Iran began preparing for a new electoral cycle in August 2023, with voters going to the polls to choose the Islamic Shura Council (parliament, whose 290 members are elected in a direct vote every four years) and the Assembly of Experts (which appoints and dismisses the Supreme Leader and consists of 88 members elected by direct popular vote for an eight-year term).

Despite the limited effect of these two councils on the Iranian regime's political decisions, both externally and internally, various elements combine to emphasize the relevance of this dual electoral right at present. This is particularly so given that the upcoming elections are the first since last year's widespread protests against the hijab law and the killing of Mahsa Amini during her detention by morality police, as well as the next elections after those that preceded them, in which the Iranian street refrained from participating in unprecedented numbers. 

The 2024 elections will put the Iranian regime to the test of balancing the fear of boycott, and thus, the rate of political participation will fall for the second time in a row, providing the opportunity for candidates of all groups, consequently facing the possibility of the return of the reformists. This is especially given the increasing criticism of the extremist movement and its accusation of monopolizing power in the country. 

The challenge of Iran's ruling regime in deciding on a precise approach to managing the upcoming electoral process coincides with a new and powerful determinant: Israel's war in Gaza. Given the significance of the Palestinian conflict on Iran's foreign policy agenda and Tehran's stance on it, this war dominates the milieu of election preparations. The reality is that, despite its declared position not to recognize Israel and its affirmation of the Palestinian resistance's legitimacy, Tehran is now pursuing a more pragmatic policy to preserve the gains made recently with the US through the prisoner exchange deal and the release of some Iranian assets frozen outside the country.

Their Views

Since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was launched against Israel on October 7, members of the Iranian Parliament have been active in both supporting it and condemning Israel's reaction with Operation "Iron Swords." This is despite Tehran's hasty denial of any connection to the Hamas movement's attack on Israeli settlements within Israel and its recent commitment to confirming that it has not yet intervened in the conflict, all while hinting that the continuation of the military operation in the Gaza Strip will result in the opening of new fronts in the region.

Iranian parliament members expanded their enthusiasm for backing the Palestinian side by scheduling sessions to address developments in the Gaza situation and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' handling of this issue. Amid the Iranian Parliament's support for Hamas and the Gaza Strip, a number of representatives requested to interrogate Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian about his stance on the war, describing him as "negligent." Mahmoud Abbaszadeh Meshkini, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Parliament, disclosed on November 14, 2023, that the parliament had started Abdullahian's interrogation process. He criticized the statements made by the diplomatic apparatus and noted that the tone had shifted from "threatening to wipe out Israel to talking about appeals to stop the war on the Gaza Strip." This request elicited opposing responses from those who supported it and those who opposed it on the grounds that interrogation at this time would divert attention away from efforts to end the Gaza war. 

This occurs at a time when the Iranian government is being increasingly criticized by the extremist wing of the conservative movement for signing the final statement of the Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh on November 11, which included the adoption of a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders —a stance that Iran rejected and continued to recognize Israel's existence. This caused Iran's Foreign Minister to clarify that the summit statement was approved following reservations about the Palestinian state's borders and the two-state solution.

Parallel to these criticisms of the Iranian government's position on the Gaza conflict, the reformist movement, which is excluded from the political scene, argues that the Iranian regime's views on the war reveal a contradiction: At a time when the regime is ignoring internal requests, it strives to resolve an external issue. This is what Sharq newspaper indicated in an article by writer Kourosh Ahmadi on November 7, in which he emphasized that the general sentiment among most Iranians these days toward what is happening in Gaza expresses a degree of indifference that cannot be denied, as the Iranian citizen finds himself confronted with a reality in which the government ignored his demands, leading him to not commit to issues concerning the regime. The author believed that the actual loser in the Gaza war was the Iranian regime itself, as the conflict exposed the differences between its internal demands and its foreign policy.

