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Continuous Complexity:

Possible Developments of the Political Crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan

25 ديسمبر، 2017


The crisis is aggravated at the political and security levels in Iraqi Kurdistan due to Kurdistan regional government’s (KRG) continued failure to address the fallout of the last referendum as well as its inability to dissuade Baghdad from its ongoing punitive policies to dash Iraqi Kurds’ independence dreams.

Revealing indications

A range of serious developments have taken place in recent days in Iraqi Kurdistan, the main indications of which are as follows: 

1- Mass protests have erupted in Sulaymaniyah and several other cities since 18 December, as people demand combating corruption and the dismissal of the government in Iraqi Kurdistan.  People are protesting against worsening living conditions and the delay in the disbursement of salaries for months. The protests led to casualties among the demonstrators, destruction of public property, facilities and party headquarters especially of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

In this context, it should be noted that Sulaymaniyah governorate is the bastion of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Movement for Change, the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), unlike Erbil and Dohuk governorates where the Democratic Party, headed by Massoud Barzani, has a dominant influence. The PUK and the Movement for Change have repeatedly threatened to turn Sulaymaniyah into an independent province if Erbil continues to marginalize it.

2- Withdrawal of the Movement for Change and Kurdistan Islamic Group from the Kurdistan government, in protest at the government’s failure to meet the demands of the demonstrators. Out of the 21 ministries comprising the regional government, the Movement for Change participates with four ministers (Finance, Trade, Peshmerga, Endowment and Religious Affairs), while Kurdistan Islamic Group participates with two ministers (Agriculture and Environment).

In this vein, the Prime Minister of the regional government, Nechirvan Barzani, said he can understand the reasons for the withdrawal of the Movement for Change from the government due to its previous conduct, but he cannot understand the withdrawal of Kurdistan Islamic Group and that the group should have an initial understanding of the situation.

3- Resignation of Yusuf Muhammad, leader of the Movement for Change from his position as a Speaker of the Parliament. In this regard, Media advisor to the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, Tariq Jawhar, announced that the Movement justified its withdrawal from the parliamentary presidency after the Speaker was barred from entering Erbil more than once. This was primarily due to the deep differences between the Movement and the Democratic Party. Jawhar also confirmed that a new Speaker for the Parliament would be chosen from Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union or the Islamic bloc.

Pressing factors

The state of insecurity, fluidity of the political situation and the current public anger in Kurdistan stem from a range of factors, the most important of which are: 

1- The sudden disappearance of the main Kurdish actors from the scene: The death of the leader of the Patriotic Union Party Jalal Talabani on October 3, as well as the resignation of the leader of the KDP Massoud Barzani on October 31, and thus their exit from the internal political equation, have created a state of confusion among the Kurds. Talabani was a leading figure that ensured rapid handling of the region’s crises, and negotiated with counterparts in the Democratic Party to contain the situation. Moreover, the vacancy of the Presidency of the region following the resignation of Barzani and the distribution of his powers between the government, parliament and the judiciary authority have led the three authorities to compete for those powers, which has in turn disrupted and diluted the presidential decrees.

2- Baghdad continues its punitive policy: The Iraqi government’s punitive measures against KRG continue to dash any future separatist ambitions of the Kurds, including air embargo, which costs $400,000 a day, continued economic embargo, as well as reducing the region’s share of the Iraqi public budget for the next year. In this context, Baghdad has tied lifting its current punitive measures to cancelling the results of the referendum, not simply freezing its results, as did Erbil.

3- The widening distrust gap between internal forces: The recent period has seen a clear turmoil in the relationship between Kurdish political forces, especially between the Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union Party. The clearest indicator is the accusations levelled by the Democratic Party against the Patriotic Union, security services and pro- peshmerga, which amounted to accusing them of great treason after the Iraqi army was able to take control, on October 16, over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and most of the disputed areas. The Democratic Party has formally blamed the Patriotic Union Party for the loss of Kirkuk.

4- The Movement for Change exploits the current situation: The Movement for change, which has consistently adopted counter-policies to those of the Democratic Party and has deep historical animosity with it, is exploiting the situation. The former has seen in the current crisis- for which it fundamentally blames the leaders of the Democratic Party for dashing the Kurdish dream of secession and independence- an opportunity to stir up the public opinion and incite against the Democratic Party. The Movement places the blame on the party’s leaders, as they have been in charge of the executive power since 2005, for corruption and the current administrative failure, in a manner that maximizes their political gains in the future.

5- Growing Iranian activity in the region: Nechirvan Barzani warned against what he described as hidden elements and entities (he did not elaborate) which try to create chaos by jumping on the bandwagon of protests, in reference to Barzani. Barazani implicitly meant the role played by Iran’s security services, which carry out suspicious activities in Sulaymaniyah, due to the geographical proximity with Iran and the existence of strong ties between Tehran and the Patriotic Union Party.

The fallout 

The current crisis in the region has negative impacts on a range of other issues, the most important of which are: 

1- Partial administrative paralysis: Some government departments have ceased to function because of the current unrest. The regional government and some government services are deficient in their work, which affect the delivery of daily services, and can cause total administrative breakdown if these conditions persist, especially amid increasing demands to stage strikes. 

2- Growing talk about the two administrative systems: The current political and security crisis is the gravest in the region since the end of the two administrative systems in the 1990s. There are growing fears among various political forces that this crisis might portend a return to the two administrative systems, especially after the failure of the referendum to secede from Baghdad.

3- Deeper politicization of internal security services: This is closely linked to the charges levelled by the Democratic Party against the security services in Sulaymaniyah, run by the Patriotic Union Party, of colluding with the Movement for Change, in addition to other illegal practices to disrupt the work of the government in Erbil. 

4- Greater vulnerability in the face of Baghdad: The increasing intensity of the internal conflict in Kurdistan plays into the hands of the Iraqi government, paving the way for Baghdad to impose its terms on the future relationship between the two sides.

In this context, the Iraqi prime minister, Haidar al-Abadi, has taken advantage of the current crisis, as evidenced by his threat to intervene to protect the protesters in Kurdistan from the local authorities. Also, he stressed that what is happening in Kurdistan is due to the wrong policies of the authorities there.

Troubled relationship

Therefore, it can be argued that the relationship between the internal actors in Kurdistan will be more strained in the coming period. The foggy scene in Kurdistan will continue until the dust settles regarding the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which will be held, according to the President of the regional government, within the next three months.

It is evident that the Movement for Change has largely withdrawn from the political process, following the exit of its ministers from the government and the post of parliament speaker. Over the coming period, the movement will most likely focus on rallying support and spearheading anti-government protests, to maximize its political gains in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

In addition, the Kurdistan regional government is in on the defensive internally and externally. Internally, it is unable to address the widespread protests and provide the daily life necessities of its population. Externally, it is failing to persuade the central government to resort to dialogue and recourse to negotiations.