Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s July 10, 2017, declaration of the liberation of Mosul City from ISIS has immediately produced repercussions within Iran. The development was especially significant given Iran’s keen interest in not separating this war from other regional issues of special importance for Tehran, including, primarily, its role in the Syrian conflict and its ongoing escalation with the U.S.
The Iranian political and military establishments rushed to exploit the "victory" in Mosul to achieve domestic political gains. This is reflected in the pre-existing conflict between the two institutions especially with the victory of President Hassan Rouhani in the first round of presidential elections held in May 19, 2017, on the conservative candidate supported by the Revolutionary Guard, Ebrahim Raisi.
However, what stands out in this context is that Iran’s top leadership, represented by the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, appeared to have given the green light for the escalation between both establishments over claiming the biggest role in backing the Iraqi government troops and the Shiite militias to achieve victory over ISIS. This can be explained by Iran’s interest in sending across direct messages to the powers involved in the war against ISIS in northern Iraq as well as in Syria, i.e. United States, Russia as well as Iraqi political forces, that Iran is a party that cannot be ignored in this war.
This coincided with Tehran’s deliberate effort to give special importance to Abadi’s visit to Mosul on July 20, as well as his meeting with Khamenei and other Iranian officials, before he declared the liberation of Mosul. Tehran’s aim was to give the impression that Iran has played a primary role in the victory, although the claim is refuted by its ongoing support for terrorism.
Ongoing Debate
Soon after Abadi declared the liberation of Mosul, Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Qods Force, the IRGC’s branch for external operations -whose sudden involvement in the escalating spat between Rouhani, on the one hand, and the conservative fundamentalists and the IRGC commanders came as a surprise- rushed to reaffirm that the development in Mosul would not have been possible without the Pasdaran’s role. Soleimani meant, particularly, Pasadaran's military and logistical support to the Iraqi government forces and the Shiite militias, as well as their supervision of the battles with ISIS. This cannot be separated from Pasdaran-affiliated media organizations’ interest in giving a special coverage to Soleimani’s visit to areas captured by the Hashd al-Shaabi militia on Iraq’s border with Syria.
On July 10, 2017, the same day Abadi announced the victory over ISIS in Mosul, Soleimani said that military factories in Iran worked round the clock to provide military support to the Hashd al-Shaabi. President Rouhani was quick to reply to Soleimani’s statement, and stressed that the Iranian government played the most significant role in providing military support to Tehran’s allies outside Iran, and to the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq in particular.
It is important to note that these statements refute the false claims which Iran continued to make since ISIS took control of Mosul in June 2014, and even when the crisis in Syria broke out in March 2011. These Iranian false claims are that Tehran's support for its allies is limited to providing advisors to forces involved in armed battles. Moreover, the claims prove Iran’s continuous violation of international sanctions imposed against it, as well as its inability to honor strict international commitments. However, this has not held Iran’s Pasdaran from giving special importance to its role in the war on ISIS in Iraq, through which it apparently seeks to achieve the following two goals:
The first goal is to emphasize that it is the role the Pasdaran (IRGC) plays outside Iran that represents the mechanism through which Iran succeeded in enhancing its regional presence and strengthening its influence in crisis-hit states, and not the policy pursued by President Rouhani. This policy is primarily based on the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and the group of 5+1 of world powers on July 14, 2015. The aim is to provide a response to the efforts being made by the government to promote the positive potential results that the agreement can bring on both the domestic and international levels.
This was reflected in Soleimani’s statements in which he called for prioritizing arms over diplomacy saying, “Sometimes we solve issues through diplomacy, which is good. But, some problems can not be solved through diplomatic means.”
The second goal is Iran’s attempt to export to the West a rhetoric that projects Tehran’s possible transformation into a key party in the war against ISIS. The attempt aims to reduce pressures put on Iran through escalating accusations of supporting terrorism. This became significant after the US Administration of President Donald Trump labeled Iran as a major source of instability in the Middle East.
To further emphasize its role in the war on terrorism, Iran sought, at the same time, to propose its participation in the reconstruction of areas liberated from ISIS in Mosul. This was evidenced in statements by Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, in which he said, on July 15, 2017, that Iran has a good experience in creating industrial zones and is ready to put this experience at the disposal of Iraq.
Challenges in Iraq
Without a doubt, this cannot be excluded from Iran’s attempts to respond to recent calls from Iraqi political figures to reduce Iran’s influence in Iraq. One such call came from Iraqi Vice President, Ayad Allawi who said, on June 16, 2017, that Iran’s support for Shiite factions in Iraq obstructs the efforts being made to overcome sectarian divisions ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Allawi’s statement coincided with protests staged in late April by supporters of the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to condemn Iran’s presence in Iraq. The protesters chanted the slogan “Iran go out”, indicating, perhaps, a significant forthcoming change to the directions of Iran’s relationship with its allied Iraqi Shiite forces in Mosul post-ISIS defeat.
Hence, it can be possibly argued that Iran, in the coming period, is likely to seek to rearrange the patterns of its alliances within Iraq in preparation for the upcoming political commitments, and the April 2018 parliamentary elections in particular. This also aims to accommodate new developments that will undoubtedly impact political balances of power in Iraq, including the Hashd al-Shaabi militia’s efforts to take up a role for itself in reconstruction in liberated areas. Moreover, the possibility that the conflict between Iran and the United States would escalate is increasing, due to President Trump’s new approach which entails confronting Iranian influence in crisis-hit states. This was evidenced in the new sanctions imposed on July 17 by Washington against Iran over its military support to terrorist and armed organizations deploying in such states.
