Researchers generally agree that there is a close interrelation between the existing international order and regional regimes. The situation of the international order, i.e. stability, cooperation, conflict, wars etc that dominates the international order does cast a shadow on the regions of the world. This influence is attributed to relations between major powers and parties to regional conflicts. More often than not, warning parties receive arms and financial and political support from regional and international powers. Likewise, when an international conflict breaks out, the involved major powers use regional allies to reinforce their standings and positions and create issues for the allies of their enemies in what is called proxy war.
The war between Russia and Ukraine which broke out on February 24 continues to dominate today’s international order. The United States and the NATO alliance unrelentingly back Kyiv in the war that triggered other crises such as inflation, soaring energy prices, food crisis, the economic downturn and potential recession likely to hit all the world, altogether further compounded by escalating tensions between the U.S. and China over Taiwan. All these international crises did cast a shadow on conflict zones and centers of tension and conflicts in the Arab region.
1. Conflict in Syria:
Syria has become an arena for conflict in which regional and international powers are involved. Because Syria is an ally to Russia and one of the seven countries that recognized Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, and because it is home to American, Russian, Turkish and Iranian troops, the impact of international conflict on the Arab country has several manifestations, the most significant of which is the interaction between American, Isaeli and Iranian policies.
Behavior of parties to the conflict in Syria cannot be separated from ongoing talks in Vienna on the revival of the nuclear deal with Iran. That is, in the beginning, the United States sought to accelerate the nuclear negotiations in the hope that sanctions on Iranian oil exports would be lifted so as to allow the flow of about three million barrels of oil a day into the global market, stabilize oil prices and consequently ease the energy crisis in Europe. Washington followed the same approach to Venezuela, its traditional foe in South America.
On the other hand, because it recognized the consequences of reviving the nuclear deal and the impact of mitigating the impact of energy shortages on European countries ahead of approaching winter, Iran dragged its feet on the nuclear talks hoping it would get better conditions. This became evident in the first week of September. After most statements indicated that an agreement on a proposal presented by the European Union's Iran nuclear talks coordinator was imminent, optimism vanished. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, on September 13, stated that it was 'unlikely' the U.S. and Iran would reach a new nuclear deal anytime soon. An explanation of this approach by the United States is perhaps a willingness to place pressure on both Iran and Syria, both allies of Russia. That is why Washington did not hesitate to use military force and send fighters, on August 23, to conduct precision airstrikes on infrastructure facilities used by militant groups affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in Deir Ezzor, in eastern Syria. The attack, announced by a spokesman of United States Central Command, CENTCOM, was the first of its kind in 14 months.
In a related development, Israel continued to conduct military attacks against Iranian presence in Syria, and on August 15, it conducted a large-scale attack in the south of the coastal city of Tartus to destroy Iranian missiles and warehouses used by Iranian troops and Hezbollah. Later on August 31, four missiles hit Aleppo International Airport. The attacks were a warning to Iran and its allies that Israel will not allow them to develop their capabilities and pose threats to Israel’s security, especially after the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted live ammunition training using medium range missiles in the Deir Ezzor desert. Moreover, observers believe that Israel's expansion of military attacks in Syria is also intended to send a message to Russia too, especially after Israel clearly condemned military intervention in Ukraine.
Russia’s foreign policy faced a difficult challenge i.e. to reconcile its interests with Damascus, Tehran and Tel Aviv. Moreover, Moscow seeks to maintain its military support to Syria and in June 2022, it staged an air drill which involved two Russian planes and four Syrian planes. Meanwhile, because the war with Ukraine requires using more arms and troops, Russia had to withdraw some of its troops and one S-300 missile battery from Syria to the Black Sea. Additionally, Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine, the Syrian regime has mounting concerns that Turkey would take advantage of the situation to achieve its goals in the areas it controls in northern Syria.
