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Multiple Challenges

Will Russia Mediate in Iran Nuclear Deal Crisis?

02 مايو، 2018


Russia does not appear to be considering mediation between Iran and Western powers about issues related to the nuclear deal. This is not only because it is keenly interested in cooperation and coordination with Iran, that goes beyond the nuclear deal to include the Syrian issue, but also because it is not interested in supporting the roles that these states are attempting to play, in the Middle East. This would impose more barriers to efforts being exerted by western states towards reducing disagreement between Iran and the United States. 

European states currently seek to persuade Russia to intervene to reduce the severity of escalating disagreement between Iran and the United States which threatens to withdraw from the nuclear after the May 12 deadline. 

From the perspective of these states, the convergence of interests between Russia and Iran extends beyond the nuclear issue to also include other regional issues, most importantly Syria. This may help Russia in any efforts that it may exert in this context. In particular, the role of mediator can send a message to Iran that it cannot always count on Russia's transformation into an international backer and protector, because Iran came under mounting pressure over the crisis of its nuclear program and regional role. 

Despite this, this European ambition may face several obstacles in this context. Most importantly, there are no signs suggesting that Russia may play such a role, due to several considerations related to its relations with Iran and disagreement with Western states over various issues. 

Accelerating Moves

Paris appears to have the view that Moscow can play a role in solving outstanding disagreements between Washington and Tehran that may prompt the former to withdraw from the nuclear deal after the May 12, 2018 deadline set by the Trump U.S. Administration, thus sending the crisis over the nuclear issue back to square one, once again. That is, Iran is expected to carry out its threats to raise uranium enrichment to the 20 per cent level that it reached before sealing the nuclear accord on July 14, 2015. 

In this context, French President Emmanuel Macron tried to persuade his Russian counterpart to play this role, especially because Paris currently is leading European states' efforts to increase the possibility of keeping the nuclear deal in place. Macron visited Washington on April 23, and the nuclear deal was a main item on the agenda of his talks with U.S. officials. 

Despite this, for several considerations, Russia may not be responsive to these efforts. Most importantly, Russia continues to believe that the nuclear deal represents the best option at this time to deal with the Iranian nuclear program, especially after Iran, in Russia's view, proved to be committed to the terms of the accord, with reports issued by  the International Atomic Energy Agency verified more than once. 

Hence, it can be argued that sending Iran's nuclear issue back to square one is not in line with Russia's interests, especially because it would increase the possibility of a new war in the region. That is primarily because both the United States and Israel will not allow Iran to possess the capability to produce a nuclear bomb. This is the track that Israel, in particular, supports. This was evidenced in an address delivered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on April 30, during which he presented what he described as "conclusive proof" that Iran had plans to produce a nuclear weapon.

Equally paradoxically, even if Iran succeeded in resuming development of its nuclear program without coming under a U.S. or Israeli military strike, or having to be involved in a direct military confrontation with both states, this too does not serve Moscow's interests because it will not allow its southern neighbour to possess a nuclear bomb threatening to cause an imbalance of power in this region, which, for Russia, is a red line.

Preventing Iran from possessing the capability to produce a nuclear weapon was one of the main goals that Russia sought to achieve through the nuclear deal. It was one of the supporters of talks that were held between Iran and the world powers and paved the way for sealing the nuclear deal. 

Additionally, the escalating disagreements between Russia and European states over other issues - more specifically developments of the crisis in Syria and the escalating tension with Britain over an assassination attempt on former Russian spy Sergei Skripal on March 4 2018- weakens the possibility of Russia playing this role. That is because Moscow pursues a strict policy to deal with the reality imposed by its disagreements with the Western powers over the Ukrainian crisis which broke out in March 2014. 

It was remarkable, therefore, that Moscow was keen to emphasize the importance of preserving the nuclear deal in the statement issued after a telephone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron, who called Putin and who will visit Moscow at the end of this month. Other reports noting that Macron called upon Moscow to play a constructive role to help settle crises in the Middle East, including the Iranian nuclear crisis, were ignored. 

Limited Options

Additionally, Moscow may not have multiple choices if it accepts to play that role, especially in light of Iran's hard stance on holding new negotiations about pending issues with the United States, namely the ballistic missile program, Iran's regional role and inspection of its nuclear and military installations. 

Remarkably, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was keen to respond to calls from the European states and the U.S. to stop interference in the various regional crises. On April 30, he said that the United States, not Iran, should withdraw from West Asia.

This coincided with statements from a number of Iranian military officials insisting on not entering into negotiations about the ballistic missile program because it is part of Iran's own defense capabilities and is not related to the nuclear deal, according to Tehran's view. It continues to claim that its missiles are not designed to carry nuclear weapons, as the nuclear deal calls for stopping missile development activities, which means Iran is in fact attempting to circumvent the nuclear deal and violate its terms. 

In light of the above, it can possibly be said that the possibility of Moscow playing an intermediary role to reduce disagreement between Iran and the United States, remains weak, especially because the May 12 deadline set by the U.S. Administration is nearing, thus taking the crisis of Iran's nuclear program into a new stage of tension and escalation.