The rapid shifts in Syria's internal dynamics, culminating in the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime on December 8, 2024, have prompted China to adopt a cautious stance in its political response. Assad's ouster, which had previously favored China's engagement in Syria and the Middle East, carries numerous unintended consequences for Beijing. These developments will impact not only China's strategic partnership with Syria but also its regional engagement and triangular arrangements with Russia and Iran in the Middle East. Given these circumstances, a re-examination of China's standing in the region is crucial.
The current situation raises important questions: How might the Belt and Road Initiative be affected in the post-Assad era? What will become of Chinese infrastructure investments as we enter a volatile new period?
A Prudent Stance
For years, Assad was a trustworthy friend of Beijing’s, and the Belt and Road projects and humanitarian aid have supported his reconstruction of Syria following the Arab Spring. Internationally, China has been aligning its veto power at the United Nations Security Council with Assad’s regime. Following the recent events that led to the ouster of Assad, Chinese officials urged “relevant parties in Syria to ensure the safety and security of the Chinese institutions and personnel in Syria” (Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Philippines, 2024). Beyond this appeal, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official statement was neutral and respectful of the Syrian people’s will and vision for their country.
On the one hand, this pragmatic stance reflects the extent to which Beijing maintains its long-standing non-intervention approach to Middle Eastern crises. On the other, Syria does not pose a direct impact on China’s regional engagement, unlike other major and medium powers’ presence in Syria. Despite its recent establishment as a diplomatic mediator in the region, Beijing remains reluctant to become involved. The wisdom in this tactic, however, lies in distancing itself from recent events, thereby promoting its resilience to deal with the successor regime that will soon rule Syria.
The Unfolding of an Uncertain Future
The cracks in the Syrian regime are rooted in the Arab Spring protests, making the potential overthrow of Assad by the Syrian rebellion a foreseeable development. Beijing understood this scenario, even if it was not explicitly discussed during China-Syria dialogues. Many countries, including China, lack a clear vision for managing their interests and engagement with a potential new Syrian regime.
While some observers believe the collapse of Assad's regime may directly impact Chinese interests in Syria, Beijing's approach typically includes a flexible exit strategy. This ensures a smooth transition when dealing with any possible government change in the region, as previously noted. Such flexibility explains China's decision to distance itself from Russian and Iranian military involvement in Syria, opting instead for diplomatic and political routes—despite its preference for sustaining Assad's presidency.
Previous Attempts to Stabilize Syria
Out of thirty resolutions proposed on Syria in the Security Council, China has utilized its veto power eight times during Syria's civil war (Foot, 2020). Many observers of Chinese affairs find this number notable, considering that Beijing has only vetoed decisions sixteen times throughout its tenure as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This means that half of China's veto power has been directed towards supporting Assad's regime.
Over the years, supporting Assad's regime emerged as the logical and natural choice for Beijing to maintain Syria's overall stable landscape and prevent security and geopolitical unrest. Beijing prioritizes backing legitimate governments against external intervention or internal rebellion, particularly given its own experiences with decades of territorial expansion from neighbors and opposition movements in Xinjiang and Tibet.
A Significant Stake
China has consistently opposed imposing economic sanctions on Syria, even when major powers like the United States and European countries have taken unilateral actions. Beijing's longstanding objection to undermining countries through economic pressure may explain its continuous financial support for Assad's regime. The Chinese government has also provided humanitarian aid and invested in various projects to support Syria financially.
Chinese state-owned companies have played a crucial role in delivering financial assistance to Syria. In 2022, bilateral trade between the two countries reached $415.98 million, with Syria exporting goods such as soap and essential oils, while China exported electrical machinery, equipment, and fabrics (Qiao, Li & Huang, 2024). However, the overall delivery of these financial packages has been slowed by the impact of American economic sanctions on Syria.
Diversifying in Anticipation of a Predictable Scenario
A widely over-simplified argument among China-Middle East analysts emphasizes the loss of a strategic partner of Beijing’s with the fall of Assad. While the changing dynamics within Syria may hinder a once-favorable strategic environment, it is important to recognize that China’s investment in the Middle East has been diversified throughout regional spots, and not centralized in Syria for a decade. Indeed, when it comes to upgrading the level of bilateral partnership with China, Xi and Assad jointly announced the strategic partnership recently in the end of 2023 (International Department, Central Committee of CPC, 2023), whereas more than sixteen Arab countries enjoy strategic partnerships (and some comprehensive strategic partnership) with China.