In this context, former Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif expressed the reformist movement's viewpoint at an early November meeting at the Iranian Bar Association, stressing that Iranians were tired of the costs of defending the Palestinian cause and the consequences of this support on their economic conditions. He emphasized that Tehran should not engage in a direct war with Israel or the United States and that the best way to defend the Palestinian people is to avoid giving the West an opportunity to promote the idea that "the Palestinian resistance is acting as an agent of Iran," in addition to not being led by extremists' increasing calls to engage in the war.

Election Campaigning

Both the reformist and conservative movements are attempting to capitalize on the Gaza conflict in order to enhance their positions in the upcoming Iranian elections. The reformist movement believes that the Iranian regime's contradictory position on this war, when compared to internal requirements, represents an opportunity for this movement to return to the political scene, even if it is still barred from state positions, and that an exclusionary policy is being implemented against it in the upcoming elections by rejecting its candidates. However, last year's protests in Iran provided an opportunity for the reformist movement to stir things up through its cadres' criticism of the government's strict stance on people's demands.

The platforms of the reformist movement, particularly the newspapers affiliated with it, also drew attention to the issue of the Guardian Council excluding opponents and removing candidates, which also prevented eight members of the current parliament from running in the upcoming elections due to their criticism of government policies. 

In this context, reformists argue that the current Iranian government is incapable of balancing the people's political and economic demands with its foreign agenda and that the cost of supporting regional parties has begun to burden the Iranian citizen, who now has two choices in the upcoming elections. The first option is to boycott the elections if the government's policy of eliminating critics and opponents, including the reform movement, continues. As a result, the Parliament will lose its credibility if political engagement falls again, as it did in the previous elections when the participation percentage did not reach 43%, setting a precedent that was the first of its kind. The second alternative is to aim to end the monopoly of one movement in the Iranian Parliament by backing opposition and reformist views if the Guardian Council allows them to run for office in the coming period.

The extremist movement, on the other hand, seeks to engage with a segment of the Iranian people on the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and the protection of the oppressed through the stance of most of its cadres that criticize the government's response to the Gaza war, as well as improve the image of the conservative movement. They also accuse people who feel that the Iranian street no longer cares about the Palestinian issue as much as it once did due to "treason and promoting lies," pointing to the protests held in response to Israel's attack on Gaza.

The conservative movement regards its support for the Palestinian cause in general, and the Gaza conflict in particular, as a significant addition to the image of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and a determinant that cannot be conceded in Iranian politics. The movement believes that retaining these constants and the accomplishments won during the past four years when it dominated every area of the Iranian state, will help him gain popularity.

Dual Obstacles

The adoption of Iran's position on the Gaza war by conservative and reformist currents runs against a variety of obstacles, including the following:

1. The reform movement is still subject to exclusion, which limits its role in mobilizing the Iranian street against the ruling regime's activities in general and against its cadres in particular. As a result, unless the boycott calls it is advocating in opposition to the monopoly of power and its domination over Parliament succeed, this movement will be unable to change the course of the electoral process. Given that the boycott is an attempt to demonstrate "civil resistance," in the words of imprisoned Iranian sociologist Saeed Madani, who, in a statement issued from Evin prison in mid-November, called for a boycott of the upcoming elections due to what he saw as a lack of minimum free electoral standards.

2. The conservative movement is caught between continuing the exclusion stance and repeating the scenario of the past elections. As a result, criticism of the movement grows, as does the potential of calls to boycott the 2024 elections or to give a degree of freedom that would allow reformists to return to Parliament and possibly the rest of the state institutions. Meanwhile, indicators of the Iranian public's disinterest in these elections and the selection of members of the next parliament are growing, as evidenced by the findings of an opinion poll conducted by the official government news agency, "IRNA," on July 25, which revealed that 68% of Iranians are dissatisfied with Parliament.

The Israeli war in Gaza has increased the difficulty and complexity of the upcoming Iranian elections, and this war will likely remain present in this electoral scene, given the conservative and reformist forces' attempts to use it to achieve domestic gains.