2. Lebanon’s Crisis:
The situation in Lebanon prompted Iran’s allies to place pressure on Israel, Washington’s major ally in the Middle East, over the delineation of a shared maritime border between Lebanon and Israel, while the United States is mediating talks between the two countries to reach an agreement. Israel unilaterally claimed the border which includes the Karish natural gas field and other disputed areas, and announced plans to produce gas in September. The announcement prompted Hezbollah to warn Israel against producing gas from the field before the issue of disputed areas with Lebanon is resolved, and deployed three unarmed drones to the proximity of the field to send a message to Israel that the field is within the range of the group’s drones. The development led to Israel changing its stance, accepting some of Lebanon’s conditions and postponing work at the field to the end of October. Meanwhile, the United States made more efforts to mediate between Israel and Lebanon in the first week of September.
In this regard, Hezbollah’s behavior can be understood within two contexts. The first involves Lebanon and Israel and shows if Lebanon is not allowed to benefit from its legitimate rights to the east Mediterranean gas, Israel too will not be able to do so. The second involves Iran and Israel. According to analysts, Hezbollah’s behavior also sent a warning message to Tel Aviv that if Israel expands the arena of its conflict with Iran in Syria and within Iran’s territory, forces loyal to Tehran can respond and make Israel pay a heavy price. The message also includes a warning that Hezbollah recognizes western countries’ dire need of more gas because of the war in Ukraine, and delaying Israel’s gas a production will place pressure on the United States European states because this Israeli gas will be ultimately shipped to European markets.
3. The Conflict in Libya:
Disagreement developed between major powers over the Libyan House of Representatives’ approval of a new government led by Fathi Bashaga. While Russia recognized and welcomed the new government, the United States and a majority of western states took a cautious position calling on Libyans to go back to the negotiating table to reach an agreement on the coming transition in the lead up to the elections. Within this context, Russia’s private security group, Wagner, maintained its presence in Libya, despite Russia’s mobilization of thousands of its soldiers to send them to the war in Ukraine. Moreover, the mission of Stephanie Williams, UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Libya, is still faltering because of Moscow’s objection to her role which it describes as “biased”. In September, the situation changed and Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal was appointed as the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. Both Bashaga and Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh welcomed the appointment of Bathily.
4. Tensions in Iraq:
International conflicts do not equally impact the other focal points of conflict in this region. In Iraq, following the parliamentary elections held in October 2021, the Sadrist Movement’s bloc, which won a majority of the parliament’s seats, failed to form a new government because of disputes with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Sunni Al-Siyada (Sovereignty) bloc, as well as opposition from the Coordination Framework, an umbrella bloc of Iraqi Iran-backed Shiite parties. Later, intra-Shia feud between the Sadrist movement and the Coordination Framework broke out between supporters of the Sadrist Movement and the supporters of the Coordination Framework. The conflict shows Iran’s evident role as well as its fear of the formation of an Iraqi patriotic government that is independent of Tehran. But it would be arbitrary to say that there is a connection between this development and the international conflict.
5. The War in Yemen:
In the current year (2022), international crises have no significant and direct impact on the war in Yemen. UN Secretary General’s of Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg managed to broker a truce between the Houthi militia and the Yemeni legitimate government in April 2022 and to extend this truce twice until October 2, which means that Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two direct allies of the two parties to the conflict, gave their green light to the agreement. Despite the Houthis’ violation of the UN-brokered truce, they fell short of escalating into a highly intense war as was the case over the past years, which means that conflict between major powers did not have a significant impact on the situation in Yemen; rather regional balances were prioritized, which involves ongoing talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Baghdad and the two countries’ willingness to find favorable circumstances to keep the talks going.
The conclusion would then be that the intensity of the impact of international conflicts and crises varies from one situation to another and hinges upon the interests of involved international powers, as well as the benefits of escalation of regional conflicts. It also hinges upon the willingness of any regional power and its capability of escalating a given conflict on behalf of a major international power.
