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Overlapping Goals

Why AQIM is Interested in Syria

04 أبريل، 2018


Strong criticism on March 28, 2018 from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for warring terrorist groups in Syria reveals that it is now seeking to reaffirm its influence as one of al-Qaeda’s most prominent branches. It also seeks to support its ability to conduct high-profile terrorist operations and maintain contact with other terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat Al Nusra Front which rebranded itself as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. 

Additionally, this also indicates that it is attempting to reduce pressures it faces as a result of increasing international interest in the war against it in some crisis-hit states where it operates. This was evidenced in a March 24, 2018 airstrike conducted by United States on one of its strongholds in the south of Libya, killing two of its operatives, including a former senior commander. 

Continued Escalation 

The leader of the organization, Abdelmalek Droukdel, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, in an audio speech released on March 28, issued a strong attack on terrorist groups involved in armed confrontations in Syria. The speech was released by the AQIM's al-Andalus Foundation, AQIM’s media arm used to publish its messages. 

In Droukdel’s view, the infighting which escalated recently leads to further division between these groups and prevents their unity under one banner. He described the infighting as a "sedition that poked its head out in the Levant." 

What should be noted here is that this is not the first-of-its-kind criticism through which Abdel Wadoud tries to show interest in developments occurring in the Syrian arena. In 2012, he released a video speech to criticize the policies adopted by some states towards the Syrian refugees, at the start of the phenomenon of refugee flows into some regional and Western countries. 

Significant Timing 

This escalation by AQIM cannot be considered separately from a group of important variables. It runs in parallel with attempts by the mother organization in Syria, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, to deal with the challenges facing it currently, due to deepening internal divisions and a multiplicity of confrontations with rival groups. Simultaneously, it seeks to consolidate and even expand alliances with a number of other terrorist groups. This is especially so in light of fast-paced developments that occurred in the Syrian arena in recent months contributing towards changing balances of power in a way that is not in the interest of the organization. 

Additionally, this reflects increasing international interest in threats posed by a resurge in the organization’s activity, following a decline in ISIS’ influence. This was evidenced by an expansion of its role in some countries such as Niger, Mali and Chad, and its execution of a number of terrorist operations in Burkina Faso. 

Various Indications 

The new approach pursued by the organization gives several indications of which the following stand out: 

1- Defying International Efforts. There are views that the organization showed keen interest in showing increased interest in calling armed terrorist groups in Syria to reach points of agreement in a bid to send out a defiant message to powers involved in combating terrorist activity and organizations in the Sahel and Sahara region. That is, the organization suggests that pressures put on it in this region will not push it to stop its efforts to support its contacts with other terrorist organizations in crisis-hit areas and maintain focus on countering military strikes conducted against it by these powers. 

Hence, such views do not rule out the possibility that this coincides with the organization’s attempts to carry out new terrorist attacks that perhaps targets multi-national forces in Mali. One such attack was carried out against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on February 28, 2018 leaving four troops dead. 

2- Sending out Implicit Messages that AQIM was able to support its terrorist base in the past period to the extent that it transformed it into a cross-border organization that was able, according to its own claims, to initiate contact with armed terrorist groups operating in some crisis-hit states and Syria in particular. In doing so, it exploits weakness of ISIS. This prompted some leaders and operatives of the latter to call AQIM to sideline disagreement to confront the Sahel Joint Force which will be created to combat terrorist organizations in that region. 

3- Reducing Pressure. The organization increased its activity and seeks to further strengthen its influence on terrorist organizations operating in that region, but this does not negate the fact that some of its leaders showed notable concern about the possibility that it would be the next target of military operations conducted by regional and international powers involved in the war on terrorism. This is especially so in light of these powers’ warnings against the danger of focusing only on weakening ISIS which can eventually allow al-Qaeda to make a comeback as the leading terrorist organization. 

Accordingly, the bid to intervene to increase the chances of terrorist organizations to reach common points of agreement in Syria is maybe driven by a desire not to concentrate on military operations against the organization’s positions in the coming period. The reason is that the war on terrorism is not over yet in both Syria and Iraq, especially after ISIS attempted to re-emerge in some areas in the two states. 

4- Supporting al-Qaeda’s Survival in Syria especially in light of ongoing pressures, including continued defections within terrorist groups loyal to it. This appears to be what pushed Droukdel to consider those confrontations as having no legitimate foundations, in a bid to avoid weakening al-Qaeda in favor of rival organizations. 

Despite this, there are other views that the organization’s keen interest in adopting that policy may indicate a decline in its role in the past period that reduced its available options due to an expansion of military operations against it in some states where it operates.