening to dissolve the government if the terms announced were accepted.
On the military front, Smotrich stated on May 19 that Hezbollah should be given a final ultimatum and that ground forces should enter southern Lebanon if the armed group does not comply. On June 4, he, along with Ben-Gvir, called for burning Lebanon and returning it to the "Stone Age" in response to Hezbollah's attacks. Additionally, on May 29, Smotrich called for a military operation in the West Bank, even if it meant Tulkarm would look like Gaza looks today.
These actions are compounded by policies the two men have adopted to entangle Netanyahu and force his hand into accepting a fait accompli. On May 22, Smotrich announced the indefinite suspension of transferring tax revenues to the Palestinian National Authority, drawing widespread criticism from the United States. On the same day, Ben-Gvir stormed the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, attempting to provoke Israeli Arabs and inflame the situation in Jerusalem's mixed neighborhoods. Furthermore, Ben-Gvir fiercely criticized Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on May 3, calling for his dismissal, and labeled Benny Gantz a "major clown" on May 18.
These policies and statements not only embroil Netanyahu with the international community and internal political factions but also strip him of one of his key political tools: maneuverability. Currently, Netanyahu is unable to maneuver against his domestic adversaries or foreign allies due to the numerous red lines set by Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and his reluctance to have direct confrontations with them at this moment.
Future Scenarios
There is a near consensus among Israeli analysts that the political rifts Netanyahu is facing, which could lead to the Israeli war cabinet being dissolved, will weaken his position for public opinion both domestically and internationally, as well as for his own right-wing partners in the government, Smotrich, and Ben-Gvir.
Given this context, the future of Netanyahu's government—regardless of the fate of the war cabinet—can be narrowed down to two main scenarios:
Scenario One: Netanyahu's Government Continues in Power:
This is currently the more likely scenario, considering the composition of the government and the ruling coalition's grip on its parliamentary seats. The coalition recognizes that dissolving the current Knesset and going to early elections will not secure them the same number of seats they currently hold, as indicated by recent polls. However, political calculations within the coalition might change in the future.
Based on the current legal and political data, Netanyahu's government is more likely to continue in power, potentially even after the Gaza war and possibly until the end of the current Knesset term in December 2026. As long as the governing coalition remains cohesive, there are unlikely to be legal gaps that could bring down Netanyahu's government against his will.
The legal conditions under which Netanyahu's government could fall but which do not currently apply can be outlined as follows:
1. A vote of no confidence against the government by a majority of 61 members. In this case, according to the "Basic Law: The Government," the Knesset would be dissolved immediately, and an early election date would be set. This is not possible as long as the current coalition (which holds 64 seats) remains cohesive.
2. Failure to renew the emergency regulations law, which treats West Bank settlers as Israeli citizens. This law, which was enacted in 1967 and renewed every five years, was behind the dissolution of the Bennett/Lapid government in June 2022. However, Netanyahu's government successfully passed it in January 2023, keeping it in force until February 2028.
3. The prime minister's incapacity to perform his duties, which was limited by the latest amendment to the Basic Laws in March 2023, to "physical or mental reasons." However, the implementation of this amendment has been postponed to the next Knesset session. Despite this, applying this law to Netanyahu by the Israeli attorney general remains challenging because the original version of the law (before the amendment) is vague, not specifying the reasons for incapacity or the procedures to follow in such a case. It is likely that even if the attorney general tried to use the incapacity law to remove Netanyahu, the Knesset would not approve this decision.
4. Conviction of the prime minister on criminal charges. According to the Basic Laws, a final conviction requires Netanyahu to resign, but the court cases against him could take around a year, followed by at least another year for appeals. These proceedings may not conclude before the current Knesset term ends.
5. Formation of an independent investigation committee appointed by the Supreme Court to investigate the October 7, 2023 attack. If such a committee finds the prime minister guilty of negligence, he would be unable to continue in office. However, the current government and Knesset are unlikely to approve the formation of this committee, though it is certain that it will be established once Netanyahu leaves office. Reports published on June 2, 2024, suggested that Netanyahu is seeking to remove the authority to appoint members of the investigation committee for the October 7 attack from the chief justice of the Supreme Court, following Benny Gantz's call for the government to form an official investigation committee.
Scenario Two: The Collapse of Netanyahu's Government:
This scenario remains possible at any moment, as it fundamentally depends on the cohesion of the ruling coalition. If this cohesion collapses or one of the coalition parties decides to withdraw due to disagreements with Netanyahu or other political considerations, the government will fall. Given the current poll data, it is unlikely Netanyahu would return to power in the next elections.
The conditions under which Netanyahu's government could fall include:
1. Withdrawal of one of the coalition parties, a threat already made by both Itamar Ben-Gvir (Jewish Power Party) and Bezalel Smotrich (Religious Zionism Party) if Netanyahu agrees to a ceasefire in Gaza. Both men understand that public opinion is not currently in their favor, so they would only take this step if they felt they were about to lose their electoral base and that withdrawing from the government at a particular moment could strengthen their electoral position.
2. An internal split within the Likud party, with some Knesset members voting against the government. Israeli reports indicate this is the opposition's current plan to bring down Netanyahu's government. The opposition believes there is an opportunity to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of some Likud members over the military service law for Haredi youth (the Torato Umanuto) and turn this into a significant internal rift, potentially leading about 17 members out of 32 representing Likud in the Knesset to rebel against the party and push for the government's downfall.
3. Failure to pass the budget within three months after the start of the new fiscal year. Since Netanyahu's government successfully passed the 2024 budget, the next potential date for this scenario is March 2025 if the government fails to pass the 2025 budget.
4. Netanyahu strikes a political deal post-Gaza war, whereby he steps down or agrees not to run in exchange for dropping some charges against him, ensuring he is not convicted or sent to prison. Currently, Netanyahu does not seem inclined to make such a deal, but this could change after the war if pressures mount, making this option the most suitable for him.
Overall, although uncertainty is surrounding the future of Netanyahu's government, the mounting internal and external pressures, and the growing disputes within the government facing the opposition and public opinion, the reasons for its continuation seem more solid than the causes for its collapse, unless a new variable emerges on the Israeli scene, altering the calculations of the various parties. This is likely to happen after the Gaza war ends. Therefore, Netanyahu and his government remain the most committed to continuing the war until achieving a decisive military victory or a change in the international scene, particularly in the White House.
