Following two years of (mostly secret) US-brokered negotiations, Israel and Lebanon finally reach an agreement to end a long-running dispute over their maritime border, opening the door to offshore energy exploration in the Mediterranean Sea, but several sticking points remain.
Yet analysts remain skeptical about the success prospects of the agreement, given the ongoing political turmoil in both countries. This November, Lebanon and Israel will see elections for a new government. Lebanese President Michel Aoun’s mandate concludes October 31st and what is expected is a presidential vacuum caused by a parliamentarian deadlock. On the other hand, in Israel, the upcoming elections could oust the current government and potentially lead to the return of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister, who have been outspokenly against the agreement, perpetuating a four-year political paralysis.
Fearing the agreement would fall over, Prime Minister Yair Lapid pushed through the Israeli divide to conclude a deal, but activist groups have submitted to the Knesset petitions to block Lapid’s deal. The High Court of Justice, however, rejected all petitions without providing details, clearing the path for the cabinet to approve the deal later this week. However, members of the Knesset promised they will work to cancel the agreement if they become part of the next government.
Besides protestation and uncertainty, analysts have questioned the motives and timing behind signing the deal. Why both sides chose to sign the agreement now and what are the mechanisms to enforce it? To what extent the US is reliable to uphold the agreement and mediate in future disputes over the demarcated areas? And does this agreement serve as a model for future dispute resolution and peacebuilding in the Arab-Israeli conflict?
Various Motives
The agreement has emerged from a historically complicated context, and it poses two key issues. First, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territories in 2000 did not include Shebaa Farms, a small strip that Israel captured from Syria during the six-day war. Israel still lays claim to Shebaa Farms, whereas Hezbollah declares that this region is a Lebanese territory, thus legitimising any attacks on Israel.
Second, Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon has grown exponentially over the past decades, being described as a ‘state within state’. Iran long before had major influence on Lebanese political scene via proxy militia like Hezbollah. Thus, in 2007 Lebanese government could not take advantage of international oil and gas companies exploring in the Mediterranean Sea off the shores of Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt, since Iran-influenced Hezbollah was against any agreement with Israel at the time.
Within this context, Lebanon could not take advantage of the potential gas fields lying under its territorial maritime. In 2020, Israel began exploring the Karish, a disputed natural gas reservoir. According to Israeli maps, the reservoir is part of an area nearly 860 to 1430 square mile; while Lebanon has claimed an economic exclusive zone, including Qana gas field, this dispute risked Israel having to stop its exploration in Karish, and Lebanon being unable to attract gas exploration company to survey Qana.
Yet an exceptional financial crisis in Lebanon has left little alternatives for Hezbollah but to let negotiations take their course, offering Lebanon an opportunity out of its economic crisis, or risk sacrificing its popularity. Iran, on the other hand, did not wish to get into another direct confrontation with the Biden administration, which has agreed to restart to revive the JCPOA.
For Israel, security and military intelligence supported a settlement with Lebanon over the maritime borders dispute, for it would facilitate a de-escalation with Hezbollah.
Mutual Hurdles
The political uncertainty faced by both countries pose great risk to the success of the agreement. Israel and Lebanon are currently governed by caretaker governments, which usually is concerned with performing some governmental duties and functions, not make strategic decision, which is left to a regular government. It follows from this that a number of challenges face Israel and Lebanon in realising the agreement, which may be summarised as follows:
1. In Israel:
The opposition maintains that Lapid’s government, negotiating sovereign Israeli territory, is in breach of Israel’s Basic Law, which mandates only a majority vote in the Knesset can rectify such agreement. Yet other legal experts argue against this view. They said Basic Law is only applicable to international agreements, whereas the triadic deal was not directly signed by the parties. Instead, the parties have agreed to US terms via official letters submitted to the United Nations. Therefore, the Israel-Lebanon deal does not constitute a bilateral agreement and falls out of the Knesset’s scope. Yet Lapid’s government said they were submitting the agreement to the Knesset for review – but not for its approval or rejection.
It remains unclear whether the deal would be affected if the Knesset disputes the agreement, specifically that a new parliament will be voted. At any rate, protestations don’t seem to be slowing down. Benjamin Netanyahu, the former PM, will continue to challenge the deal, at least politically. Yet both security and military institutions in Israel support the deal – until the new elections, at least.
2. In Lebanon:
Political obstacles seem less challenging. Facing unprecedent economic crises, either Hezbollah or their opposition are reluctant to stand in the way of any hope for the Lebanese people out of the situation. However, doubt looms over Lebanon’s share of the deal as recent reports have revealed Qana’s reserves are commercially not very promising. Frustration is growing within the Lebanese public, and the economic viability of Lebanon’s gas reserves are questioned.
On the other hand, Lapid has responded to his critiques by claiming that Israel would be able to claim at least 17% of Qana’s revenue, and that Karish would start operation straightaway, promising Israel billions of dollars in revenue in the coming years. Such statements by the Israeli government have raised serious doubts about how soon Lebanon could profit from its fields.
Hezbollah’s Stance
Secretary-general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, has referred to the deal as ‘talks’ of the sort carried with parties that do not recognise Israel, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. As such, he has implied that the deal is non-binding for Hezbollah, and Israel continues to be an enemy, reserving the Iran-backed militia’s “right to resistance against Israel”. He has warned in recent televised speech that the deal does not mean normalising with Israel.
Israel understands the underlying undertone of Nasrallah’s discourse. Hezbollah could end the agreement similar to previous cease fire deals in the past. Howeer, Israeli analysts claim that this deal would be different, as Hezbollah would not be willing to risk upsetting the Lebanese people who are hoping the energy deal would lift Lebanon out of its economic crisis.
It would be difficult for Hezbollah, moreover, to prevent Lebanese officials from meeting with Israeli counterparts under this deal. Not being part of such meetings would create a blind spot for Hezbollah, leaving them at a disadvantage.
Put to the Test
The Israel-Lebanon energy deal is test to the ‘economic peace’ hypothesis. Israel had tried to use it with the Palestinians in the past through granting economic concessions as an alternative to the political stalemate as a mean to reduce mutual violence between both sides.
Thus, this agreement could be an appealing model for maintaining economic peace that transcends ideological differences, which can later be applied to the Palestinian case.
