Under the rule of President Vladimir Putin, Russia has sought to enhance its role and impact in the conflict areas of the Middle East, via enacting a strategy of seeking allies. This strategy entails making alliances, reaching accords and signing agreements, as Moscow seeks to establish itself among the elites in certain Middle Eastern countries and gain their trust. Such a policy is a reflection of the Russian elites’ view on Russian national interests as they relate to military intervention in internal conflicts. The policy is not a potential return to the Russian imperialism of old, in lieu of Russia’s economic blunders and its lack of scientific and technological accomplishments as compared with the West.
Reflecting Indicators:
Moscow’s vision is centered upon strategically prioritizing the Middle East, which constitutes an important pivot for potential power projection by any international power, be it American or European or Asian. Russia’s military capacities enable it to participate in shaping the new map of the Middle East. A package of indicators of Russia’s Middle Eastern strategy has come to light, and can be summarized as follows:
1- Offensive involvement in the Syrian crisis: the Syrian military was severely exhausted after six years of conflict with the armed opposition and the Islamic State, especially in light of the military’s failure to gather large numbers of new recruits. This prompted Russia to escalate its military involvement, in a manner that contributed to the Syrian army’s re-conquest of vital areas and cities, such as Aleppo.
As per the security agreements between Moscow and Damascus, Russian forces are permanently stationed on Syrian territory, specifically in the port of Tartus and the airbase of Khmeimim, the latter being one of the most important centers for Russian command and influence in the region. In light of this, it can be said that direct Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, especially in the battle for Aleppo, has clearly revealed Moscow’s intention to defend its interests not only in Syria, but the entire Mediterranean basin.
It is clear that Syria holds vital importance for the high strategic interests of Russia as compared with any other Middle Eastern state, which has prompted the Russians not only to take interest in the military dimension of the conflict, but also the transitional arrangements towards a resolution. Russian president Vladimir Putin confirmed, in a statement to the press on the eve of his visit to Tokyo on December 16th 2016, that the liberation of Aleppo is the beginning of a new truce throughout all of Syria. This would indicate that Russia is attempting to impose a peace that conforms to its strategic vision.
Intelligence Alliance:
2- Regaining influence over events in Libya: Russian intervention in Libya cannot be expected to match its intervention in Syria. Russian influence in Libya evaporated after the fall of the Qaddafi regime, after Western states backed by the Arab League militarily participated in overthrowing it in 2011. This overthrow impacted Moscow’s economic interests, as the new authorities in Libya sought to renew the contracts signed between Qaddafi and Western companies, while not following suit for Russian companies.
In that context, Russia has sought to revitalize its role in Libya, which was apparent in Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s visiting Moscow twice during 2016, as the Libyan National Army simultaneously expanded its control over larger swaths of Libyan territory. Many reports stated that the Libyan army will require Russian backing, should the United Nations at some point in the future decide to lift the arms embargo. A number of Russian military technical experts visited Cyrenaica in Libya in November 2016 in an attempt to renovate the Libyan military and renew its weapons systems, as well as improve its naval and air defenses. In addition, Aguila Saleh, the head of the Libyan House of Representatives, met with the Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense, as well as the Russian national security advisor a few weeks ago.
In an interview with the London-based al-Hayat newspaper on December 17th, 2016, Aguila Saleh welcomed the expansion of Russia’s role in Libya, so long as it didn’t lead to a Russian military base on Libyan soil. According to Moscow’s declared policies, the Russians support the political solutions reached by the parties involved in the Libyan conflict. Russia claims it will respect political legitimacy and not recognize any government held in contempt by the parliament, nor recognize any political accord that is not accompanied by an amendment to the Libyan constitution and steps to unify all Libyans in confronting the terrorist organizations running rampant across the country.
In the interview with al-Hayat Saleh also stated that Russia has a desire to create a real understanding between the Libyans, and to prevent foreign intervention in Libya in order for the Libyan people to choose their rulers and solve their problems on their own, with the role of the international community being restricted to providing assistance. Saleh emphasized that there can be no military bases for Russia or any other country on Libyan land, and that a foreign military presenceis unacceptable. According to him, what may be required of Russia is logistical support and providing expertise in the field of training and organization and other such matters.
3- Early signs of expanding Russian influence in Iraq: There have been indications of the expansion of Russian military influence in Iraq throughout 2015 and 2016. This was especially true after Russia’s intelligence alliance with Iraq, Iran and Syria through establishing an intelligence center in Baghdad to combat the threat of terrorist organizations, especially the Islamic State. The intelligence center includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the aforementioned countries’ militaries.
Moscow’s actions stem from a realization that Iraq and Syria represent traditional spheres of Russian influence, which allows for Russian planes carrying weapons to Syria to pass through Iraqi airspace. A Russian delegation, the largest in years, visited Iraq in February of 2016, and pledged to offer more weapons and assistance to the Baghdad government.
The Partially Open Door:
4- Neutrality in the Yemeni conflict: It is clear that Russia is not involving itself in the crisis in Yemen, despite historic relations between the two, given that the weapons of the Yemeni military were Russian at one point. Moscow is avoiding engagement in the Yemeni ‘swamp’, especially when considering that Russia is not the main player in that country. Moscow is satisfied at present with calling for a peaceful transition of power.
