The United Nations’ secretary general’s special adviser on Libya, Stephanie Williams, in closing remarks at a meeting of the Joint Committee between the Libyan House of Representatives and the High Council of State on Constitutional Track, held in Cairo from May 15 - 20, announced that both sides reached an initial consensus on 137 articles out of 179 making up a draft constitution prepared by the Constituent Assembly of Libya in July 2017. The agreement represents a significant development on Libya’s political landscape, despite the ongoing conflict between the two rival governments led by Fathi Bashagha and Abdel Hamid Dbeibeh.
Intertwined domestic contexts
At the second round of the meetings of the Joint Committee, hosted by Cairo, the two sides agreed on 70% of the draft constitutions, more specifically on articles on rights, freedoms and the state’s three authorities. The development comes amid several developments taking place in Libya. These can be outlined as follows.
1- Bashaga’s failure to enter Tripoli:
The announcement came days after a failed attempt by the head of the new Libyan government Fathi Bashaga to enter the capital city. The parliament-appointed prime minister was forced back out of the city by violent clashes between the troops loyal to his government, and rival troops loyal to the government led by Dbeibeh.
2- Dbeibeh’s intensified foreign movements:
Recently, Dbeibeh intensified efforts to mobilize support for staying in power until elections are held. The elections, however, appear to be undergoing a state of unseen postponement.
Dbeibeh a few weeks ago visited Algeria and was reportedly preparing for a visit to the United States to meet the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres. The real aim of his visit, however, is to reach agreements with Washington about its position on Libya’s rival parties.
3- A new French initiative:
French reports noted that an initiative led by Paris will be presented at a conference on Libya that will discuss a proposal to establish a federal state made up of the three regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan.
The reports also noted that a delegation led by former prime minister Ali Zedan is in Paris for the conference. The odds for the initiatives are slim, especially because a majority of Libya’s parties and some countries reject the proposed federal system.
Key implications
The previously mentioned developments reveal various key implications, which can be presented as follows:
1- Continued disagreements on the constitutional track:
Although the second round of the Cairo meetings achieved some progress, agreement about some 57 articles of the constitution are yet to be reached in a third round, expected to be held in June.
The deferred points represent the main pillar of disagreement between members of the Joint Committee, which means that there are still doubts as to whether reaching understandings is possible. The articles at issue revolve around a central state, powers of the president, as well as requirements that presidential candidates must meet to enter the race.
Intensified efforts are underway to achieve a breakthrough and resolve the issue on the constitutional track in the next round of talks, so as to present it to the House of Representatives and the Higher Council of State for approval, and later for a popular referendum.
2- Rapprochement between the House of Representatives and the Higher Council of State:
The agreements reached recently at the Cairo talks between the two bodies show that they are likely to resolve their disagreement. This may prompt some international powers to declare support for Bashaga’s government, a major source of concern for Dbeibeh who is likely to attempt making counter-arrangements.
Accordingly, reports have it that Speaker of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh made attempts to reach understandings with the head of the Higher Council of State Khalid al-Mishri. According to the reports, the attempts may have involved demands presented by al-Mishri, as prerequisites for backing Bashaga’s governments. These include some reshuffles to Bashaga’s current cabinet.
3- Efforts to back Bashaga:
Bashaga’s failure to enter the capital Tripoli may impact sources of his domestic and foreign support and boost support for Dbeibeh, especially if his visit to the United States proved to be a success.
Additionally, Algeria backs Dbeibeh’s government, especially after he recently managed to strike deals between General Electricity Company of Libya and the neighboring country’s National Company for Electricity and Gas on renewable energy. Another such agreement was signed between Libya’s National Oil Corporation and Algeria’s state-owned oil company Sonatrach.
On the other camp, Aguila Saleh is making movements to prop up Bashaga’s government, including his visit to Turkey to influence Ankara’s position and take advantage of its concern over declining support for Dbeibeh both at home and abroad, especially from the US over his role in blocking the elections scheduled in December 24 last year.
Maintaining existing alliances
Potential implications of the recent changes in Libya can be outlined as follows:
1- Reinforcing existing alliances:
The recent understandings reached between the House of Representatives and the Higher Council of State, as well as the anticipated visit of Speaker of the House Aquilla Saleh to Turkey, indicate attempts to maintain agreement between Libya’s eastern and western camps that was previously evidenced by electing Bashaga as prime minister.
This view becomes even more valid by several meetings held in the Moroccan city of Bouznika on May 24 between Libyan armed groups including the powerful Stability Support Apparatus, led by Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, also known as Ghneiwa, the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, led by Ayoub Abu Rass, the General Security Apparatus, led by Emad Al-Tarabelsi, as well as representatives of the commander of the Libyan National Army Khalifa Haftar.
According to some assessments, Haftar’s son, Belkacem, as well as members of Bashaga’s cabinet and members of the Libyan parliament are willing to participate. The participation reflects ongoing attempts to build on, and reinforce existing understandings between eastern and western Libya, which would reduce Bashaga’s influence.
In the other camp, Dbeibeh’s precautionary countermeasures feature a plan developed by his Minister of Interior Khaled Mazen to re-integrate armed militias in eastern Libya and impose controls on arms there. The move appears to be aimed at strengthening Dbeibeh’s influence in eastern Libya, and avoid a repeat of Bashaga’s attempt to enter the capital Tripoli or to secure support from armed militias operating there.
2- Failure to propose a new government formation:
Attempts are underway by domestic and foreign parties to reach agreement on forming a new Libyan government replacing the two rival governments, especially because the country is sliding into severe political divisions.
The idea was well-received by some internal parties, especially Khalid al-Mishri, as well as the head of the Libyan Presidential Council Mohamed al-Menfi, who in recent weeks proposed an initiative to form a small government led by him to replace the two rival governments led by Bashaga and Dbeibeh. However, the Libyan parliament reiterated its disapproval of forming a third small government and insisted on keeping Bashaga as head of the current government, which means the attempt has failed especially because the positions of international powers is still ambiguous.
In conclusion, despite the importance of agreements reached at the Cairo talks on the constitutional track, several issues persist as major challenges that have to be resolved in a third round of talks. Additionally, all Dbeibeh’s attempts to reinforce his domestic support base are still challenged by the House of Representatives, which insists on keeping Bashaga as the head of the Libyan government and rejects any other initiatives to form an alternative government replacing those led by Bashaga and Dbeibeh.
