On October 13, US President Donald Trump announced his decertification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), citing Iran’s violation of the accord’s “spirit”, and laid out his strategy for countering Tehran’s expanding influence more aggressively.[i] Yet without unilaterally scrapping the JCPOA, Trump told Congress and US allies in the P5+1 that they must ‘fix’ the accord by imposing more stringent constraints on Iran. If they fail to do so, the US president is threatening to “terminate” the agreement.[ii] Due to Trump’s decertification decision, which constitutes the gravest action against the JCPOA’s legitimacy since its passage, and the Treasury Department’s new sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), US-Iran relations have entered a new phase marked by more confrontation and less diplomacy. The implications for the Middle East’s security landscape will be significant with the specter of direct confrontation between the US and Iran, in addition to substantial increase of the arms' race between key Middle Eastern states.

Iran’s Stance

If the US unilaterally walks out of the JCPOA, Iran would likely see the costs of complying with the JCPOA as outweighing the benefits. Under such a scenario, Iran could also possibly join North Korea in being the only other country to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[iii] Although President Hassan Rouhani responded to Trump’s speech maintaining that Iran would continue adhering to the JCPOA regardless of Washington’s moves, he warned that Tehran would only remain compliant with the accord if the other signatories do so too.[iv] On October 18, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, vowed to tear the JCPOA to shreds if the US abandons the agreement.[v]

If Iran would no longer be a party to the JCPOA and/or NPT, the Iranians would attempt to enrich uranium without being committed to the treaty's constraints. Some scholars argue that if Iran persists on its endeavor to become a nuclear state, along with its interventionist policies in the region, some Arab states may consider developing nuclear capabilities as a form of deterrence, fueling a nuclear arms race in the region.

Washington’s Internal Dynamics

The risks of regional instability heightening from Iran having free reign to enrich more uranium have largely contributed to disagreement within Trump’s administration. Secretaries of Defense and State, James Mattis and Rex Tillerson, warned against abandoning the JCPOA without any evidence of Iran’s violations of any of the accord's technical terms, of which there is none according to the International Atomic Agency and US and Israeli intelligence agencies.[vi]^, [vii]^, [viii]^{, [ix]} From Mattis and Tillerson’s vantage point, while Washington and its allies should hawkishly counter Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East, it is better to address the Iranian menace through policies that do not threaten to unravel the JCPOA.

Yet those in Washington who support Trump in weakening the JCPOA, and possibly soon terminating the accord, argue that threatening the future of the nuclear agreement offers America more leverage over Iran with respect to non-nuclear issues including Tehran’s missile testing and its support for the Syrian regime and various non-state actors in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

With Trump shifting the JCPOA’s fate to the US Congress, American lawmakers will have the authority to unravel the accord. Trump has urged Congress to establish “trigger points” by December 12 that could automatically reimpose sanctions on Tehran should the Iranians not comply with the new constraints imposed unilaterally by Washington. Yet according to the European Union’s chief diplomat, Federica Mogherini, the US Congress intends to ensure Washington’s compliance with the JCPOA despite the president’s position.[x] Although each Republican member of the Republican-controlled Congress opposed the JCPOA, now that the accord has been implemented and receives staunch support from Washington’s Western allies – in addition to China and Russia - American lawmakers from Trump’s party are indicating that in the interest of preserving the US’ credibility on the international stage. Accordingly, they are likely going to push for foreign policy initiatives to challenge Tehran more aggressively throughout the Middle East without unravelling the JCPOA.

Iran’s Domestic and Foreign Outlook

Odds are good that Trump’s policies vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic will further backfire against his administration’s interests in empowering Iran’s reformists. In June, Tillerson implied that the US was in favor of regime change in Tehran, stating that supporting “elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government” was the administration’s policy.[xi] Yet Trump’s increasingly anti-Iranian foreign policy is strengthening the IRGC’s prestige and legitimacy among Iranians across the country’s political spectrum. Consequently, the Iranian regime has capitalized on growing nationalism as more citizens of the Islamic Republic have rallied around the flag, ultimately undermining the Iranians seeking to democratize their country’s political system and embrace more Western influence.[xii]

New sanctions on Iran, especially nuclear ones, would increase Tehran’s hostility toward the US and result in a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East. The unravelling of the JCPOA would empower those in Iran who have argued that engaging Washington diplomatically is counter-productive, and weaken arguments of “moderates” in Tehran who seek more compromise with the United States in the future.

Last month, the IRGC commander warned that Tehran would respond to new sanctions with more missile tests and expansion of its arsenal, which could target America’s military bases and personnel in countries near Iran. Unquestionably, officials in Tehran are keen on avoiding a war with America and the JCPOA’s unraveling is unlikely to push Iran toward starting one with the US, yet the Islamic Republic may begin conducting a foreign policy in the Arabian Gulf that bears certain features of notably similarity to North Korea’s conduct in Northeast Asia. Within this context, the Trump administration would probably fail to work in tandem with Iran in the war against ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and perhaps elsewhere, as the US military did under Obama albeit unofficially so.

In sum, due to the Trump administration’s plans to confront expanded and consolidated Iranian influence in the Middle East more aggressively, there is a high probability that instability throughout regional hotspots from the Levant to Yemen and Bahrain to Afghanistan will intensify. Although there is no indication that either the Trump administration or Iran’s regime seek an all-out US-Iran war, the risks of such a scenario are heightened as the White House has abandoned the Obama administration’s efforts to ease tension in Washington’s relationship with the Islamic Republic.

* Dr. Theodore Karasik is the senior advisor at Gulf State Analytics (@GulfStateAnalyt), a Washington, DC-based geopolitical consultancy.

Mr. Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.