Russia doubtlessly has interests in Yemen as it does in Syria, yet it prefers not to involve itself in more Middle Eastern conflicts. Russia’s intervention in Syria was at the request of the Assad regime, the legitimate Syrian government as per international law, whereas the case in Yemen is different. The Houthi rebels in alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh are not internationally recognized, but rather considered a rebellion against the constitutionally legitimate government. Russia also believes that the Yemeni crisis is not permanent and will wind down eventually, and sees that Russian involvement may actually broaden its scope.
In this context, much of the literature sees Russia as being two-faced in its approach to Yemen, with the official statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry contradicting Russian behavior in the field. It must be taken into account that Moscow abstained from voting on Security Council Resolution 2216.
In a later phase, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called for all sides in Yemen to avoid any unilateral actions, in response to the Houthis and Saleh declaring that they formed a government the previous November. The Russian Foreign Ministry received a Houthi delegation on December 14th, 2016, headed by Mohamed Abdul Salam, the head of the Houthi delegation during the Kuwait peace talks. Moscow appears to be dealing with Yemen in a dualistic manner, backing constitutional legitimacy while simultaneously utilizing the insurgency for its own geopolitical interests.
There are numerous factors pointing to a growing role for Russia in Middle Eastern conflicts, the most prominent being:
Fighting In Retreat:
1- The American withdrawal from the region: The strategic inclinations and field movements of the United States under President Barack Obama indicate that Washington prefers to avoid crisis zones throughout the world, including the Middle East. This is largely due to the negative ramifications of George W. Bush’s interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially their high human and material costs, and the reverse effect these interventions had in strengthening terrorist groups rather than weakening them.
Thusly, the belief became widespread among Middle Eastern elites that the United States was no longer capable of protecting its allies or exerting influence in regional crises. Such a scenario creates a regional strategic vacuum, which would dictate that an international power like Russia would fill that void or re-assert its Cold War status as a challenger to the United States. As American influence gradually wanes, Moscow is seeking to establish multilateral relations, as do many of the Middle East’s regional power centers.
A New Chechnya:
2- The fragility of the Middle East: The Middle East region is highly fragile, and Moscow does not require any extra effort in order to impose its influence and gain a military foothold in that region. Yet there is a fear among the ruling elites in Moscow that the absence of state power creates a vacuum which will be filled by a “Jihadist tsunami”, a tsunami which may be amplified should Islamists take power in Syria if the Russians fail to militarily intervene.
Such a vacuum may have regional ramifications, the most significant of which is the creation of a “new Chechnya” which might ignite the situation in the Caucuses, a region of which Muslims make up 20% of the population. Putin’s vision is to prevent an Islamist Jihadist regime taking over Syria, an action which he sees as a direct defense of Russian national security. Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Moscow-based think tank the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy stated more than once that the Middle East is the main stage on which to signal the end of Russia’s absence as a major power on the international arena.
Copying Models:
3- Confronting tans-border terrorist organizations: Given that the main Middle Eastern states are structurally fighting not simply to properly function but to survive, Moscow sees that it must enter into strategic alliances with countries like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, with a goal to confront armed groups and terrorist organizations. Such groups pose a danger not only to individual states but now threaten the entire region, and the Islamic State has come to pose such a threat to Russian national security.
In this context, Russia’s defense of the Assad regime isn’t simply motivated by fears of its collapse or replacement, but rather the chaos that will spread after its fall. This is especially true given the decentralization of control of borders in the region, and the multiplicity of armed violent non-state actors, which have become more akin to parallel armies of considerable numbers based in strategic areas.
Direct Ramifications:
It is possible that Russia’s involvement in the Middle East will bring losses which cannot seem inconsequential to Russian eyes. Russia has been subjected to escalating terrorist attacks, the most dramatic example being the assassination of Russian ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov on December 19th, 2016. His assassination occurred after the conclusion of the battle for Aleppo and one day before the holding of a major conference on Syria in Moscow, between Russia Iran and Turkey. The assassination indicates a targeting of Russian interests abroad.
Russia’s Federal Security Service declared on December 15th of the same year that it had thwarted a plot to carry out a series of explosions in Moscow. The plot was apparently hatched by a cell loyal to the Islamic State, in direct coordination with an Islamic State leader residing in Turkey. The Federal Security Service arrested three citizens from Tajikistan and a fourth from Moldova. Locally produced bombs of a high explosive capacity were confiscated, as well as a number of machine guns and large amounts of highly explosive material. This led President Putin to call on the institutions of the state to enhance Russian security procedures both internally and externally.
Regaining Authority:
In summary, it is likely that Russian power in the Middle East will increase in the course of the current crises, therefore contributing to Russia’s image as a great power, as demonstrated by specific indicators and overarching motivators. This is primarily through armed means, followed by trade and energy. Moscow now sees the Middle East as a stage in which to confront American power, thus emphasizing Russia’s status as both a Middle Eastern and global power simultaneously.
