أخبار المركز
  • أسماء الخولي تكتب: (حمائية ترامب: لماذا تتحول الصين نحو سياسة نقدية "متساهلة" في 2025؟)
  • بهاء محمود يكتب: (ضغوط ترامب: كيف يُعمق عدم استقرار حكومتي ألمانيا وفرنسا المأزق الأوروبي؟)
  • د. أحمد أمل يكتب: (تهدئة مؤقتة أم ممتدة؟ فرص وتحديات نجاح اتفاق إنهاء الخلاف الصومالي الإثيوبي برعاية تركيا)
  • سعيد عكاشة يكتب: (كوابح التصعيد: هل يصمد اتفاق وقف النار بين إسرائيل ولبنان بعد رحيل الأسد؟)
  • نشوى عبد النبي تكتب: (السفن التجارية "النووية": الجهود الصينية والكورية الجنوبية لتطوير سفن حاويات صديقة للبيئة)

Shifting Alliances

What’s behind the visit of the speaker of Libyan parliament to Turkey?

18 أغسطس، 2022


On August 2, Libya’s speaker of the House of Representative, Aguila Saleh, visited Turkey where he met President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Accompanying Saleh was deputy chairman of the Presidential Council, Abdullah Al-Lafi. The visit comes amid shifting dynamics in Libya’s public and foreign policy.

 

Turkey’s efforts in Libya

Turkey’s increased engagement in Libya’s affairs can be outlined across key three vectors:

 

1.    Libyan envoy’s visit to Ankara:

This was Saleh’s first visit to Turkey since becoming speaker of the parliament in 2014, and he had stated earlier in July his intention on making the trip. His visit was marked by meetings with high-level Turkish figures, including President Erdogan, and Mustafa Şentop, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Saleh later was joined by Al-Lafi, and Khalid al-Mishri, Chairman of the High Council of State.

 

Key matters were discussed at these meetings: the urgent need for parliamentary and presidential elections to reach agreement on a united Libyan government; reaffirming the rejection of armed violence to resolving differences; and Saleh’s proposal to handing over government duties to interim Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha to facilitate new elections.

 

2.    International meeting in Istanbul:

Earlier on July 21, representatives from Egypt, US, UK, Germany, Italy, and France, in addition to American diplomate and former deputy head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Stephanie Williams, met to discuss latest developments in Libya and the way forward.

 

3.    Turkey’s envoy visit to east Libya:

Aiming to revitalise relations between the two countries, the Turkish parliament in April 2021 approved the formation of the Parliamentary Friendship Group, headed by Ambassador Ahmed Yildiz. Latest reports have said members of the group are preparing for a visit to east Libya in the coming months.

 

In December 2021, a Libyan envoy headed by deputy speaker of Libyan parliament, Fawzi Al-Nuiri, visited Turkey. Similarly, a group of Turkish businessmen visited Benghazi to discuss investment opportunities and new projects in the region.

 

Crossroads

Saleh’s visit highlights a shift in the Turkey-Libya relations and could be summarised as follows:

 

1.    A new strategy on Libya:

Turkey's ambassador to Libya, Kenan Yilmaz, has indicated that Ankara looks at Libya as one unity, and it aims to mediate political stability among political factions by facilitating cross-party dialogue and agreement on a new constitution.

 

2.    Changing alliances:

Saleh’s visit to Ankara highlights a possible understanding between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, and interim PM of the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, an understanding that concerns Saleh and Ankara. Turkey’s trust in Dbeibeh has diminished in recent months, and Ankara might find its interests elsewhere.

 

Saleh’s visit reflects a change in cross-faction alliances in Libya, especially as rifts between him and Haftar surfaced following Bashagha’s failed attempt to enter Tripoli. Haftar, no longer in agreement with Saleh, has founded an alliance with Dbeibeh who could secure needed funds for the Libyan general, thus deepening the fracture between Haftar and Saleh.

 

3.    Saleh seeks Turkey’s support of Bashagha:

Libyan speaker of parliament is aiming to change Turkey’s long-held disengagement to counter the Dbeibeh-Haftar alliance. Saleh might be capitalising on Ankara’s differences with Haftar, and some observers argue he might be able to get Turkey to back Bashagha who enjoys support in both eastern and western regions, thus providing Turkey with access to the entire country.

 

To that end, Saleh with Turkey’s support has pushed armed groups in Tripoli to shift their alliance from Dbeibeh to Bashagha. Yet it remains to be seen whether his attempt has borne results.

 

4.    Turkey’s mediation:

Ankara is playing a role in ongoing negotiations between al-Mishri and Saleh to reach an agreement on political and constitutional roadmap, which explains al-Mishri’s trip to Ankara during Saleh’s visit. Although state media did not announce these meetings officially, observers believe they took place indeed, and that Turkish mediators are keen to mediate a sustainable agreement between the two Libyan parties. 

 

There remains speculation over the success of Turkey’s efforts amid endless transitional phase which threatens the stability of any long-term solution, and the risk of Libya’s security imploding in the western region. The situation also is exacerbated by the lack of a regional and international will to facilitate an exit of the current deadlock.

 

5.    Turkey’s gains in Libya:

Saleh’s rapprochement with Ankara may lead the way for Turkey’s economic investment in the eastern region. The two countries seem to be inching closer to resolving outstanding disputes over boarders, following on an agreement that was signed between Turkey and Government of National Accord in 2019. Ankara is urging the parliament to approve the new deal which would cement Turkey’s advantage on natural gas exploration in the Mediterranean.

 

What Next?

Saleh’s visit may produce two key breakthroughs in Turkey-Libya relations, outlined as follows:

 

1.    Cementing Turkey’s position in Libya:

Saleh’s visit presents an opportunity for Turkey to revive diplomatic and economic relations, through the re-opening of a Turkish consulate in Benghazi, and the resumption of air and naval traffic between the two countries. A Turkish business delegation soon is visiting Tobruk to explore new investment projects in eastern Libya.

 

Turkey also mediated a dialogue between fighting militias loyal to rival governments who were on the cusp of a civil war.  Observers note Turkey’s efforts may have been the catalyst of a surprise truce between rival militias who agreed on a cease fire beginning of July 27.

 

2.    Possible change in executive government:

Several reports have indicated that the recent meetings in Ankara explored the possibility of forming a new government alternative to current rivals. Reports have said the High Council of State and the parliament are discussing this option.

 

One possible scenario could be the forming of a new presidential council headed by Saleh, and a caretaker government lead by Al-Lafi that prepares for new elections. Yet another scenario might be the extension of Bashagha’s government until Libyan factions reach a consensus on a new government.

 

Other reports indicated that Turkey also is seeking to replicate the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum’s model to reach consensus on a new constitution that facilitates the formation of a new, functional executive government. These efforts, however, may have been unsuccessful, for the Libyan parliament has not agreed yet to forming a new government. 

 

In summary, uncertainly still mars Libya’s future. Libya’s fragile political scene and shifting alliances, combined with endless transitions on the ground, diminish hopes for an exit out of the current stalemate. Yet ongoing negotiations and talks across regional and international actors might bring about important changes to Libya’s political structure in near future.