The visit of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, on October 29th 2016, points out to a significant change in the European Union’s (EU) policy towards the regional crises in the Middle East, which have strong and direct repercussions on the interests and security of the states. It is of note that the nuclear agreement Iran reached with the P5+1 group on July 14th 2015 was not the only topic of conversation by European and Iranian officials during the visit. The Syrian issue, in particular, gained the attention of the two parties during the talks.
In fact, the repeated visits of European officials to Iran is of important significance, this significance being that reaching a nuclear agreement pushed the EU to engage in non-nuclear dialogues with Iran, in light of the EU’s increasing interest in the crises of the region. This engagement faces several tough challenges, similar to the continuing conflict over the nuclear agreement and the increasing accusations against Iran of supporting terrorism, in addition to the latter’s apparent eagerness to experiment on launching ballistic missiles and their insistence of support for the Syrian regime.
Several Interests:
The EU believes that engaging in non-nuclear talks with Iran could have many positive impacts:
1. Ensuring the continued application of the nuclear agreement: The EU gives special attention to the application of the nuclear agreement as it will help spare the Middle East a wide-range war due to the Iranian nuclear file, in light of the U.S. and Israel’s previous insistence to not allow Iran to reach the pre-nuclear-bomb production phase.
European states played an important role in efforts to reach a settlement of the nuclear crisis since its escalation in 2002. At the time, the UK, Germany, and France led the European Troika, which exerted unremitting efforts in this context.
After expanding the range of international forces participating in the dialogues with Iran, three European states, besides Germany, fiercely took part in the negotiations with Iran, which had significant results through the signing the Joint Plan of Action in November 2013, and ending with the nuclear agreement in July 2015.
Hence, the European forces’ current interest in seeking to eliminate the obstacles which still stand in the way of lifting international sanctions on Iran can be explained. The EU is particularly interested in the obstacles which prevent banking and financial transactions between the Iranian companies and banks on one side, and the European companies and banks on the other side, especially since the latter fear American sanctions in case signing deals with entities within Iran could be misinterpreted as supporting terrorism.
2. Solving the refugee crisis: the pressures imposed by the refugees crises on the European states economically, security-wise, and socially, have pushed these states to move towards activating participation in the efforts exerted to reach a settlement for the regional crises in the Middle East, particularly the Syrian crisis.
As per the European vision, one of the main ways in which Europe can be involved in solving these crises is for active participation in discussions from regional powers. This explains the eagerness of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, to launch an initiative for dialogue with these regional powers to support opportunities for agreement in order to start a political transitional operation in Syria, which could contribute to solving the nearly six year long crisis.
However, in this context, it is notable that Europe’s interest does not only focus on refugees from the Middle East but also extends to refugees hosted by some of the regional states on their lands, for example, Iran, which is located on the way from Afghanistan to Europe. The number of Afghani refugees is only second to Syrian refugees.
With this in mind, the European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management Christos Stylianides’ visit to Iran in October 2016 can be explained, as he announced that the EU will offer aid to Afghan refugees in Iran, amounting to €12.5 million.
3. Searching for a new energy alternative: Perhaps the EU is looking for a new alternative for crude oil and gas after the Ukrainian crisis imposed significant pressures on the EU due to Russian policy. Hence, Iran could be a potential alternative for transporting energy to Europe. Furthermore, due to Iran’s huge reserves of crude oil and gas, Europe may adopt an energy resources diversification policy, in order to avoid a crisis similar to that following the widening conflicts with Russia.
It is of note that, during his meeting with Mogherini, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani affirmed that Iran was capable of providing energy safely in the long run, especially since it was transformed, in his view, to a safe passageway for trade from Asia to Europe.
Different Obstacles:
This potential engagement in non-nuclear talks between Iran and the EU is going through many challenges, as the EU still shows concern for the human rights violations in Iran. In April 2016, this pushed the Council of the European Union to extend its sanctions imposed on 82 individuals and entities in Iran for a year.
It seems that this has pushed Iran to adopt a strict policy towards human rights, which was evident in its refusal to establish an office affiliated with the Council in Iran only two days prior to Mogherini’s visit. The Secretary of High Council for Human rights, Judiciary of Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad-Javad Larijani, said that the office is a nest of corruption, stating that, in Iran’s viewpoint, the problem of the office is that it will turn into a communication forum between the human rights activists and non-governmental organizations inside Iran. This had taken place prior to Iran’s reaffirmation that this issue was not tackled during Mogherini’s visit, which pointed out that there was some sort of disruption in the policy Iran adopted towards the EU.
Moreover, Iran’s persistence to carry out more experiments to launch ballistic missiles poses another tough challenge, especially since it indicates that Iran could breach the articles of the agreement, and that it would no longer be trusted to commit to international agreements.
In light of Iran’s fierce support for the Assad regime, it will not be possible to rely on Iran’s ability to take part in the efforts exerted to reach a settlement for the Syrian crisis. Through this alliance, Iran aims to boost its chances in regaining some of the areas which were recently under the control of the Syrian opposition.
Hence, it is notable that the EU, similar to other international forces, is not interested in Iran’s endeavors to form sectarian militias to support the Assad regime, or of its taking advantage of the Afghan refugees on its lands to build these militias. Iran builds these groups through forming what is called “Liwa Fatemiyoun.” The EU has no reaction to this at all, however it does follow up on the condition of Afghan refugees in Iran and, in this context, provides financial aid.
Moreover, Iran’s shift to being an alternative to Russia in terms of energy exports to Europe does not seem easy, mainly due to a lack of Iranian infrastructure that is able to transport gas to Europe, and Iran’s fear of a potential rise in tension with its relations with Russia, which will regard this step as an attempt to sway its own influence in the region.
In light of the above, it can be said that the endeavors of the EU to participate in efforts to settle regional crises in the Middle East will probably not achieve prominent results, at least in the short term, particularly in light of the lack of indications which consolidate the possibilities of reaching these settlements in the next period, in addition to Iran’s persistence to not make changes in the policies it adopts, which has resulted in the inadvertent escalation of these crises.
