Although Iran is trying to downplay the importance of the current spiraling protests in Basra, this does not negate that these developments have caused considerable concern for Iran, as they have numerous impacts on the ongoing efforts to bolster its influence in crisis-ridden countries. These developments come at a time when Tehran braces itself for the difficult strategic choices that it may face in the next period, particularly with the upcoming US sanctions reducing Iranian oil exports, if not completely halting it, after the 4th of November 2018, in parallel with the US moves to take actions to confront Tehran's interventions on the ground.

Thus, Iran will likely reconsider its strategy in Iraq, having realized that its influence over the past 15 years is facing tough choices, due to the recent political developments, especially after the last Iraqi parliamentary elections on 12 May 2018.

Numerous Signs 

The recent protests in Basra have revealed numerous signs of particular importance to Tehran: The first is that these protests, for the first time, have extended to the symbols of Iranian influence in Iraq, whether the Iranian consulate or the affiliated offices of the pro-Iran sectarian militias, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Badr Brigade, among others.

The attacks launched by protestors on the above-mentioned premises sends a clear message that Iran and its militias bear a large part of the responsibility for worsening living conditions in Basra, with the collapse of public infrastructure, lack of basic services such as water and electricity, education and health, as well as the rampant corruption in government institutions, which have not been able to deal positively with these problems.

In other words, the issue is no longer about Iran’s role in the electricity shortage crisis that the governorate has faced in recent months, though important, but it also about Iran’s role in draining the Iraqi treasury, through activities and moves that primarily align with its interests. 

Therefore, several estimates have come to the view that Iran’s attempts to exert pressure on Iraq, specifically the government of Haider al-Abadi- in recent months after the parliamentary elections- by fueling the electricity crisis, have backfired. They have put a spotlight on the negative effects of its influence over Iraq, on living conditions and infrastructure, as evident in the slogans raised by protestors, such as “Iran, out, out!”, in reference to the growing demand for an end to Iran’s influence over Iraq.

Apparently, Iran is aware of the extent of discontent in Iraq over its influence, prompting it to send Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, heading a high-ranking security-political delegation to Iraq, on September 5, to explore ways to protect Iranian interests in Iraq after being targeted by protestors, as well as summoning the Iraqi ambassador to protest the storming of its consulate in Mosul.

In addition, the Iranian rhetoric seems to be in harmony with the visions of its sectarian forces in dealing with these events, accusing “infiltrators” and “outside forces” of fueling protests, with the aim of diverting attention from the real causes that triggered the protests, the same mechanism Iran has followed in handling the internal protests which had erupted in the past period.

Upward Trend 

The second sign shows that these developments give particular relevance to the estimates that indicate that Iran’s political influence in Baghdad is on the wane, which is evident in many indicators. Indicators include the decline in the ranking of pro-Iranian political and sectarian forces in the parliamentary elections held on 12 May 2018, such as the Fatah alliance led by Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Brigade and the State of Law coalition led by Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, in favor of some forces that were keen to keep some distance, foremost among them Sairoon coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the Victory bloc led by the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Wisdom party, led by Ammar al-Hakim and the National Alliance led by Iyad Allawi.

This retreat was not only confined to the results, but it also extended to the factors which produced them. Iran has not yet succeeded in dictating its own vision of forming a government, although at the same time it is keen to put obstacles in the way of forming a government that is not dominated by the majority of its forces.

Hence, the relationship with Iran has been a major focus in the political screening in the Iraqi scene between two teams, each trying to form the new government by securing the largest bloc in parliament. However, this does not mean that there is a complete break between Iran and the forces that joined the axis that It includes Sairoon, Victory, Wisdom and the National alliance, as some of them are still eager to establish balanced relations with the latter.

What is remarkable is that both groups are trying to exploit the current protests in Basra to enhance their chances to win the ongoing race for the formation of the new government, as it is evident in the Fatah coalition’s demand that Haider al-Abadi steps down for failing to handle the protests.

Open Confrontation 

The third sign is that any developments that Iraq may witness, which do not conform to Tehran’s interests- such as the formation of a new government that does not include its allies or whose influence is diminished- will largely mean the success of the new strategy of US President Trump on Tehran. It is well known that the US strategy is designed to expand the confrontation with Iran to include, besides the nuclear deal, both the regional role, especially in crisis-ridden countries, and the ballistic missile program.

That may help explain the reasons for Iran’s swift criticism of the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, after his remarks on August 8, 2018, in which he declared his country’s commitment to the US sanctions on Iran, before he backtracks and indicates that Baghdad would only respect the dollar ban in transactions with Iran.

This show, according to several views in Iran, that the Iranian efforts to support some sectarian forces, similar to what happened during the reign of former president Saddam Hussein, are not tolerated. Iran hosted them before returning to Iraq after the fall of the Saddam and helped them seize power.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the political and security developments in Iraq will have a direct impact on the possible paths of open confrontation between Iran and the US, after the latter has made halting the former’s influence in the region a top priority.