Syria's continuous internal instability, rooted in the large-scale pro-democracy protests of 2011, predated the announcement of the Belt and Road initiative in 2013. Consequently, the Syrian government's official joining of the initiative was delayed until 2022 (Middle East Briefing, 2022). Despite its geostrategic importance, Syria has not attracted the most profitable Chinese investment projects when compared to countries like Egypt. For instance, between 2017 and 2022, Chinese investment in Egypt increased by 317% (Maher & Farid, 2023).
New Horizons Ahead With a Silver Lining?
The fall of Assad's regime may herald the launch of new development projects in the near term under a new government. From Beijing's perspective, China remains a key development partner for Syria at the inter-state level, and cooperation is expected to resume once the new regime consolidates power. However, the incoming government may recalibrate its approach to great power involvement in Syria. Notably, external powers that supported Assad's regime, including Russia and Iran, have lost some of their appeal (Fulton, 2024, para 8).
Beijing views Syria's ongoing instability as a concern for its projects in the country. While the future of China's investments in Syria remains uncertain, there is an undeniable and urgent need for development projects and humanitarian aid for the new regime and the Syrian people. This potential space for Chinese projects could bolster China's presence in the region as a whole, without necessarily resulting in a significant impact on its overall investment in the Middle East.
China is likely to view the reconstruction of post-Assad Syria as an opportunity to reinforce its image as a responsible global development power. Such involvement aligns with Beijing's official narrative, promoting China as a peacebuilder in contrast to the United States, which is perceived as leaving other regions (particularly the Middle East) with geopolitical tensions and security vacuums.
Crafting a Holistic Approach
China's involvement in other regions is designed through "Whole of Region Diplomacy," as described by Professor Sun Degang, Director of Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University. He views China's engagement in the Middle East through "a multitude of regional and international organizations," with Beijing seeking constructive interactions with regional and medium powers as part of a comprehensive international relations approach (2019).
To mitigate the impact of Assad's fall, China must further consolidate its regional strategic partnerships in relation to the new Syria. Chinese officials have consistently complemented bilateral relations with multilateral cooperation. Sustaining Beijing's relations with a new regime requires modifying its strategy, taking into account Syria's new national conditions and regional powers' reactions to the new leadership.
Through a balanced agenda-setting mechanism, Beijing will be able to maintain its engagement with the new regime while adapting to the changing political landscape in Syria and the broader Middle East.
China-Syria in Context
China's navigation of the fallout from Assad's regime, in relation to other great powers and regional medium powers, represents a significant development with a triple effect on the whole region. Beyond bilateral interests, Syria remains a key component of China's Middle East foreign policy, and any internal change will disrupt the feasibility of approaching the Middle East as a unified region. The significance is particularly noteworthy as China has been exploring opportunities to play a more meaningful role in the area, demonstrated by its mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as its involvement in the Beijing Declaration aimed at strengthening Palestinian national unity.
Prioritizing the longer-term stability of the region, China positions itself as a responsible great power and contributor to global security governance. In deciding future steps for Syria, Beijing may take time to observe the country's internal situation and the architecture of regional powers' relations with the new regime before adapting to the new circumstances. Ultimately, China will ensure a smooth transition and adaptation to a modified and cautious action plan rather than inventing an entirely new approach.
References:
Embassy of People’s Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Situation in Syria,” December 4, 2024. Accessed December 22, 2024. http://ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202412/t20241218_11496063.htm.
Foot, Rosemary. “China’s vetoes during the Syrian conflict.” East Asia Forum, February 28, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/02/28/chinas-vetoes-during-the-syrian-conflict/.
Fulton, Jonathan. “What the fall of the Assad regime really means for China - Atlantic Council.” Atlantic Council, December 18, 2024. Accessed December 21, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-assad-hts-china-future/.
International Department, Central Committee of CPC. “Xi, Assad Jointly Announce China-Syria Strategic Partnership,” October 10, 2023. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/ttxw_5749/202310/t20231010_162440.html.
Mahir, Mohamed, and Mohamed Farid. “The Growth of Chinese Influence in Egypt: Signs and Consequences.” The Washington Institute, April 23, 2023. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/growth-chinese-influence-egypt-signs-and-consequences.
Middle East Briefing. “Syria Joins China’s Belt And Road Initiative.” Middle East Briefing, January 16, 2022. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://www.middleeastbriefing.com/news/syria-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/.
Qiao, Jun, Yitong Li, and Mingxuan Huang. “The Relationship Between China and Syria in the Context of BRI – MEPEI.” Middle East Political and Economic Institute. Accessed December 22, 2024. https://mepei.com/the-relationship-between-china-and-syria-in-the-context-of-bri/.
Sun, Degang. “China’s Whole-of-Region Diplomacy in the Middle East: Opportunities and Challenges.” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 05, no. 01 (January 1, 2019): 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1142/s2377740019500015.
